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The credit rating agencies (hereafter CRAs) plays a significant role in the financial market 
but they were criticized for failing to accurately reflect the default risks of bonds, especially 
in structured finance, which exacerbated the global financial crisis of 2007–8, or even 
resulted in the financial disruptions throughout the entire financial market in two respects: 
the over-reliance on credit ratings and the low rating quality. Against this background, this 
thesis is designed to identify the issues that cause such big rating failures and analyse the 
effectiveness of the existing regulations against such issues. More importantly, having 
illustrated the issues and regulations, this thesis puts forward some suggestions to the current 
regulatory frameworks. 
 
This thesis analyses the issues form both external and internal perspectives. From an external 
perspective, the market and regulatory over-reliance on the credit ratings strengthen the 
interconnections among the financial institutions and intermediaries in the financial market, 
which exacerbates the liquidity risk and systemic risk stemming from the rating downgrades, 
especially during the financial crisis. From an internal perspective, three issues that affect 
the accuracy of credit ratings and the independency of CRAs include the conflict of interest, 
the oligopolies market structure and the civil liability for CRAs. Firstly, the conflict of 
interest provides incentives for CRAs to provide inflated rating services. Secondly, when the 
oligopolistic members are aware of their dominant market status, they lack motivations to 
update rating models and methodologies. Thirdly, it analyses whether or not civil liability is 
an effective approach to deter CRAs from their low rating quality.  This thesis adopts a 
comparative approach between the European Union, United States and China. In order to 
provide a better understanding for the different problems with respect to the issues 
mentioned above and the different jurisdictions in these three regions, it first introduces the 
respective evolution of CRAs in these three areas respectively. It then examines the 
effectiveness of their various regulatory approaches to each issue as mentioned above.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Credit ratings are published by credit rating agencies (hereafter ‘CRAs’) and used by 
investors to assess the default rates of bonds. Credit ratings are utilized to reduce the 
information asymmetry between investors and bonds so that investors can make investment 
decisions. However, during the global financial crisis of 2007–8 (also hereafter ‘global 
financial crisis’ or ‘financial crisis’), CRAs were criticized for failing to accurately reflect 
the default risks of bonds, especially in structured finance, which exacerbated the financial 
crisis, or even resulted in the financial disruptions throughout the entire financial market in 
two respects: the over-reliance on credit ratings and the low rating quality. Against this 
background, this thesis is mainly designed to answer the following questions: (i) What are 
the main issues caused such a big rating failure during the financial crisis? (ii) Are there 
regulations in place to cope with these issues? Do these regulations achieve their goals? If 
so, how; if not, why? (iii) To what extent do the regulatory approaches to the problems differ 
in the European Union, United States and China? What are the possible reform proposals for 
improving the existing regulations?  
 
In order to answer the first research question, four issues that led to the big rating failure are 
analysed in this thesis, (i) the over-reliance on credit ratings, (ii) the conflict of interest, (iii) 
the oligopolistic market structure in the rating industry and (iv) the civil liability for CRAs, 
which are discussed in Chapters 3 to 6 respectively. From an external perspective, markets 
and regulators overly rely on credit ratings, which directly strengthens the interconnections 
among the financial institutions and intermediaries in the financial market, and further 
exacerbates the liquidity risk and systemic risk stemming from the rating downgrades, 
especially during the financial crisis. Chapter 3 aims to explain why the over-reliance on 
credit ratings does have such a big influence on the financial market. From an internal 
perspective, inaccuracy of credit ratings constitutes another reason for the rating failure 
during the financial crisis. In this thesis, the issues that affect the accuracy of credit ratings 
and the independence of CRAs are conflicts of interest, oligopoly and the civil liability for 
CRAs. Chapter 4 aims to address what the conflicts of interest are with which CRAs are 
faced, and how they are motivated by these conflicts to provide numerous rating services 
regardless of their rating quality. Chapter 5 focuses on the negative influence of the 
oligopolistic market in the rating industry on the rating quality. Chapter 6 aims to examine 
whether or not the current civil liability regimes for CRAs in the European Union, United 
Sates and China effectively deter CRAs from issuing inaccurate ratings that, to some extent, 




are designed to explain the external and internal reasons for rating failure in the financial 
crisis. 
 
In order to answer the second research question, in each chapter (Chapters 3 to 6), the 
existing regulations respectively targeted at the issues in the European Union, United States 
and China as mentioned above will be introduced first. In addition, having demonstrated the 
effectiveness and implementation of these regulations, the advantages and challenges of 
these regulations will also be discussed. In terms of the third research question, considering 
the different challenges of the existing regulations in each jurisdiction, Chapters 3 to 6 
analyse the regulatory approaches and the possible solutions. Furthermore, this thesis 
attempts to provide some reform proposals to further improve the current regulatory 
frameworks. To better understand the various problems with respect to the issues listed 
above and the different jurisdictions in the European Union, United States and China, 
Chapter 2 introduces the evolution of CRAs and the relevant regulatory systems in the three 
regions, and different impacts of rating failures during the financial crisis on these areas. 
This chapter serves to provide a wider social context in which, and factors that resulted in, 
the emergence and development of CRAs. More importantly, from a historical perspective, 
this also explains why these areas have the different regulatory approaches to each of the 
same issues mentioned. 
  
Throughout the thesis, a comparative approach between the European Union, United States 
and China is adopted. Even though the CRAs in the three regions are different in terms of 
economic environment, legislative system and development of the credit rating industry, 
they are faced with the same issues as mentioned above. This constitutes the basis of the 
comparative analysis in the thesis. In terms of the first research question, it demonstrates 
how specific problems relating to CRA issues in the three areas are different. While 
discussing the latter two questions, it discusses what the different challenges faced by the 
three areas are, and why the regulatory approaches regarding these challenges differ in each 
region. In addition, Chapter 2 adopts a retrospective study to take stock of the evolution of 
CRAs in the three areas. Apart from that, for the US civil liability regime of CRAs, in 
Chapter 6, the case law is concentrated on more so as to better address each obstacle against 
establishing civil liability for CRAs on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Chapter 2 aims to address why the CRA issues faced by the European Union, United States 
and China are different, as well as why the three areas carry out different regulatory strategies 




be regarded as a financial intermediary, and the bond market is the underlying market. The 
chapter first addresses the impact of bond market evolution on the development of CRAs. 
Next, it discusses the relationships between the evolution of CRAs and the development of 
their underlying bond markets. Chapter 2 also compares the various impacts of the financial 
crisis on the European Union, United States and China. In addition, it introduces the 
regulatory regimes in the three regions, which lays a foundation for better analysing the 
influences, which vary in degree, on the subsequent regulatory approaches related to CRAs. 
 
Chapter 3 tries to address why the credit ratings are so important for regulators and financial 
institutions, and how CRAs have such a huge influence on the financial system. It first 
addresses the widespread use of credit ratings in legislation, regulation and supervisory 
policies. Then, it discusses a series of influences caused by rating downgrades and how the 
over-reliance exacerbated these negative impacts on the financial market. To cope with these 
negative impacts, the European Union, United States and China carry out various regulatory 
approaches against over-reliance. It then analyses to what extent these regulatory approaches 
and their implementations are effective.  
 
Chapter 4 aims to answer the two questions: (i) how do the conflicts of interest within the 
credit rating industry affect the rating quality; (ii) how can we improve the rating quality in 
this respect? Conflicts of interest in relation to credit rating arise in a situation where an 
agency or agency employees have the necessary incentives to compromise their integrity for 
personal gain during a rating activity.1 Such conflicts create various incentives for CRAs 
and, consequently, they are more likely to integrate a laissez-faire attitude which finds in 
favour of their customers, especially under the issuer-pays model. At first, the chapter 
introduces the main conflicts of interest at the individual level and the countermeasures 
against these conflicts in the European Union, United States and China respectively, ranging 
from corporate governance to regulations. Next, conflicts at the agency level include rating 
shopping and ancillary service, which are more difficult to manage. While discussing the 
existing regulations and internal controls against these conflicts in the European Union, 
United States and China, the thesis addresses the challenges in coping with the ancillary 
services and rating shopping. In order to better manage the conflicts of interests, some 
researchers provide reform proposals associated with the business model. Having 
demonstrated the advantages and challenges of these reform proposals, a proposal with 
 
1 Cristian Marzavan and Tănase Stamule, ‘Conflicts of Interest’s Management within Credit Rating Agencies’ 




respect to the prohibition on structured finance will be discussed, based on the observation 
that credit ratings related to structured financial products seem more obviously inaccurate 
compared to the rating in corporate bonds.  
 
Chapter 5 attempts to address the negative impacts of oligopoly on the CRA industry and 
regulation. The credit rating market could be defined as an oligopoly of the ‘big three’2. In 
such a market, the big three lack incentives to improve the accuracy of credit ratings, and 
the oligopoly becomes a regulatory hurdle to making CRAs behave well. To deal with 
oligopoly, one of the common regulatory strategies is to enhance competition. The chapter 
then analyses the effectiveness of the relevant regulations in the European Union, United 
States and China, and puts forward a reform proposal to make the CRAs behave better.  
 
Chapter 6 mainly analyses whether or not civil liability regime is an effective approach to 
deter CRAs from their low rating quality. This chapter introduces the civil liability regimes 
for CRAs in the European Union, United States and China, and addresses the main obstacles 
in establishing civil liability for the respective CRAs in these three areas. In addition, it also 
aims to compare the effectiveness of public enforcement, such as reports and monetary 
penalty, and private actions. As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, structured finance 
provides sufficient motivation for CRAs to provide inflated ratings and the oligopoly further 
weakens the reputational cost for CRAs when they provide low-quality rating services. In 
order to create a new incentive for CRAs that motivate them to improve or deter them from 
improving their rating quality, civil liability for CRAs became a new regulatory focus post 
the financial crisis. On the one hand, many market participants suffered numerous losses for 
inflated or even inaccurate ratings during the financial crisis, but few investors with 
contractual relationships could claim damages against CRAs. This gave rise to a discussion 
as to whether or not it is necessary to establish civil liability for CRAs as a gatekeeper or an 
expert. On the other hand, following the financial crisis, the regulators aimed to rebuild 
market confidence in credit ratings by integrating a civil liability regime for CRAs into the 
regulatory framework, based on the principle that civil liability can be regarded as a deterrent 
for the inaccurate ratings. 
 
The aim of this thesis lies in exploring the rationales for, and weaknesses in, the current 
regulations for CRAs in the European Union, United States and China from a comparative 
 
2 The ‘big three’ are Standard & Poor's (hereafter ‘S&P’), Moody's Investment Service (hereafter ‘Moody’s’), 




approach, and putting forward some viable reform proposals for the existing regulatory 





Chapter 2: The Evolution and Regulatory Regimes of Credit Rating Agencies  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
To better understand that the demand for the amelioration of information asymmetry created 
CRAs, it must first be explained what creates the information asymmetry. There are two 
basic participants in the financial market, namely (i) a lender and (ii) a borrower.1 The 
optimal circumstance is that a lender lends surplus funds to an investment borrower who has 
a shortage of funds, and both lender and borrower will enjoy the returns, provided that flow 
of funds can be transferred efficiently from lender to borrower.2 However, the borrower has 
more business information about the borrowing firm than the lender and the borrower does 
not disclose the some of the relevant information on purpose so as to gain an investment 
from the lender.3 This gives a rise to information asymmetry. Bringing the scope of analysis 
back to the United States, at the beginning of the twentieth century, faced with a large 
number of choices in the corporate bond market, investors (lenders) needed urgently to break 
the information asymmetry, and the market needed an intermediary to ensure the smooth 
flows of funds between lenders and borrowers. As a result, CRAs fulfilled the role.4  
 
CRAs can be generally defined as companies that offer professional assessment regarding 
the credit capacity of the debtor.5 That assessment, namely credit rating, is ‘an opinion 
regarding of the creditworthiness of an entity, a credit commitment, a debt or debt-like 
security or issuer of such obligations, expressed using an established and defined ranking 
system…credit ratings are not recommendations to purchase, sell or hold any security’.6 As 
Kronwald stated, credit rating is ‘an evaluation of the credit risk of a prospective debtor’, 
which is used to not only assess debtors’ ability to pay back the debt, but also predict 
probability of the debtor defaulting.7 High rating generally means less risk of default by the 
 
1 Frederic S. Mishkin and Stanley G. Eakins, Financial Markets and Institutions (Eighth global, Pearson 2016) 
36. 
2 Nan S. Ellis, Lisa M. Fairchild and Frank D’Souza, ‘Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry after 
Dodd-Frank: Continued Business as Usual’ (2012) 7(1) Virginia Law& Business Review 4. 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid 5. 
 5 Allana M. Grinshteyn, ‘Horseshoes and Hand Grenades: The Dodd-Frank Act’s (Almost) Attack On Credit 
Rating Agencies’ (2011) 39(4) Hofstra Law Review 937, 950. 
6  IOSCO, ‘Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies’ (2008), 4 
<https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD271.pdf> accessed 10 October 2020. 
7 Christian Kronwald, Credit Rating and the Impact on Capital Structure (Norderstedt, Germany: Druck und 




debtor.8 Besides, as Lupica stated, credit rating, as a forecast made by CRAs, reflects the 
creditworthiness of the issuers and the quality of the securities they issue.9  
 
A brief glance at the history of credit ratings will be helpful to analyse the problems in CRAs. 
In the United States, the credit rating industry has evolved over more than one hundred years. 
There were main three stages. In the first stage, a comparatively mature corporate bond 
market was the basis of CRAs. Later, doubts regarding the accuracy of the credit ratings 
limited the further development of CRAs. In the second stage, the regulatory use of credit 
ratings created the second peak in the credit rating industry. However, at the same time, this 
leads to an over-reliance on the Nationally Recognized Statistics Rating Organizations 
(hereafter ‘NRSROs’) in the future. In the third stage, the boom in structured finance brought 
CRAs into the public discussion because overly high credit ratings are deemed to have 
triggered the financial crisis. The EU sovereign crisis that followed also exposed the huge 
potential influence of CRAs in financial stability and the lack of internal rating agencies in 
the European Union. In China, the bond markets are divided and regulated by different 
regulators. Therefore, the question arises as to how multi-regulators supervision system 
further does have an influence on CRAs. 
 
This chapter aims to analyse the roots that drive CRAs, such as the prosperity of the bond 
market and regulatory certificates. The bond market is the underlying market of the rating 
industry, and thus the different situations in the United States, European Union and China 
are all discussed from the angle of bond market. Furthermore, given that the credit rating 
industry originated in the United States, the United States has a comparatively complete 
evolution of rating agencies and more experiences to cope with various issues. However, the 
conflicts in respective areas during the recent economic crisis are exposed to various 
characteristics of the United States, European Union and China. This is therefore an attempt 
to address the diversity in the three jurisdictions that cause the different problems. 
 
2.2 The Emergence of Credit Rating Agencies 
 
The expanding corporate bond market was the prerequisite for the emergence of the CRA 
industry in the United States. The boom of corporate bonds created a huge demand for 
 
8 Lois R. Lupica, ‘Credit Rating Agencies, Structured Securities, and the Way Out of the Abyss’ (2008) 28 





lenders (investors) to ameliorate the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. 
Objectively, to meet this demand, CRAs emerged.  
 
The development of the US railroads in the twentieth century contributed to the boom in 
corporate bonds. Financial markets functioned well for several centuries prior to CRAs, 
which was the case because most investments in the securities market focused on sovereign 
bonds. It is generally believed that governments are capable of repaying their debts and 
sovereign bonds are more likely to be invested. With the private sector and corporate bonds 
developing rapidly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the situation in the United 
States started changing in the twentieth century.10 Since the early nineteenth century, with 
the increasing capital need to build railroads in the United States, corporations showed a 
mushroom-shaped growth. Most US railroads were organized and established as private 
corporations, with some governmental assistance. 11  After 1850, railroad corporations 
gradually expanded into undeveloped regions where a few banks and investors financed 
them. To cope with the funding problem, corporate bonds became an advisable way to raise 
money and the corporate bond market thus further enlarged, which was regarded as a US 
financial innovation. Until the nineteenth century, the US corporate bond market was larger 
than that of any other country, such as the United Kingdom and France.12 In fact, with the 
booms in railroad bonds, a large amount of corporate bonds appeared in the United States. 
Between 1900 and 1943, the total par value of straight corporate bonds was USD 71.5 
billion13, including bonds offered by railroad, public utility, and industrial corporations and 
held by the investing public.14 
 
As corporate bonds expanded in twentieth century, the information asymmetry between 
bonds issuers and investors further widened in three respects. First, at one point the 
investment choices were massively broadened by the boom of corporate bonds. Profit is the 
primary driving force in financial markets. A flourishing corporate bond market provides 
high-yield investment opportunities for investors. Secondly, corporate bonds are different 
from treasury bonds and any other kind of government bonds, especially when it comes to 
 
10 Richard Sylla, ‘A Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Rating’ in R. M Levich, G. Majnoni and C. M. 
Reinhart (eds), Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System (Springer, Boston, MA 2002) 24.  
11 ibid. 
12 Raymond W. Goldsmith, ‘Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of Twenty Countries, 1688–1978’ 
94 (6) The Journal of Political Economy <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1833104> accessed 10 March 2019. 
13 USD 1 in 1900 is equivalent in purchasing power to USD 30.05 in 2018; USD 1 in 1943 is equivalent in 
purchasing power to USD 14.59 in 2018. See CPI inflation Calculator, ‘Value of $1 from 1943 to 2018’ 
<https://www.in2013dollars.com/1943-dollars-in-2018?amount=1> accessed 31 October 2018. 
14 W. Braddock Hickman, ‘Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience’ in W. Braddock Hickman (ed), 




credit risk. Governments generally have good creditworthiness and investors are thus hardly 
concerned about bond defaults. However, in terms of corporate bonds, investors take all 
measures to reduce potential risks. When the first and second points are put together, the 
boom in corporate bonds rather than any other government bonds fundamentally creates the 
demand for ameliorating information asymmetry for investors.  
 
Thirdly, the difficulty that common investors experienced in acquiring relevant business 
information from issuers was exactly the reason why the CRA emerged at that time. Faced 
with numerus corporate bonds, investors did not have sufficient time to investigate and 
distinguish between every bond. Besides, expanding the bond market in geographical scope 
made collecting business information more difficult. In the initial stage of business, when 
the scope of business was small, most transactions happened among people who overlapped 
in social networks. At that time, investors tended to lend money to those with whom they 
were familiar or who provided letters of recommendation; in other words, the extent of 
information asymmetry was not severe. There was thus no strong need to fulfil the 
information gap between investors and investees. However, since the second half of the 
nineteenth century in the United States, corporate bonds, to a large extent, financed the 
railroads, both in the domestic and international bond market.15 As a result, faced with larger 
scopes of business and increasing corporate bonds, investors had pressing needs to reduce 
the information asymmetry so that they could make more informed investment decisions.  
 
CRAs bridged the gap of increasing information asymmetry between the investors and bonds 
issuers. Before the advent of CRAs, credit reporting agencies and the financial press had 
already attempted to gather business information and provide professional reports on the 
creditworthiness of US firms for a long time.16 Later in order to satisfy the continual demand 
for amelioration of information asymmetry, CRAs emerged. Faced with the massive choices 
in the railroad bond market, as John Moody thought, investors were willing to pay for the 
service that synthesized the mass of information into an easily digestible format.17 In 1909, 
Moody's Investment Service (hereafter ‘Moody’s’) was founded by John Moody as the first 
CRA that provided company appraisals for investors.18 Moody’s collected and synthesized 
the relevant financial information, which included assessment of the quality of a business’s 
 
15 Richard Sylla (n 10).  
16 ibid.  
17 Frank Partnoy, ‘How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers’ [2006] Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series Research Paper 63. 
18 Erin M, Wessendorf, ‘Regulating the Credit Rating Agencies’ (2008) 3 Enterpreneurial Business Law 




portfolio and corporate management, to create an estimate of risk for corporate debt and 
provided ratings for subscribers. In other words, the credit rating fulfilled the role of 
ameliorating information asymmetry through providing professional assistances for 
investors.  
 
It should be noted here what contribute to the emergence of the credit rating industry in 
China? One of the reasonable explanations for this is that prior to the Chinese Economic 
Reform in 1978, this type of economy had been planned for many years. Even though since 
1978 China has abandoned the plan, it still had some remaining effects during the 1980s, 
especially in the regulatory framework. The Chinese government was accustomed to 
designing and planning the tendencies in the market. The advantage was that some of the 
predicable problems could be avoided. In the context of the issue of enterprise bonds being 
permitted in 1987 in order to better regulate enterprise bonds, even the whole bond market, 
the regulation pertaining to CRAs was enacted. Consequently, many rating agencies were 
followed.  
 
2.3 The Evolution of Credit Rating Agencies  
 
2.3.1 Stock Crash of 1929 and the Securities Act of 1933 
 
CRAs encountered the first challenge in 1929. During the Stock Market Crash of 1929, there 
were numerous bond defaults and investors doubted whether or not the credit ratings were 
valid or valuable. Admittedly, in a downturn of the stock market, the reliance on credit 
ratings is likely to be increased, because investors are inclined to select low-default bonds, 
namely bonds with a high credit rating. 19 However, the stock market crash of 1929 destroyed 
the confidence of investors regarding credit ratings. Prior to the stock crash, the major CRAs 
issued a large amount of ratings, most of which were overly high. By the end of the 1920s, 
there were approximately 6 000 bond issues in the US bond market, which amounted to USD 
26 billion and a majority of those bonds were rated by CRAs.20 As shown in Table 2.1, most 
of the ratings by the main CRAs were Category A in 1929. That triggered credit rating 
inflation in the 1930s. For instance, the bond of Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad 
was rated Category A by all the major agencies in 1929 but it was in default in 1934.21 
 
19 Thomas J. McGuire, ‘Ratings in Regulation: A Petition to the Gorillas’ (1995) Delivered to the SEC Fifth 
Annual International Institute for Securities Market Development 17. 
20 Frank Partnoy, ‘The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets? Two Thumbs down for the Credit Rating 
Agencies’ (1999) 77 Washington University Law Quarterly 619, 640. 




Following on the heels of the stock market crash, was a wide range of downgrades of credit 
ratings. Besides, the hysteretic nature of credit ratings gradually realised that there was a lag 
between the time of the market prices and the time that the credit ratings revealed the 
negative information.22 Therefore, investors began to lose confidence in the CRAs’ ability 
to generate valuable information and were not as interested in purchasing credit ratings as 
before.23 
 
Table 2.1: Distribution for issues by ratings, 15 July 192924 
Rating Fitch Moody Poor Standard 
A (included A+ and A-) 291 259 267 275 
B (included B+ and B-) 61 86 90 82 
C+ 3 0 0 4 
D+ 0 0 0 1 
Unrated  8 18 6 1 
 
As a tool to reduce the information asymmetry, why are CRAs so important? Because it was 
not compulsory to disclose information in the United States until 1933; in other words, credit 
rating could be regarded as an exclusive approach to disclose business information for 
lenders and investors before 1933. Under the Securities Act of 1933 (hereafter ‘Securities 
Act’), all securities offered in the United States are required to be registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter ‘SEC’) unless some securities qualify for 
exemption from the registration requirements. The registrants should provide essential facts, 
which include the following: ‘1. A description of the company’s properties and business; 2. 
A description of the security to be offered for sale; 3. Information about the management of 
the company; 4. Financial statements certified by independent accountants.’ 25  This 
registration aims to disclose important financial information so that investors can make 
informed decisions, but it does not guarantee the accuracy of information provided by 
companies. 
 
Compared with the Securities Act focuses on disclosure of securities in the primary market, 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereafter ‘Exchange Act’) further emphasizes 
 
22 ibid 644. 
23 Aline Darbellay, Regulating Credit Rating Agencies (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013) 22. 
24 Gilbert Harold, Bond Ratings As An Investment Guide: An Appraisal of Their Effectiveness (The Ronald 
Press Company 1938) 90. 
25 Investor Gov, SEC, ‘Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933’ <https://www.investor.gov/introduction-




periodical reports in the secondary market. Under the Exchange Act, the SEC was created 
and empowered to regulate the securities transaction and companies that publicly traded 
securities and were registered with the SEC.26 The Exchange Act also has some disclosure 
and periodical reporting requirements for these companies in the securities exchange and 
over-the-counter market.27 Owing to these disclosure and periodical reporting requirements, 
the role of CRAs in reducing information asymmetry between issuers and investors was not 
unique during the 1930s, and it was doubtful whether CRAs were able to generate valuable 
information.28 Admittedly, these disclosure regulations, to some extent, reduce information 
asymmetry. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the role of CRAs can be replaced. The 
more information is disclosed, the less time investors have to read every document and to 
make informed decisions.  
 
The first time that credit rating started being used for regulatory purposes was to distinguish 
between investment-grade securities and speculative-grade securities. In the face of the 
banking crisis in March 1931 and following the Great Depression in 1936, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency defined the term investment securities and required banks to 
invest exclusively in investment-grade bonds, which meant that bank holdings of publicly 
traded bonds had to be rated BBB or higher by at least one CRA.29 Once securities are rated 
by investment grade, the issuer of bonds and borrowers are more likely to acquire capital 
from investors and lenders. The investment-grade rating means access to capital markets and 
extends the finance channel to issuers and borrowers. 30  Another example would be 
institutional investors who only regard those corporate bonds rated as investment-grade as 
appropriate investments.31 Even though this rule aims to prevent future bank failure, it 
substantially introduced CRAs into the financial regulatory framework.  
 
2.3.2 The 1970s: Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs) and Globalization 
 
 
26 Section 4(a), Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Public No. 291, 73D Congress, HR 9323). The Exchange 
Act has been amended many times. In this paragraph, Exchange Act means the original one. 
27 For example, section 13 provides detail periodical requirements for every registered issuer. ibid. 
28 Partnoy (n 20) 644.  
29 Section 5136, Banking Act of 1935 (Public No. 305, 74th Congress, HR 7616). 
30 Committee on Governmental Affairs Unites States Senate, ‘Rating the Raters: Enron and the Credit Rating 
Agencies’ (2002) one hundred seventh congress, second session 2 <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-





The credit rating industry remained stagnant for decades.32 At the start of the 1940s, the 
overall economy was stable, and defaults of corporate bonds were rare. The demand for 
credit ratings was thus not so high.33 During the Vietnam War (01 November 1955 to 
30 April 1975), with the rising volatility of bond prices, the demand for credit information 
increased but the CRAs remained small and lacked enough reputational capital in order to 
meet the demand.34 Besides CRAs, banks also fulfil the function of credit analysis.35 In 
general, credit analysis provided by commercial banks took place on the balance sheet for a 
loan while CRAs provided a credit rating service related to issuance of a marketable debt 
instrument. Since the later part of the 1960s, it was comparatively difficult for commercial 
banks to take deposits due to Regulation Q36. Pursuant to Regulation Q, the capability of 
banks regarding savings and loans was further restricted, which thus negatively affected 
commercial banks to make credit analysis.37 As investors were unable to get enough credit 
analysis from banks, they turned to CRAs. Therefore, the demand for CRA increased fast.  
 
During the 1970s, with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System and the steel crisis, the 
United States entered into economic stagnation, namely the 1973–75 recession. Later, the 
Stock Crash of 1973–74, ranging from Europe to North America made the recession more 
evident. To enhance the stability of the financial market, the SEC began to regard CRAs as 
a regulatory tool. In 1973, the SEC first utilized the CRA in determining capital requirements 
and distinguishing the quality of assets.38 The SEC promulgated approvals to a handful of 
CRAs as NRSROs.39 According to the Net Capital Rule, if securities could be rated as 
investment grade, deductions could be less and to ensure the credibility of credit ratings, 
these credit ratings were required to be issued by at least two NRSROs.40  
 
32 Frank Partnoy (n 17). 
33 Partnoy (n 20) 647.  
34 ibid 648. 
35 Ekins and Calabria (n 32) 6.  
36 Regulation Q was promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board in 1933 and set out capital requirements for 
banks. Capital Adequacy of Bank Holding Companies, Saving and Loan Holding Companies, and State 
Member Banks (Regulation Q) (12 CFR 217). 
37 Ekins and Calabria (n 32) 6-7.  
38 In 1973, SEC adopted a uniform net capital rule, as a part of Net Capital Rule for broker-dealers (Rule 15c3-
1), so as to ensure ‘that registered broker-dealers have adequate liquid assets to meet their obligations to their 
investors’. Under the Net Capital Rule, broker-dealers were required to ‘deduct from net worth certain 
percentage of the market value of their proprietary securities’, but SEC thought that the deduction could be 
less. 
 See SEC, ‘Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities 
Markets’ (2003), 5 <https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf> accessed 20 April 2020. 
39 Merely three rating agencies were approved by SEC as NRSROs, namely Moody, S&P and Fitch rating 
agencies. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (The Joint Forum), ‘Stocktaking on the Use of Credit 
Ratings’ 3-4 <https://www.bis.org/publ/joint22.pdf> accessed 1 January 2020. 
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Apart from that, NRSROs were associated with administrative regulations with respect to 
financial activities. For instance, in the late 1970s, credit ratings issued by NRSROs were 
applied by the US Department of Education to ‘set standards of financial responsibility for 
institutions which want to engage in student financial assistance programs under Title IV of 
the Higher Education Act of 1965’. For another instance, with respect to section 3(a)(41) of 
the Exchange Act, ‘mortgage-related security’ is required to be ‘rated in one of the two 
highest rating categories by at least one NRSRO’. Gradually, US administrations 
increasingly depended on NRSROs. With the regulations relying on NRSROs, more and 
more issuers actively seek credit rating service of NRSROs. As a result, NRSROs gradually 
became a ‘regulatory licence’ and this regulatory licence offers NRSROs a privilege in 
market. 41 Institutional investors invest such bonds that were rated by an NRSRO. 42 
 
Additionally, the continually enlarged bond market and the globalization further promoted 
the credit rating industry. From the 1970s to 1990s, CRAs expanded meteorically. As the 
globalisation spreads to the Europe, the European bond issuers were able to enter into the 
American bond market, providing that they had positive credit ratings. In other words, the 
globalisation enlarged the bond market in geographical scope and increased the businesses 
of credit ratings, which further promoted the credit rating industry. Owing to the increase in 
international capital flows after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System, more 
companies issued bonds in both domestic and international securities markets. In 1975, 600 
new bonds issues were rated, raising the number of outstanding rated corporate bonds to 
5,500. 43  The expansion of the bond market in geographic scale further expanded 
employment. To cope with the increasing demand at the global level, CRAs employed more 
analysts and set up more branches. 44  In 1980, there were merely 30 professionals in 
Standards and Poor’s (hereafter ‘S&P’), while the numbers rose to 800 analysts and 1 200 
staff in total in 1995. For example, the Moody’s annual revenue in 1999 was USD 564 
million, and the 90 per cent was derived from bond rating as well as 30 per cent from 
abroad.45 A further example, in 1999, the scope of the rating business in S&P covered 60 
countries with offices in 16 countries, and Fitch Ratings (hereafter ‘Fitch’) covered 75 
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countries with offices in 23 countries.46 In the same year, Moody’s rated 20 000 US issuers 
and 1200 non-US issuers, and the worth of rated securities reached USD 5 trillion.47 S&P 
rated a slighter fewer number of issuers in each category and the rated securities was worth 
about USD 2 trillion. 48 As a result, Moody’s and S&P gradually dominated the global 
ratings markets. It should be noted that with the globalization, the US CRAs could easily 
enter into the EU market, because there was no market entry limit for ratings issued by a 
non-EU country until the financial crisis. By contrast, at that time, the Chinese bond market 
was not yet established, let alone the credit rating market.  
 
2.3.3 Twenty-first Century: The Financial Crisis of the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2007–8 and the Euro Area Crisis 
 
Over the past decades, although CRAs played a crucial role in financial markets and their 
ratings were incorporated into regulation in many countries, the credit rating industry was 
not regulated. Until the twenty-first century, the credit rating industry was faced with some 
rating failures. That led to a rethinking of the necessity and importance of regulation 
regarding CRAs. In 2001, the Enron Corporation, an American energy, commodities, and 
services company based in Houston, Texas, was downgraded to the speculative grade by the 
Moody’s and S&P four days before it announced its insolvency.49 That downgrading was 
regarded as a delay, and the public and investors expressed their frustration and wrath at this 
delay.50 This event gave rise to doubt regarding the accuracy and reliability of credit ratings. 
Furthermore, CRAs were questioned as to whether or not they should take the responsibility 
of gatekeepers of the market. The Enron scandal raised the alarm that self-disciplined 
regulation of the credit rating industry was far from enough. According to the detailed report 
regarding Enron’s finances by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the SEC and 
the private-sector regulator should strengthen the supervision of CRAs.51 Later in 2006, the 
US Congress enacted the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (hereafter ‘CRARA’)52, 
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A more well-known event is the 2007 financial global economic crisis, which was also 
deemed as another rating failure.54 The inflated and inaccurate credit rating was attributed, 
to a large extent, to aggravate this financial crisis. At the beginning of the 2007 global 
financial crisis, adjustable-rate mortgages encouraged more and more people to purchase 
housing, which increased the demand for purchases, though most people who purchased 
houses were actually unable to afford them. Based on the mortgages, there was an 
unprecedented boom in the United States real estate market. In order to get more cash and 
diversify credit risks held on the balance sheet, these mortgage assets were securitized by 
financial institutions and sold to investors.  
 
With more and more rethinking of the 2007 financial markets, people gradually realized the 
significant role CRAs played in financial stability. CRAs during this financial crisis failed 
to accurately price the value of securities and reflect the inherent information in detail in the 
process of securitization. Given that so many investors and even financial institutions overly 
and even solely depend on credit ratings, especially when they select debt securities, credit 
ratings have a huge effect in financial markets. However, the following doubt persists: are 
they capable of providing valid and accurate ratings? In order to maintain financial stability, 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter ‘Dodd–Frank Act’) 
was enacted in 2010, which contains some reforms to better regulate the credit rating 
industry.55  
 
At the EU level, when the financial crisis spread from the United States to the European 
Union, the euro area crisis followed. In 2012, S&P downgraded nine European sovereign 
debt ratings, such as France, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus, as well as posted negative 
outlooks of an additional fourteen European countries, while only German kept a AAA 
rating and was not affected.56 These downgrades increased uncertainty among investors, 
especially soon after the shock of the financial crisis, and easily incurred the wrath of 
European countries. The reason behind the EU’s anger for these rating downgrades is that 
rating agencies tend to employ a lax requirement when the market is good, but once the 
bubble bursts, immediately act more severely. 57  Apart from that, external CRAs were 
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<https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1572308916300249> accessed 4 December 2020. 
57 Christian Scheinert, ‘The Case for a European Public Credit Rating Agency’ (European Parliamentary 




deemed to have overlooked the imbalance in public finance and the lack of sustainability of 
growth models during this European sovereign crisis. 58 In this regard, CRAs were blamed 
for not warning investors prior to the financial crisis but accelerating bubbles and causing 
further deterioration of the financial crisis.  
 
In contrast, the sovereign rating downgrades in the eurozone had a worse effect than in other 
areas that had not adopted one common currency. In 2009, the Greek sovereign rating 
downgrade triggered a string of crises, from the Greek debt crisis to the whole eurozone 
crisis, affecting the entire Europe. This sovereign downgrade in Greece presented differently 
because Greece, as a part of the eurozone, had adopted the euro as the common currency and 
thus did not have the opportunity for increased trade after its currency devaluation. In general, 
once a sovereign rating downgrades, numerous investments, particularly foreign investments, 
will shift abroad, and the national currency will thus depreciate. That currency devaluation 
will decrease trade cost for foreign investment and stimulate demand for imports in turn. As 
a result, a series of adjustments finally improves the country’s economy. However, given 
that 19 countries in the eurozone share one currency, once the Greek sovereign rating 
downgrades, the currency will transfer from the downgraded area to an unaffected area 
instead of lead to the devaluation of the euro.59 Therefore, there is no increased export 
demand in a downgraded country. This implies that not only can the downgraded country 
not improve its economy, but there is also an intrachain influence in the whole eurozone. 
 
To sum up, first, the United States’ mature underlying bond market drives the CRA industry 
to emerge and evolve. US CRAs have almost a century’s history and advanced expertise and 
rating methodologies. During the globalization in the 1970s, with no market entry limits, US 
CRAs could easily access the EU rating market. The two points could, to a large extent, 
explain why the US CRAs own the major global market shares, which also underpinned the 
current oligopolistic rating market. Next, the euro area crisis has special influence on EU 
regulation, which provides political incentives for EU leaders to break the oligopoly, reduce 
the over-reliance on CRAs, especially foreign CRAs, and promote the local CRAs industry. 
This will be analysed in the chapters that follow. In addition, the huge impact of sovereign 
downgrades in the European Union also gives other countries a warning, including China. 
 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/589865/EPRS_BRI(2016)589865_EN.pdf> 
accessed 10 March 2019. 
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As can be seen from the subsequent Chinese regulation, China has scruples about allowing 
foreign CRAs to enter into its domestic market. 60  
 
2.3.4  The Belated Chinese Bond and Credit Rating Market  
 
Unlike the US corporate bond market, the bond market cannot be regarded as a sufficient 
driver for the emergence of CRAs in China. For long periods, dominant issuers in the 
Chinese bond market were mainly governments and state-owned enterprises (hereafter 
‘SOEs’). Investors possessed an innate trust in government bonds (including treasuries and 
local government bonds) and authorities’ bonds (such as central bank bills) and the demand 
for a credit rating system was thus not very high. Until 1986, the People’s Bank of China 
(hereafter ‘PBOC’) permitted local enterprises to issue bonds for the first time.61 Later, in 
1987, with the enactment of the Temporary Regulations on the Management of Enterprise 
Bonds62, provincial banks were encouraged to set up CRAs as a subsidiary. In this regard, 
the Jilin Province Credit Rating Corporation was created as a subsidiary of banks in 1987, 
which can be regarded as the first official CRA in China.63 As the regulation promotes the 
setting up of CRAs, many banks set up a CRA as a subsidiary.64 In 1988, the first private 
CRA was established, namely the Shanghai Far East Credit Rating Co., Ltd (hereafter 
‘Shanghai Far East’)65, which was independent of any financial institution.66  
 
Why is the Chinese bond market unable to provide sufficient demand for a credit rating 
industry? To answer this question, it is necessary to analyse the historical background to the 
Chinese bond market. With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the 
 
60 Until 2020, only S&P had received approval to enter into the Chinese rating market. See Lianting Tu, ‘S&P 
Global Gets Approval for China Local Rating Business’ People’s Bank of China (Bloomberg, 2019) 
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61 Credit Research Center of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics [上海财经大学信用研究中心], 
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Construction [2015中国金融发展报告: 社会信用体系建设的理论、探索与实践] (The Press of Shanghai 
University of Finance and Economics [上海财经大学出版社] 2016) Chapter 15. 
62 Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds [企业债券管理条例] (Order No. 121 [1993] of the 
State Council [国务院 [1993]121号]). 
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Chinese Central People’s Government (hereafter ‘CCPG’)67 first issued national bonds in 
1950, namely the RenMin ShengLi ZheShi’ Government Bond68, and then between 1954 
and 1958, the CCPG issued government bonds five times, namely the National Economic 
Construction Government Bond69. However, the Chinese government stopped issuing any 
bonds in the following 20 years, since they were affected by the Leftist Impatience and 
Rashness Thoughts.70 Owing to the financial deficit caused by a series of economic policies, 
the government overdraft from the national bank in 1979 and 1980 triggered currency 
inflation.71 In order to improve the inflation rate, in 1981, the Ministry of Finance of the 
People's Republic of China (hereafter ‘Ministry of Finance’) resumed its issue of sovereign 
bonds.72 This marked the beginning of the modern Chinese bond market. The fact that until 
1987 enterprise bonds were allowed to be issued, the development of the private sector was 
far from its counterpart in the United States in the early of twentieth century.  
 
Since the establishment of the first CRA in 1987, a large number of CRAs followed and 
more than 90 CRAs came into being as subsidiaries of banks all over the country. 73 
Nevertheless, all the CRAs established by banks were compulsorily revoked in 1989, 
according to the Notice of Revocation of Securities Companies and CRAs set up by the 
 
67 From 1949 to 1954, the CCPG [中国中央人民政府] was the chief administrative authority of the People's 
Republic of China and has been replaced with the State Council of the People's Republic of China [中华人民
共和国国务院]. See Article 47, 1954 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国宪法 
(1954年)]. 
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of People’s ShengLi ZheShi Governmental Bonds[关于发行人民胜利折实公债的决定 ]’ (1949) 
<http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/10/content_4239.htm> accessed 10 October 2019. 
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on 1955 National Economic Construction Government Bond [1955 年国家经济建设公债条例]’ the 3rd 
Session of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, 20th December 1954; ‘Rules on 1956 National 
Economic Construction Government Bond [1956年国家经济建设公债条例]’ the 26th Session of the National 
People’s Congress Standing Committee, 10th November 1955; ‘Rules on 1957 National Economic 
Construction Government Bond [1957年国家经济建设公债条例]’ the 52th Session of the National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee, 29th December1956; ‘Rules on 1958 National Economic Construction 
Government Bond [1958年国家经济建设公债条例]’ the 83th Session of the National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee, 10th November 1957. 
70 The Great Leap Forward [大跃进], from 1958 to 1962, was an economic and social campaign, which finally 
resulted in the Great Chinese Famine and tens of millions of deaths. See Dennis Tao Yang, ‘China’s 
Agricultural Crisis and Famine of 1959–1961: A Survey and Comparison to Soviet Famines’ (2008) 50 
Comparative Economic Studies 1. 
71 Jialun Li [李加伦], ‘The Stroy behind the Resumption of Treasury Bond in 1980 [1980年恢复’国库券’发
行鲜为人知的幕后故事]’ Liberation Daily [解放日报] (11 October 2006) <http://news.hexun.com/2008-07-
10/107332744.html> accessed 8 October 2018. 
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PBOC.74 In this period, the role of CRAs was replaced with credit rating committees but few 
cities had credit rating committees.75 Hence, the credit rating industry once again came to a 
halt.  
 
Until 1993, pursuant to the Regulations on the Management of Enterprise Bonds76 issued by 
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter ‘State Council’)77, an issuer 
of enterprise bonds could apply for credit ratings from recognized CRAs. In 1996, all the 
enterprise bonds issued or purchased on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange (hereafter 
‘Shanghai Exchange’) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (hereafter ‘Shenzhen Exchange’) 
were required to apply for credit ratings from rating agencies that were recognized by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (hereafter ‘CSRC’)78.79 In 1997, the PBOC first 
authorised nine CRAs which were exclusively allowed to provide credit ratings of enterprise 
bonds.80 In addition, all the issuers of enterprise bonds should be rated by these nine CRAs 
before issuance.81 In 2003, the NDRC officially required issuers of enterprise bonds to 
provide credit ratings.82 In 2004, according to the Interim Provisions on the Administration 
of the Monetary Market Funds 83 , money market funds were not allowed to invest in 
enterprise bonds below a AAA rating. In addition, the PBOC announced the credit rating 
 
74 People’s Bank of China, ‘Notice of Cancellation of Securities Companies and Credit Rating Agencies 
Established by People’s Bank of China [关于撤销人民银行设立的证券公司、信誉评级公司的通知]’ 
No.272 [1989] of the People’s Bank of China [银发［1989］272号]. 
75 People’s Bank of China, ‘Notice of The Establishment of Credit Rating Council [关于设立信誉评级委员
会有关问题的通知]’ No.211 [1990] of the People’s Bank of China [银发[1990]211号]. 
76 Regulations on the Administration of Corporate Bonds [企业债券管理条例]. 
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78 [中国证券监督管理委员会] 
79 Shanghai Stock Exchange, ‘Corporate Bonds Listing Rules of Shanghai Stock Exchange [上海证券交易所
企业债券上市管理规则]’ (1996); Shenzhen Stock Exchange, ‘Corporate Bonds Listing Rules of Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange [深圳证券交易所企业债券上市管理规则]’ (1996). 
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公司]. See People’s Bank of China, ‘Notice of the Qualification of China Chengxin Securities Evaluation Co., 
Ltd. and Other Agencies to Engage in Corporate Bond Credit Rating Business [关于中国诚信证券评估有限
公司等机构从事企业债券信用评级业务资格的通知]’ No. 547 [1997] of the People’s Bank of China [银发 
[1997] 547号]. 
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National Development and Reform Commission [发改财金[2003]1179号]. 
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requirement in the interbank market in January 2005.84 In addition, the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (hereafter ‘CIRC’)85 required insurance companies exclusively to 
invest corporate bonds with at least AA ratings.86 As a result, the credit rating system in the 
Chinese bond market, ranging from over-the-counter (hereafter ‘OTC’) market to exchanges, 
has gradually been established. 
 
A clear difference can be found between CRAs in China and those in the United States and 
European Union when their respective histories are compared. Although the Chinese CRA 
industry was, to some extent, driven by the inherent market demand, the relevant legislation 
and regulation had a much more important effect on the evolution of Chinese CRAs, 
especially compared with the United States and European Union. The CRA industry seems 
regulation- rather than market-driven. One reasonable explanation behind that is that before 
the Chinese economic reform in 1978, the economic system in China was a planned economy 
whose most obvious characteristic was governmental intervention in the economy. Even 
though China had begun to enter into a market economy system since 1978, governmental 
intervention still exists. Because the establishment and development of the Chinese bond 
and credit rating markets are comparatively late compared with the European Union and 
United States, China did not allow foreign CRAs to directly provide a credit rating service 
until 2017.87 This may avoid the oligopoly of US CRAs, as will discussed in the Chapter 5.  
 
2.3.5  The Issuer-Pays Model 
 
At present, the most common business model worldwide is the issuer-pays model, while at 
the beginning of the credit rating industry, most CRAs charged subscribers (investors), 
namely the subscriber-pays model (investor-pays model).  
 
From 1909 to the 1970s, the major operation revenue of the United States’ CRAs was from 
subscription fees, and this business model was the subscriber-pays model.88 Initially, bond 
issuers opposed the rating agencies and they regarded the ratings as an intrusion into 
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corporation business.89 However, high ratings objectively increased the channels of funding 
so bonds issuers had to provide valuable information to CRAs so as to improve their 
ratings.90 Based on the valuable information that sometime included non-public information 
provided by issuers, CRAs published accurate ratings and thus became credible.91 Gradually, 
credit ratings became important for both issuers and investors.  
 
The trend to the issuer-pays model was hinted at during the 1930s. Although there was a 
decline in confidence in credit ratings, institutions still relied on credit rating to different 
degrees during the 1930s. Large New York banks only regarded credit ratings as a double 
check, while the smaller local banks regarded ratings as authoritative guides in assessing 
credit risks of securities. In terms of insurance companies, their own analysts played a more 
important role rather than ratings from other CRAs. By contrast, credit ratings were 
considered significant in trust companies. 92  For example, Dillman A. Rash from the 
Louisville Trust Company stated that ‘the AAA rating . . . was the only way we were able to 
sell it to our Trust Investment Committee’.93 At that time, a study by Gilbert Harold tried to 
reveal whether changes in credit ratings had an influence on market prices. As Harold’s 
study implied, the market value of bonds with high ratings would increase within a certain 
period, or the reverse would apply.94 If a CRA raises one bond’s rating, the bond would be 
purchased at higher prices, which means that high-rated bonds have better liquidity.95  
 
The change of business model from investors-pays model to issuers-pays model happened 
in the 1970s. In 1970, Moody’s and Fitch began to shift their business model from the 
subscriber-pays model to the issuer-pays model. Later in 1974, S&P began to charge 
issuers.96 There were three reasons behind the change. First and foremost, the CRA was 
utilised by regulatory tools in the 1970s, as discussed above. Second, photocopying 
technology made credit ratings widely available for investors at a low cost.97 It was hard for 
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Third, on the heels of the liquidity crises, the 1970 Penn Central default on USD 82 million 
in commercial paper drew attention to the credit risk.98 Therefore, issuers had incentives to 
actively seek ratings so that they would more likely be trusted by investors.99 Until now, the 
issuer-pays model had been the most common business model. 
 
The regulatory status of CRAs is the key to the issuer-pays model. The basic function of 
credit rating is to reduce the information asymmetry between the investors and rated entities 
in financial markets. This function creates direct incentives for investors instead of issuers 
to purchase rating services. Nevertheless, when regulation depends on credit ratings to 
identify and select bonds, issuers have sufficient incentives to purchase ratings from CRAs.  
 
2.4 The Regulatory Regimes of Credit Rating Agencies  
 
2.4.1  The United States Regime 
 
CRAs in the United States should register with the SEC and those that receive authorization 
and certification from the SEC become NRSROs. In the United States, the SEC is a 
centralized regulator for NRSROs and other relevant securities issues. According to section 
932 (a) (8) of the Dodd–Frank Act, the Office of Credit Ratings (hereafter ‘OCR’) has been 
created as a specific regulatory body within the SEC. The legislation empowers the OCR to 
regulate NRSROs and to implement the relevant SEC rules, ranging from disclosure to 
conflicts of interest. In addition, the OCR was established to ensure the accuracy of the credit 
rating, and to protect rating users and the public interest.100  
 
Even though NRSROs were used for long periods, the term was defined for the first time in 
2006 under the CRARA. NRSROs had not been regulated for long periods until CRARA 
empowered the SEC to oversee NRSROs that registered with the SEC, and thus the SEC 
became the primary regulator of NRSROs. CRARA added section 15E to the Exchange Act, 
and this section established the current regulatory framework applicable to NRSROs. 
CRARA aims to ‘to improve ratings quality for the protection of investors and is in the public 








industry’.101 Later in 2007, the SEC adopted a series of rules102 to regulate NRSROs to 
implement the registration and supervision framework under CRARA. Rule 17g-1 provides 
specific eligibility criteria for a CRA to apply for NRSRO registration with the SEC. Rule 
17g-2 requires NRSROs to make and maintain the records associated with its business for 
certain prescribed periods. Rule 17g-3 requires NRSROs to furnish the audited financial 
statements to the SEC on an annual fiscal year basis, which aims to assist the SEC in 
monitoring the integrity of NRSROs. Under Rule 17g-4, a NRSRO is required to establish, 
maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures so as to prevent the misuse of material 
non-public information. Rule 17g-5 requires NRSROs to establish and maintain an adequate 
structure of internal controls to manage, avoid and disclose conflicts of interest. Under Rule 
17g-6, a CRA would be prohibited from engaging in certain ‘unfair, coercive or abusive 
practices’. Although CRARA and these rules aim to improve the registration, transparency 
and oversight of NRSROs, the SEC, pursuant to section 15E of CRARA, does not have the 
power to regulate the rating content, procedures and methodologies of NRSROs. 
 
After the financial crisis, the Dodd–Frank Act was designed to improve the regulation of 
NRSROs by setting out specific rules derived from sections 931 to 939H. Besides the OCR 
mentioned above, there were three changes under the Dodd–Frank Act. First, section 939A 
requires the relevant regulators to review each rating-based rule in their regulations and 
remove those rating-based rules that induce uncritical reliance on external credit ratings as 
well as replace them with alternative standards103 Second, section 932 requires NRSROs to 
establish more independent corporate governance, greater internal controls, and more 
expansive and accessible disclosure of ratings and rating basis in order to better manage 
potential conflicts of interest.104 Third, the Dodd–Frank Act enhanced the civil liability of 
CRAs so that investors can claim damage under a private cause against CRAs.105 
 
2.4.2  The European Union Regime 
 
CRAs were not officially regulated until the financial crisis. After the financial crisis, the 
EU realised the deficiency of self-regulation and took a series of regulatory measures to 
better regulate CRAs. CRAs haven’t been regulated for long periods in EU. Until the 
 
101 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (Pub L No. 109–291,120 Stat 1327), 1. 
102 The rules range from the 17 CFR 240.17g-1 to 17 CFR 240.17g-6. See SEC, ‘Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’ (2007) Release No. 34-55231; 
File No. S7-04-07 <https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2007/34-55231.pdf> accessed 10 November 2018. 
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financial crisis of 2008, the EU realized the important role of CRAs in financial markets. 
Later, the following euro area crisis arising from sovereign downgrades further affirmed the 
importance of enhancing the regulation of CRAs. To better regulate the financial market, the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (hereafter ‘ESMA’) was specially designed to 
regulate CRAs. During just five years (2009–2013), there were three Acts that especially 
aimed at regulating CRAs, namely (i) Regulation (2009/1060/EC) (hereafter ‘Regulation 
2009’), (ii) Regulation (2011/513/EU) (hereafter ‘Regulation 2011’) and (iii) Regulation 
(2013/462/EU) (hereafter ‘Regulation 2013’).  
 
Regulation 2009 was designed to establish a harmonised EU-wide regulatory framework for 
CRAs. Regulation 2009 targets the improvement of the problems of conflicts of interest and 
rating quality. This regulation also provides for the registration and certification 
requirements for CRAs in the European Union. Regulation 2009 marked the first official 
regulatory framework applicable to CRAs, and also implies that the European Union was 
ready to set higher and more stringent regulatory standards. 
 
Subsequently, according to Regulation 2011, ESMA was established and designed 
specifically to regulate CRAs so that these regulations mentioned could be effective. Unlike 
the former supervisory regulator, namely the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(hereafter ‘CESR’), ESMA is a centralized and more powerful authority. The role of CESR 
is more like an advisory group to assist the EU Commission and even though it has 
supervisory function, its power was still limited.106 In order to regulate CRAs throughout the 
entire EU market, ESMA was empowered to request all the information needed under Article 
23(b) of Regulation 2011 and conduct the necessary investigation of persons concerned 
under Article 23(c) of Regulation 2011.  
 
Regulation 2013 further deepens CRA reforms by giving more provisions pertaining to 
managing conflicts of interest, reducing over-reliance on CRAs and increasing competition 
in the CRA industry. Among these reforms, Regulation 2013 designed a rotation mechanism 
so as to foster competition and to break the oligopoly of the CRA market. 107  Most 
importantly, in order to enhance the market confidence in CRAs, Regulation 2013 created a 
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civil liability regime for CRAs so that investors and issuers without contracts can claim 
damages against CRAs.108  
 
2.4.3 The China Regime 
 
a. Background to the Multi-Supervision System  
 
The biggest regulatory concern regarding CRAs in China is the multi-regulator supervision 
system. The root of the concern could originate from the supervisory system in the bond 
market. The history of the Chinese bond market could be divided into three main periods 
since its establishment in 1981.109 First (from 1981 to 1991) the number and types of bonds 
are limited, and most are national government bonds. Until 1990, there were ten different 
negotiable national government bonds.110 In addition, the OTC market is the main trading 
platform.111  Second (between 1992 and 2000), with the establishment of the Shanghai 
Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen Exchange in 1994, the main trading places for bonds 
gradually became the exchanges. Many serious shorts and financial fraud took place in the 
OTC market in 1995, which reflected the potential management risks in that market. To 
control the risks and better regulate bond market, OTC as trading platform was forbidden in 
the trading off bonds. As a result, the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges became the 
exclusive legal bonds trading platform.112  
 
Third, since 2001, the interbank market has become the main bonds trading platform, which 
is a remarkable change for the multi-regulator system. As mentioned before, even though 
the legal bonds trading platforms were established, namely the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
exchanges, the supporting risk-control legal framework had not yet been formed. Thus, it 
was easy to raise capital for issuers through bonds repurchases and, at the same time, there 
were frequent bond trading violations, such as the 327 Treasury Futures Event.113 In order 
to enhance the stability of the financial market, regulators attempted to decrease potential 
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risks in the bond market. However, owing to the unsophisticated regulatory ability at that 
time, regulators could only design a separate bonds trading platform especially for the 
banking industry because financial institutions play a vital role in the whole financial market 
and generally have comparatively high credit. In 1997, the PBOC, the Chinese central bank 
and other financial regulator, required all commercial banks to exit from the exchanges.114 
Therefore, commercial banks are only allowed to purchase or repurchase bonds through the 
transaction system of interbank. Later, on 16 June 1997, the national interbank bond market 
was officially formed. As shown in Table 2.2, in 2001, the number of bond transactions in 
the interbank market exceeded the counterpart in exchanges for the first time and the gap 
continues to widen. So far, in terms of the number of bonds issuance, custody and transaction, 
the interbank market has been the biggest platform in China, compared to the exchanges and 




114 People’s Bank of China, ‘Notice of the People’s Bank of China on The Cessation of Securities Repurchase 
and Cash Trading by Commercial Banks at The Stock Exchange [中国人民银行关于各商业银行停止在证
券交易所证券回购及现券交易的通知]’ No. 240 [1997] of the People’s Bank of China [银发 [1997] 240号]. 





Table 2.2  A comparison of trading platforms in the Chinese bond market from 
1997 to 2012 
 
Amount of bond transaction 
(billion yuan) 
Amount of bond custody  
(billion yuan) 
Trading 
platform Interbank market Exchanges Interbank market Exchanges 
1997 336 1 6439 4 121  / 
1998 1 096 2 1601 9 884  / 
1999 4 664 1 8191 13 189  / 
2000 16 363 1 8892 16 746  / 
2001 41 030 20 304116 19 728  / 
2002 106 322 33 129 25 584 /  
2003 151 369 58 057 33 512 4 113 
2004 127 849 47 054 46 745 4 699 
2005 228 457 26 040 68 495 4 128 
2006 382 840 16 954 88 387 3 785 
2007 628 788 19 612 119 708 3 646 
2008 1 008 224 26 391 147 142 4 491 
2009 1 214 412 37 561 171 058 4 947 
2010 1 552 808 67 539 197 302 6 279 
2011 1 672 120 200 841 206 370 8 428 
2012 2 125 553 347 242 241 896 1 245 
 
b. Main Regulators of the Bond Market and Credit Rating Agencies  
 
The bond market regulation in China is in the charge of several regulators according to 
various bond trading platforms. The main bonds trading platform includes exchanges and 
the interbank market. In order to ensure easier and more convenient supervision and 
regulation, the PBOC has the power to regulate and supervise bonds in the interbank market, 
while the CSRC supervises and regulates bonds on the stock exchanges.  
 
As seen in Table 2.3, from the perspective of bond type, the main types of bonds include 
government bonds, financial bonds, corporate bonds and enterprise bonds. Unlike bonds 
issue in the United States, namely submitting required information and registering with the 
 




SEC, Chinese bonds issue is required to be examined substantially and approved in limited 
quantity by the particular regulator, which could be regarded as a stringent requirement of 
bonds issue and objectively increases the regulatory burden on the regulator. Nowadays, the 
Chinese bonds issuance examination mechanism is inclined to be looser and open to the 
market. First, the Ministry of Finance is the nominal issuer of treasury bonds and local 
government bonds, and it has the power to approve the issuance of government bonds. The 
government bonds mainly include treasury bonds, local government bonds, central bank bills 
and others. Because the de facto issuers of treasury bonds, local government bonds and 
enterprise bonds issued by SOEs are governmental authorities, whichever bond defaults, the 
governmental authorities are more likely to pay it back. Second, the PBOC has the power to 
approve the issue of financial bonds. The issuer of a financial bond is a financial institution, 
which generally has a higher credit rating compared to a company. In China, in order to 
protect financial stability, all financial bonds are issued and circulated in the interbank 
market. 117  Financial bonds mainly consist of policy financial bonds and commercial 
financial bonds. The issuer of policy financial bonds are three recognised banks, namely (i) 
the China Development Bank, (ii) Exim Bank of China and the (iii) Agriculture 
Development Bank of China.118 Third, the CSRC has the power to approve the issue of 
corporate bonds. According to Article 2 of the Company Law of the People's Republic of 
China (hereafter ‘Company Law’), the issuer of corporate bonds cannot be anything but a 
limited liability company or a joint stock company. 119 By contrast, enterprise bonds have a 
longer history and can date back to 1985. At that time, the State Development Planning 
Commission (the predecessor of the NDRC) was in charge of all SOEs and the issuing of 
bonds of such enterprises. In addition, the requirements of examining and approving 
enterprise bonds were once extremely strict. Therefore, the issuer of enterprise bonds, in fact, 
had been confined to SOEs for a long period, even though there was never any regulation to 
limit the scope of the issuers of enterprise bonds. Entering into the twenty-first century, non-
SOE companies as the issuer of enterprise bonds began to appear. At present, besides the 
difference in issuers between corporate bonds and enterprise bonds, the most important 
difference is the issue system. In terms of corporate bonds, the CSRC just verifies the 
 
117 Article 13 of Measures for the Administration of the Issuance of Financial Bonds in the National Inter-bank 
Bond Market [全国银行间债券市场金融债券发行管理办法] (No. 1 [2005] of the People’s Bank of China 
[中国人民银行令[2005]第 1号]). 
118 [国家开发银行], [中国进出口银行] and [中国农业发展银行].  
119 Article 2 provides that ‘the term of ‘Company’ as mentioned in the law refers to a limited liability company 
or a joint stock company limited set up within the territory of the People’s Republic of China according to the 
provisions of this law. ‘[第二条 本法所称公司是指依照本法在中国境内设立的有限责任公司和股份有限
公司。] Company Law of the People’s Republic of China [中华人民共和国公司法] (Sixth Session of the 




information provided by the applicant and there is no limit on the annual issue amount of 
corporate bonds. Nevertheless, the requirement of issuing enterprise is comparatively high, 
and the NDRC not only examines the applicant and strictly controls the issue amount of 
enterprise bonds.120 Owing to the examination and approval mechanism in the Chinese bond 
market, different regulators means various levels of rigorous bond issue requirements and 
various regulatory standards, such as information disclosure and conflicts of interest. 
 
Table 2.3  Table various types of bonds and trading platforms by different 
regulators in China 
Regulator Bonds trading platform Type of bonds 




NDRC Both stock exchanges and 
interbank market 
Enterprise bond  
CSRC Stock exchanges Corporate bond 
PBOC  Interbank market Financial bond 
Medium term note 




Chinese bonds mainly include sovereign bonds and government bonds, financial bonds, 
corporate bonds and enterprise bonds. The reason for the different categories of bonds is 
because they are regulated by different regulators. The Chinese bond market developed 
rapidly in the recent decades. Between 1981 and 1984, the annual average market value of 
Chinese sovereign bonds was approximately 4 billion yuan.121 In February 2018, as Table 
2.4 and Figure 2.1 illustrate, the monthly market value of Chinese sovereign bonds is 
approximately 10 409 billion yuan and the monthly market value of Chinese government 
bonds is approximately 11 098.6 billion yuan, which occupies 42.77 per cent of the whole 
Chinese bond market (20.70 and 22.07 per cent respectively). Financial bonds are worth 
nearly 20 000 billion yuan (more than 40 per cent). Corporate bonds and enterprise bonds 
are worth 3 112.56 and 2 924.3 billion yuan respectively, and amount to 6.19 and 5.81 per 
cent respectively. According to Figure 2.2, the four regulators occupy various proportions 
 
120 Bingxi Shen[沈炳熙] and Yuanyuan Cao [曹媛媛] (n 82) 146-48.  




of Chinese bond market and this also reflects the Chinese supervision system in the bond 
market. In the primary market, the CSRC, PBOC, Ministry of Finance and NDRC are in 
charge of corporate bonds, financial bonds, government bonds and enterprise bonds 
respectively. In the second market, the PBOC supervises the OTC and interbank market, 
while the CSRC supervises the stock exchanges market. In this regard, the Chinese 
supervision system with multi-regulators stemmed from the bond market. There are some 
influences under this supervision system: on the one hand, owing to the various types of 
bond issue being examined and approved by different regulators, regulatory gaps and 
regulatory arbitrage exist. Some novel bonds take advantage of the regulatory gaps or 
regulatory arbitrage, which creates the unfairness on different trading platforms. In addition, 
the regulatory system easily gives rise to regulatory overlap, especially when the supervising 
scope of regulators is not clearly defined. This may waste regulatory sources, decrease 
supervision efficiency and there is competition and comparison between regulators. 
Regulators thus should reform and improve the existing regulatory framework in order to 
co-build a competitive and fair bond market.  
 
Table 2.4 Chinese market value by various types of bonds in February 2018122 
Bond type Market value(billion yuan) 
Treasury bond 10,409.016 
Government bond 11,098.587 
Financial bond 14,554.304 
Medium term note 4,895.72 
Short-term and super short-term commercial 
paper 
1,640.06 
Enterprise bond 2,924.319 
Corporate bond 3,112.55 
others 16,604.97 




122 Data collected from China Bond, ‘Monthly Bulletin of Statistics February 2018 中债指数统计月报 2018





Figure 2.1 The percentage of Chinese market value of various bonds in February 
2018123 
 
Figure 2.2 The percentage of bond market that various regulators held in 2018124 
 
 
123 Data collected from ibid.  
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As discussed above, the supervision system of multi-regulators in the bond market has a 
decisive influence on the regulatory system for CRAs. Prior to December 2019, the credit 
rating industry lacked a unified standard of recognised CRAs. Unlike NRSROs in the United 
States, different regulators have different approval standards on different trading platforms. 
Because of the various requirements, there are different recognised CRAs in China. Besides 
the nine CRAs recognised by the PBOC in 1997 as mentioned before, the PBOC approved 
five CRAs in 2005 so that they could provide rating services for bonds issued in the interbank 
market. However, the PBOC revoked one of the five CRAs, namely Shanghai Far East, and 
later authorised two more CRAs. In terms of corporate bonds on stock exchanges, the CSRC 
recognised five CRAs in 2007, and then authorised more separately in 2011 and 2014.125 
With respect to enterprise bonds, the NDRC licensed five CRAs in 2003 and later also 
revoked Shanghai Far East’s certificate and approved two more CRAs separately in 2008 
and 2011. 126  Apart from that, the licences issued by CIRC originated in 2003 127  and 
nowadays CIRC recognises eight CRAs. 128  Bonds issued without the licensee being 
approved by CIRC cannot be invested by insurance funds. Table 2.5 lists the ten CRAs that 
are currently recognised by at least one regulator. Simply put, the credit rating of enterprise 
bonds and corporate bonds is regulated by the NDRC and CRSC respectively, and all credit 




125 Nan Guo [郭楠], ‘Five Important Things Related to the Bond Ratings [关于债券市场评级不得不说的 5
件事]’ (1 October 2017) <http://www.sohu.com/a/195899069_667855> accessed 3 May 2018. 
126 ibid. 
127 Shanghai Far East and Lianhe were recognised by the CIRC in 2003. See China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission, ‘Notice on More Recognised Credit Rating Agencies of Enterprise’s Bond [关于增加认可企业
债券信用评级公司的通知]’ No.92 [2003] of China Insurance Regulatory Commission [保监发 [2003]92号]. 
128 In 2013, besides to the two approved CRAs as mentioned above, CIRC recognized five more CRAs, namely 
Dagong, Shanghai Brilliance Credit Rating & Investors Services, Golden [东方金诚国际信用评估有限公司], 
China ChengXin International and its relevant subsidiary. See China Insurance Regulatory Commission, 
‘Notice on Recognition of 7 Credit Rating Agencies [关于认可 7家信用评级机构能力备案的公告]’ No.11 
[2013] of China Insurance Regulatory Commission [保监公告[2013]11号].  
In 2014, CIRC issued another approval to the China Bond Rating[中债资信评估有限责任公司]. See China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission, ‘Announcement of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission on the 
Recordation of Recognized Capability of the Credit Rating Institution[关于认可信用评级机构能力备案的




Table 2.5 The certificates of Chinese main CRAs by four regulators 
 NDRC CSRC PBOC CIRC 
Dagong Global Credit Rating Co., Ltd  
(hereafter ‘Dagong’)129  √ √ √ √ 
Golden Credit Rating International Co., Ltd  
(hereafter ‘Golden’)130 √ √ √ √ 
China Chengxin International Credit Rating Co. 
Ltd (hereafter ‘CCXI’)131  √  √ √ 
Shanghai Brilliance Credit Rating & Investors 
Service Co. Ltd (hereafter ‘SB&IS’)132 √ √ √ √ 
China Lianhe Credit Rating Co. Ltd  
(hereafter ‘Lianhe’)133 √  √ √ 
Shanghai Far East   √   
Pengyuan Credit Rating134  √ √   
China Chengxin Securities Rating Co., Ltd 
(hereafter ‘CCXR’)135  √  √ 
United Credit Rating Co., Ltd  
(hereafter ‘United Ratings’)136 
 √  √ 
China Bond Rating Co., Ltd. 
(hereafter ‘China Bond Rating)137 
  √ √ 
 
There are three negative effects of the multi-regulator supervision system. First, the different 
recognised standards added extra costs to issuers, especially when issuers who have 
 
129  Dagong Credit [ 大 公 国 际 资 信 评 估 有 限 公 司 ] 
<http://en.dagongcredit.com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&catid=11> accessed 6 July 2019. 
130 Golden [东方金诚国际信用评估有限公司] <http://www.dfratings.com/news/info/15> accessed 27 July 
2019.  
131  China ChengXin International Credit Rating Co., Ltd (CCXI) [中诚信国际信用评级有限公司 ] 
<http://www.ccxap.com/About.aspx> accessed 6 July 2019.  
132 Shanghai Brilliance Credit Rating& Investors Services(SB&IS) [上海新世纪资信评估投资服务有限公
司] <http://www.shxsj.com/en/inside.php?menuid=106&catid=116> accessed 6 July 2019.  
133 Lianhe [联合资信评级有限公司] <http://www.lhratings.com/about/jianjie.html> accessed 6 July 2019.  
134 Pengyuan Rating[鹏元资信评估有限公司] <http://www.pyrating.cn/zh-cn/about/zizhizili> accessed 6 
July 2019. 
135  China Chengxin Securities Rating (CCXR) [ 中 诚 信 证 券 评 估 有 限 公 司 ] 
<http://www.ccxr.com.cn/about.asp?link=4> accessed 6 July 2019. 
136  United Ratings [ 联 合 信 用 评 级 有 限 公 司 ] 
<http://www.lianhecreditrating.com.cn/News.aspx?m=20140627095017653668> accessed 6 July 2019. 
137  China Bond Rating[ 中 债 资 信 评 估 有 限 责 任 公 司 ] 




purchased one credit rating that cannot be applied on another trading platform have to 
purchase an additional credit rating that is recognised by the other regulator. Second, in order 
to avoid the extra costs, issuers are inclined to choose CRAs that possess four certificates. 
As a result, the regulatory certificates provide advantages for a few CRAs. As is seen in the 
Table 2.5, there are only three CRAs with three certificates, namely (i) Dagong, (ii) Golden 
and (iii) SB&IS. From the credit rating industry’s perspective, the regulatory approval itself 
easily leads to the hurdle of market entry and the multi-regulatory approval further 
aggravates this unfair competition. Third, the multi-approval supervision system reduces 
efficiency and wastes regulatory resources. One CRA applies for certificates for all relevant 
regulators, and every regulator has to review and verify the information provided by the 
same CRA.  
 
Before analysing whether or not that is a waste, the following question should first be 
answered: Are these different standards substantially different? That implies if these 
standards issued by various regulators are really different rather than different on the surface, 
their presence is rational and necessary. If not, they are merely issued by different regulators, 
but the requirements are substantially similar that are not necessary or efficient. By 
comparing the two certificate requirements from the CSRC and PBOC respectively,138 it is 
found that most of the requirements are similar and there is no big difference besides the 
regulators themselves. The reason behind that is for the sake of convenience of supervision 
the objects and platforms that the two regulators supervise are different. If these regulators 
could co-operate with each other, the regulation would be more efficient and effective.  
 
Back to the bond market history, in order to protect the banking industry and financial 
stability, the interbank bond market was established and has regulatory privileges, such as 
least legal procedures involved in bond issues. On the one hand, these regulations and multi-
supervision system provide a more or less stable financial market. Rapid and increasing 
financial markets boost the development of CRAs. On the other hand, these regulations and 
the multi-supervision system in reverse limits the further development of CRAs and the 
regulatory burden reduces the efficiency from the rating industry to the whole bond market. 
 
138  The requirements of application for recognised CRAs registered with CRSC, see China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, ‘The Requirements of Application for Recognised Credit Rating Agencies [资信评
级机构从事证券服务业审批]’ <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/gszqjgb/fwzn/201603/t20160329_2949 
05.html> accessed 9 September 2018. The requirements of application for recognised CRAs registered with 
the PBOC, see Guiding Opinions of the People’s Bank of China for the Management of Credit Rating [中国





Chinese regulators have realised the problems under the multi-regulator system. In 2016, the 
PBOC drafted a regulation specifically for CRAs, namely the Interim Measures for the 
Administration of the Credit Rating Business (exposure draft).139 In 2019, the PBOC, NDRC, 
CSRC, NDRC and Ministry of Finance jointly issue the Interim Measures for the 
Administration of the Credit Rating Industry140 (hereafter ‘Interim Measures 2019’). The 
Interim Measures 2019 provide that the PBOC is the supervisory body, while the other three 
regulators are the administrative bodies.141 In terms of the regulators, both the European 
Union and United States, have one centralized regulator, namely the SEC (including its 
branch OCR) in the United States and ESMA in the European Union. Since 2019, even 
though the PBOC became the supervisory regulator, there are still other administrative 
regulators as well as the multi-regulator system still exists.  
 
c. Over-Concise Legal Framework 
 
Another regulatory concern is the current incomplete legal framework, and the existing laws 
and rules regarding CRAs. The current legal framework regarding credit ratings has not 
completely been established as yet. There is no legislation specially designed for CRAs, and 
most of the existing regulations regarding credit rating are scattered in different laws and 
rules, such as the Company Law and the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereafter ‘Securities Law’). For instance, all the relevant articles under the Securities Law 
are followed: First, under Article 169 of the Securities Law, CRAs are required to get 
approval from the CSRC and the relevant regulators. By contrast, the CSRC is entitled to 
approve and supervise CRAs. Secondly, Article 170 provides for qualification requirements 
for the rating analysts in CRAs. Thirdly, as Article 172 states, CRAs are required to charge 
reasonable fees in accordance with the relevant requirements issued by the State Council. 
Fourthly, as Article 226 states, if a rating agency is established without the approval of the 
CSRC and provides rating services in the securities market, the CSRC will impose a fine on 
it and may revoke its license. Last, Articles 173 and 223 refer to the accountability of CRAs.  
 
 
139 Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating Industry (exposure draft) [信用评级业管理
暂行办法（征求意见稿）] (People’s Bank of China [中国人民银行] 2016). 
140 Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating Industry [信用评级业管理暂行办法] 2019 
(No. 5 [2019] of People’s Bank of China, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of 
Finance and the China Securities Regulatory Commission). 




However, as illustrated in Table 2.6, the existing regulation is not systematic enough. Some 
of these rules only contain a few provisions associated with credit rating. Apart from that, 
on the ground that all existing regulation, except the Company Law and Securities Law, are 
not at national level but departmental rules and codes, the scope of jurisdiction and binding 
force are thus limited. For example, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (hereafter 
‘CBRC’)142 issued one department rule, namely ‘Administrative Measures for the Capital of 
Commercial Banks (for Trial Implementation)’143, which requires that CRAs should be 
recognised by the CBRC, otherwise their ratings cannot be applied in the calculation of 
market risk by commercial banks.144 This is a departmental rule and should have applied 
into the commercial banks. Nevertheless, CBRC did not approved any CRA yet and this rule 
thus has limited binding force in practice. The reason why the lack of CBRC approvals for 
CRAs is that the actual power for registration, certification and approval has been carved by 
other regulators. In theory, both the PBOC and the CBRC have right to recognise CRAs that 
their ratings could be used in the calculation of market risk for commercial banks. In practice, 
the PBOC is superior regulatory than the CBRC and there is an overlap between the PBOC 
and the CBRC in approving CRAs associated with capital for commercial banks. As a result, 
this rule issued by CBRC seems ineffective. As seen the messy situation under a multi-
regulators supervision system for CRAs, it is incumbent upon regulator to establish a unified 




143  China Banking Regulatory Commission [中国银监会], ‘Administrative Measures for the Capital of 
Commercial Banks (for Trial Implementation) [《商业银行资本管理办法》（试行）]’ No. 1 [2012] of the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission. 




Table 2.6 The Existing Regulations and Departmental Codes Regarding CRAs Issued 
by Various Regulators 
Administration Official documents 
CSRC  1. ‘Interim Measures for Administration of Credit Rating Business at 
the Securities Market’ (effective since 2008)145 
2. ’Standards for Credit Rating Report on Bonds of the Securities 
Companies by CRA’ (effective since 2005)146 
PBOC  1. ‘Guiding Opinions of the People’s Bank of China for the 
Management of Credit Rating’ (effective since 2006) 147 
2.  Specification for credit rating in the credit market and inter-bank 
market (effective since 2006) 148 
3. ‘Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating 
Business Regarding the Securities Market’ (effective since 2019) 
 
State Council 1.  ‘Interim Regulations on Administration of Enterprise Bonds’ 
(effective since 2011) 
2.  ‘Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, 
Opening, and Steady Growth of Capital Markets’ (effective since 
2004) 
CBRC 1. ‘Administrative Measures for the Capital of Commercial Banks 
(for Trial Implementation)’(effective since 2012) 
 
In December 2019, the final ‘Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating 
Business Regarding the Securities Market’149 came into effect. The main changes focus on 
the following three aspects: first, Interim Measures 2019 provides registration 
 
145 Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating Business Regarding the Securities Market [证
券市场资信评级业务管理暂行办法] (No. 50 [2007] of China Securities Regulatory Commission [证监发
[2007] 50号]). 
146 China Securities Regulatory Commission, ‘Standards for Credit Rating Report on Bonds of the Securities 
Companies by Credit Rating Agency’ (2005) 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69166.html> accessed 2 
February 2018. 
147 Guiding Opinions of the People’s Bank of China for the Management of Credit Rating [中国人民银行信
用评级管理指导意见]. 
148 Specification for Credit Rating in the Credit Market and Interbank Market [信贷市场和银行间债券市场
信用评级规范] (JR/T00301-3—2006, People’s Bank of China). 




requirements 150  and disclosure requirements. 151  Second, it requires CRAs to establish 
internal controls and corporate governance to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure 
independence. Third and most importantly, Interim Measure 2019 increases the level of fines 
and penalties. Interim Measures 2019 revolutionarily establishes a uniform regulatory 
framework applicable to CRAs and requires regulators to apply consistent standards for 
CRAs. However, Interim Measures 2019 has not determined what the particular 
responsibilities for each regulator are and how to regulate CRAs with unified standards in 
various platforms for different bonds. As analysed above, the multi-regulators for CRAs 
stemmed from the multi-regulator system in the bond market. A CRA is a financial 
intermediary, and serves bonds issue and securitization. Bond regulators have various levels 
of requirements, such as disclosure and capital requirements, that are designed for various 
bonds and different issuing platforms. Therefore, regulation of CRAs cannot separate the 
CRA issues from its based bond market.  
 
The key problem during the multi-regulator phase is that the various regulators issue 
certificates to various CRAs. This problem has not changed. The Interim Measures 2019 aim 
to establish a uniform certification standard. However, this increases the approval standard. 
Since the Interim Measures 2019, so far, the PBOC and the other three regulators have not 
issued any new CRA with a certificate of approval.152 This may create barriers to market 
entry and impede effective market competition. Compared to the CRA regime of the 
European Union and United States, the China regime for CRAs seems comparatively overly 
concise and unsystematic.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
Having illustrated the evolution of CRAs and the relevant regulatory systems in the 
European Union, United States and China respectively, it observes that the varying degrees 
of development in credit rating industry lead to various problems encountered by each region. 
The United States has almost one-century history of CRAs. For one thing, the US bond 
market provides the sufficient demand for reducing information asymmetry between bond 
issuers and investors. For another, the SEC created the regulatory license, namely ‘NRSRO’, 
 
150 Chapter 2&3, ibid. 
151 Chapter 6 (Articles 38-44), ibid. 
152 Fanfu Meng [孟凡富], ‘The Licenses for Credit Rating Agency: An Analysis for 56 Credit Rating Agencies 
Completed Recordation [ 信 用 评 级 牌 照 85: 56 家 完 成 信 用 评 级 备 案 机 构 的 分 析 ]’ 




which offered special market status to recognized CRAs. The regulatory licenses of 
NRSROs were offered to a certain number of CRAs for several decades. Since the approval 
of NRSRO, the credit ratings issued by NRSROs have been increasingly employed into the 
legislations, regulation and standards. 
 
With the development of economic globalization, as mentioned above, European and other-
region bond issuers were allowed to enter into the US bond market, and when they had 
positive credit ratings, they were more likely to obtain more capital in the bond market. This 
created large number of businesses for the US CRAs. Therefore, the US CRAs gradually 
occupy global market shares, especially in European market shares. At the same time, the 
Chinese bond market has not been formed. Therefore, the global CRAs has less effect on the 
Chinese CRA industry. Compared to the global financial crisis, the subsequent euro area 
crisis raises more significant concerns for the EU member states about the over-reliance on 
the foreign CRAs. This provides a strong political and economic motivations to encourage 
EU domestic or regional credit rating industry. In addition, China has been less affected by 
the financial crisis of 2008. Thus, the China regime of CRAs seems over-concise as the 
demand for regulation of CRAs is less than other two areas. It is because the history of 
Chinese CRAs is younger than that of the European Union and United States, that there are 
fewer unresolved problems than that faced by the other areas’ jurisdictions.  
 
More importantly, this chapter provides the wider social contexts with respect to CRAs in 
the European Union, United States and China, and these backgrounds contributes to 
understanding the three regions’ various problems and their respective regulatory 
approaches to the same issue in the chapters that follow. In this Chapter, that the references 
to credit ratings of NRSROs were increasingly employed into the US legislations and 
regulations and standard, gave a clue to the severe regulatory over-reliance in the United 
States, as it will be discussed in Chapter 3. A small number of CRAs were approved in the 
United States for a long time and then entered in the global market during the economic 
globalization, which, from a historical perspective, addresses the oligopolistic market 
structure of the big three, as it will be discussed in Chapter 5. In addition, these specific 
problems provide various incentives for the three regions to regulate the CRAs. The United 
States more focuses on the regulatory reliance associated with the NRSRO. Given that the 
huge impact of the eurozone crisis, the European Union has the political motivations in 
dealing with the foreign CRAs issue, which will be observed from the EU regulatory 




economic and political motivations to better regulate CRAs. Given that the fewer unsolved 








CRAs were criticised during the global financial crisis of 2007–8  in two respects. One, was 
their over-reliance on credit ratings and the other was the rating quality. Taking as a starting 
position the post-crisis regulatory reforms of CRAs at the national, international and regional 
levels, this chapter critically analyses the over-reliance of investors and market participants 
on external credit ratings and the extent to which such a phenomenon was exacerbated by 
the use of credit ratings in legislation and regulatory frameworks. Chapter 3 is designed to 
answer the following questions related to the over-reliance: What is the over-reliance on 
credit ratings? Why is this overreliance considered to have exacerbated the global financial 
crisis, or even the financial stability? What are the existing regulatory approaches against 
the over-reliance? What is the implementation of such regulations? Are these regulatory 
approaches and implements effective enough to deal with the over-reliance? Otherwise, to 
what extent do these regulatory approaches and implements improve the situation 
respectively? Chapter 4, 5 and 6 aim to analyse the factors affecting the rating quality, 
namely the conflicts of interest, the oligopolistic market structure in credit rating industry 
and civil liability for CRAs.  
 
In order to address these questions, this chapter, at first, addresses the common uses of credit 
rating in the legislation, regulations and standards. The widespread uses of credit ratings by 
regulators, investors, financial institutions and other market participants is the basis that 
credit ratings paly such a significant role in financial market. Second, it addresses a series of 
negative effects stemmed from rating downgrades, including rating triggers, cliff effects and 
systemic risks. Rating downgrades may trigger liquidity crisis and further cause the systemic 
risk of the whole financial market at national, regional and international level. The most 
important thing is the relation between the over-reliance and the financial stability. The 
Over-reliance not only exacerbates the liquidity problems but also results in financial 
disruptions. Third, it continues to address the existing regulations against the over-reliance 






3.2 The Basis for the Reliance on Credit Ratings  
 
3.2.1 Historical Background 
 
In the early part of the nineteenth century, the boom of US railroad bonds created a huge 
information asymmetry, which gave birth to the credit rating Industry. Specifically, before 
the expansion of railroad bonds, most transactions were conducted on the domestic level or 
even between people who know each other.1 With the building of railroads all over the 
United States and the need for capital for these growing railroads, raising capital through 
local bank loans and bonds issuances in a small region for these railroad corporations were 
far from enough. Therefore, capital was beginning to be raised through railroad bonds across 
the country.2 Meanwhile, faced with the increasing expansion of the bonds market, lenders 
and investors tended to pay attention to such railroad bond issuers with whom they had been 
unfamiliar. This created a huge demand for reducing the information asymmetry between 
investors and bond issuers. As a result, CRAs filled the gap. CRAs provided reports 
regarding the creditworthiness of such railroad bond issuers. Early in 1841, Lewis Tappan, 
the founder of Mercantile Agency, sold business information about the creditworthiness of 
American commercial enterprise;3 and later, in 1890, Poor’s Publishing Company provided 
comprehensive analysis about the business information of the railroad bonds.4  
 
In 1909, John Moody, who set up Moody’s Investors Services Inc. (hereafter ‘Moody’) later 
in 1914, issued Analyses of Railroad Investments,5 which revolutionarily expressed business 
information of each railroad bond by classifying the creditworthiness of these bonds by way 
of alphabetical symbols;6 for example, the rating of an ‘A’ letter indicated a high probability 
of repayment, while a ‘D’ meant a high probability of default. Gradually, the following 
CRAs adopted this successful alphabetical–symbol way of rating.  
 
 
1 Francesco De Pascalis, Credit Ratings and Market Over-Reliance: An International Legal Analysis (Brill 
Nijhoff 2017) 15. 
2 Raquel García Alcubilla and Francisco Javier Ruiz del Pozo, Credit Rating Agencies on the Watch List: 
Analysis of European Regulation (Oxford University Press 2012) Chapter 1.1.1.  
3 Nicola Jentzsch, Financial Privacy: An International Comparison of Credit Reporting Systems (2nd edn, 
Springer 2007) 63–4.  
4 Timothy J. Sinclair, ‘Bond Rating Agencies’ (2003) 8 New Political Economy 147.  
5  Moody’s Investors Services Inc, ‘Moody’s History: A Century of Market Leadership’ 
<https://www.moodys.com/Pages/atc001.aspx> accessed 15 February 2020.  
6 Emory R Johnson, ‘Moody’s Analyses of Railroad Investments by John Moody’ (1909) 34 Annals of the 




There are two obvious advantages to this alphabetical-symbol rating of credit. First, the 
rating quality of various bonds is ranked by several rating scales, ranging from investment 
grade to speculative grade.7 These credit ratings of various bonds provide more business 
information to market participants, so that market participants can understand the credit 
quality of various bonds, as well as the position of each bond in the whole market. Credit 
ratings play a role as information intermediary in the financial market, which essentially 
mitigates information asymmetry. Secondly, this kind of simple letter makes credit ratings 
easy to understand. Faced with large quantities of information in the financial market and 
various complex financial products, market participants are inclined to choose this simple 
but effective rating. 
 
Simply put, the credit ratings were derived from the increasing need that mitigated the 
information asymmetry between bonds issuers and investors. The current way of rating 
credit is easily to understand and disseminate.  
 
3.2.2 Theoretical Basis 
 
The ground of market over-reliance on credit ratings is the role of credit rating in 
amelioration of information asymmetry. The following is the ‘lemon’ theory about the 
importance of mitigating information asymmetry for the whole market; in other words, 
mitigating information asymmetry helps the market maintain effective and stable. Akerlof 
put forward the ‘lemon’ theory, which explained information asymmetries through the used-
car market: If every car in the market is either good or bad (a ‘lemon’), the buyer of a new 
car cannot know whether the car is a good or bad until he/she purchases and uses it for some 
time.8 We suppose that only the owner of the used car (seller) knows whether or not his/her 
car is good or bad, while the potential buyer does not. In other words, the seller now has 
more information regarding car quality than the buyer does and the information asymmetry 
is thus created. Furthermore, when buyers are unable to distinguish between good cars and 
bad cars (‘lemon’), buyers may be more likely to offer the same price for both cars. 
Conversely, both good and bad cars have to be sold at the same price.9 Consequently, the 
sellers of good cars cannot get fair offers. In short, the result of an information asymmetry 
 
7 Investment grade includes A category (AAA, AA and A) to BB (the intermediate rating), while speculative 
grade includes B and other below ratings.  
8 George A Akerlof, ‘The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84 





may cause low-quality products, finally driving high-quality products out of the market, and 
the market may even collapse. 
 
As mentioned above, the ‘lemon’ theory can be applied to the bond market. Bond issuers 
have more information about the quality of bonds, while lenders cannot know whether the 
issuers would be able to repay the debt until lenders own the bonds by the date of maturity. 
Owing to information asymmetries between bond issuers (borrowers) and lenders, the 
difficulty of selection is identified in the inability of the lenders to distinguish between high-
risk bonds and low-risk bonds. Faced with a similar situation, lenders may also more likely 
offer the same interest rate to bond issuers (borrowers). As a result, the issuers of low-risk 
bonds have to pay the same interest rate as the issuers of high-risk bonds. Apart from that, 
there are other negative consequences caused by this information disequilibrium. For 
example, a certain number of borrowers who could have afforded a low interest rate, cannot 
raise capital from the bond market. Another example would be where lenders may lose 
confidence in the bond market due to the lack of sufficient information, and the whole capital 
market would shrink.  
 
3.3 The Use of Credit Ratings 
 
3.3.1 The Widespread Use of Credit Ratings in the United States  
 
The first use of credit ratings for regulatory purposes dates back to 1930s in the United States. 
On the heel of the banking crisis in March 1931 and the Great Depression, US regulators 
attempted to strengthen investor protection. As a result, they decided to make a line to 
differentiate securities by their credit quality so that investors could avoid risky 
investments.10 As a result, in 1936, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (hereafter 
‘OCC’) categorised securities between investment grade and speculate grade by their credit 
ratings.11 According to the relevant regulation of OCC, the bonds that financial institutions 
held had to be publicly rated at least BBB to be carried at book value; otherwise the bonds 
(rated below BB rating) should be written down to current market value and ‘50 percent of 
the resulting book losses were to be charged against capital’.12 Later in 1936, the Office of 
 
10 Steven L Schwarcz, 'Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox' (2002) 1 University 
of Illinois Law Review 
11 The OCC legally defined the ‘investment securities’ in section 5136 of Revised Status as Amended by the 
‘Banking Act of 1935’. Banking Act of 1935 (Public No. 305, 74th Congress, HR 7616).  
12 Richard R. West, ‘Bond Ratings, Bond Yields and Financial Regulation: Some Findings’ (1973) 16 The 




Comptroller of the Federal Reverse further enhanced the market status of CRAs by 
prohibiting financial institutions from holding bonds rated below BBB by two rating 
agencies.13  
 
During the 1970s, one vital change incorporated credit ratings into the US rating-based 
regulation, namely the concept of NRSROs. On the heels of the collapse of Penn Central 
Transportation, the regulators aimed to enhance market confidence and maintain financial 
stability. At the same time, the growth of the credit industry and the function of credit rating 
service drew the attention of regulators. In 1973, the SEC created the NRSRO concept 
through amendments to Rule 15c3-1 of the Exchange Act, namely the Net Capital Rule. The 
Net Capital Rule specifically required broker-dealers to ‘deduct from net worth certain 
percentage of the market value of their proprietary securities’,14 namely a ‘haircut’. The 
‘haircut’ was based on the risk characteristics of debt instruments held by broker-dealers.15 
If one debt instrument was rated at investment grade by one of two NRSROs, the broker-
dealer could take a lower haircut.16 This kind of regulatory approval granted a credible 
market status to NRSROS, which also triggered widespread use of credit ratings in more 
regulations. 
 
Afterwards, credit rating, as regulatory tool, was extensively used in various sectors, 
including the banking sector, education sector, labour sector and the insurance sector. As 
Table 3.1 lists, a large number of regulations, such as the Securities Act of 193317 and the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, have incorporated the terms of NRSROs for regulatory 
purposes since the use of the Net Capital Rule. For example, in the late 1970s, credit 
ratings issued by NRSROs were applied by the US Department of Education to ‘set 
standards of financial responsibility for institutions which want to engage in student 
financial assistance programs under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965’. In 
another instance, section 3(a)(41) of the Exchange Act required ‘mortgage-related security’ 
to be ‘rated in one of the two highest rating categories by at least one NRSRO’.  
 
13 Richard Cantor and Frank Packer, ‘The Credit Rating Industry’ (1994) 1 FRBNY Quarterly Review 1, 6.  
14 SEC, ‘Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets’ 
(2003) 6 <https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf> accessed 20 April 2020.  
15 US General Government Division, Regulatory and Industry Approaches to Capital and Risk (1998) 132. 
16 SEC, ‘Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets’ 
(n 14).  
17 Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.10); Rule 436 (17 CFR 230.436); Form S-3 (17 CFR 239.13); Forms F-2 and 
F-3 (17 CFR 239.32, 239.33). See SEC, ‘Concept Release: Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations’ (1994) Release No. 34-34616, File No. S7-23-94; <https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-





Table 3.1 List of Rules and Regulations relating to NRSROs18 
Rule or regulation Detail 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
‘Exchange Act’ Rule 15c3-119 
(enacted in1975) 
 
This rule required broker-dealers to deduct percentages 
of their proprietary securities’ market value when 
computing net capital. Nevertheless, reduced 
deductions are required for particular securities rated 
investment grade by at least two NRSROs. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
‘Exchange Act’ Rule 10b-620 
 (adopted in 1975)  
Exempts particular transactions in non-convertible debt 
and non-convertible preferred securities from Exchange 
Act provisions if the securities are rated investment 
grade by at least one NRSRO. 
Investment Company Act of 1940 Rule 
2a-7 21 
(enacted in 1975) 
This rule requires money market funds to limit 
investments to ‘eligible securities’ that are rated in 
either of the top two short-term debt rating categories by 
the requisite number of NRSROs. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act Section 
1831 
(enacted in 1989) 
Congress defines ‘investment grade’ corporate debt for 
savings associations as only securities rated in one of 
the four highest categories by at least one NRSRO.22 
Investment Company Act of 1940 Rule 
3a-723 
(enacted in 1992) 
Issuers of fixed-income securities rated in one of the top 
four rating categories by at least one NRSRO are 
exempted from registering and complying with the 
Investment Company Act. 
This rule also set out plenty of requirements to 
distinguish between investment companies and 
structured financing. Among these, the structured 
financings are required to be rated investment grade by 
NRSROs.  
 
18 Table adapted from Emily McClintock Ekins and Mark A Calabria, ‘Regulation, Market Structure, And the 
Role of the Credit Rating Agencies’ (2012) No.704 Policy Analysis 
<https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA704.pdf> accessed 29 September 2019. and SEC, 
‘Concept Release: Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’ (n 17) 3-6. 
19 17 CFR 240.15c3-1, see SEC, ‘SEC News Digest: A Daily Summary from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’ (1973) Issue 73-230 <https://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1973/dig112973.pdf> accessed 2 April 
2019. 
20  17 CFR 240.10b-6(a)(4)(xiii), see SEC, ‘Concept Release: Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations’ (n 17) 5.  
21 17 CFR 270.2a-7.ibid. 
22 ibid. 
23  17 CFR 270. 3a-7, see SEC, ‘Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Company for Structured 
Financings’ Release No.IC-19105; File No. S7-12-92 <https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/1992/ic-19105.pdf> 




Rule or regulation Detail 
Investment Company Act of 1940 
Rule 10f-324 (enacted in 1979) 
This rule created a definition of municipal securities, 
and to be eligible as a municipal security, the debt 
instrument is required to be rated as investment grade 
by NRSROs. 
 
Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 
Pension funds shall be partly based on credit ratings of 
their investment criteria on bond, and the credit ratings 
are required to be provided by NRSRO designated 
CRAs. 
Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 
 
Pension funds are mandated to be partly based on credit 
ratings of their investment criteria on bond and the 
credit ratings are required to be provided by NRSRO 
designated CRAs. 
Secondary Mortgage Market 
Enhancement Act of 1984,  
section 3(a)(41) of the Exchange Act 
NRSRO is used as a term to account for ‘mortgage 
related security’ which is required to be ‘rated in one of 
the two highest rating categories by at least one 
NRSRO.25 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1989  Company debt securities is required to be rated on one 
of the four highest categories at least one NRSRO.26 
Investment Company Act of 1940 Rule 
2a-7  
(enacted in 1991) 
 
Less than 5 percent of money market mutual fund assets 
may be invested in commercial paper that NRSROs 
assign lower than the first or second highest grade. 
Simplification of Registration 
Procedures for Primary Securities 
Offerings, Securities Act 1992 
Credit ratings issued by NRSROs are applied to 
distinguish between different types of securities that 
may be issued using simplified registration procedures. 
 
In short, the regulatory use of credit rating in US legislation can be dated back to the Banking 
Act of 1936. Later in 1970s, the SEC conferred a special market status on NRSROs through 
the Net Capital Rule. As the Net Capital Rule paved the way to the widespread use of credit 
ratings in regulations and rules, the US rating-based regulatory framework, ranging from 
banking regulation to labour and insurance regulation, gradually formed. 
 
24  17 CFR 270.10f-3, see SEC, ‘References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization’ (2008) Release Nos. IC-28327; IA-2751 File No. S7-19-08, 22-3 
<https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/ic-28327.pdf> accessed 20 February 2020. 






3.3.2 The Regulatory Use of Credit Ratings in the European Union, China and 
United States 
 
Credit ratings are broadly used in the European Union, China and other countries. At 
international level, credit ratings are used in regulation and rules for three or four main 
purposes: (i) to determine capital requirement; (ii) to identify permissible assets, usually in 
the context of eligible investments or permissible asset concentration; (iii) to provide an 
evaluation of credit risk when securities or covered bond offering; and (iv) to determine 
disclosure requirements and prospectus eligibility.27 In China, according to the report issued 
by the PBO in 2013, the regulatory use of credit ratings manifests in determining capital 
requirement for commercial banks, insurance and reinsurance, and for securitisation and 
corporate bond offerings.28  
 
a. Capital Requirement  
 
The primary use of external credit ratings is to determine the regulatory capital, especially 
in the pillar I ‘Minimum Capital Requirements’ of the Basel II framework.29 The European 
Union, United States and China have incorporated this framework into their respective 
regulatory systems, and the external credit ratings can be used to determine regulatory capital 
requirements and set capital models for credit risk among these areas. 
 
The calculation of capital requirement considers various forms of risk. Among them, credit 
risk is the major component for commercial banks, while market risk is more significant for 
investment banks and securities firms. External credit rating can be regarded as a primary 
determinant of the quality of risk-weighted assets which is used to determine the credit risk. 
This process is similar to the calculation of market risk for debt securities. As a result, the 
credit rating directly affects the determination of capital requirements.30  
 
 
27 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (The Joint Forum), ‘Stocktaking on the Use of Credit Ratings’ 3–
4 <https://www.bis.org/publ/joint22.pdf> accessed 1 January 2020.  
28 Xiangdong [向东] Zhang [章], ‘Research on the test of Credit Rating Quality in China [我国信用评级质量
检验报告]’ (PhD Thesis, University of International Business and Economics [对外经贸大学] 2015). 
29 Rolf H. Weber and Aline Darbellay, ‘The Regulatory Use of Credit Ratings in Bank Capital Requirement 
Regulations’ (2008) 10 Journal of Banking Regulation 1, 4. 
30 Iain G MacNeil, ‘Credit Rating Agencies: Regulation and Financial Stability’ in Thomas Cottier and Others 




The European Union implemented the Basel III framework for both banks and investment 
firms through Capital Requirements Directive IV.31 In the United States, credit ratings are 
most extensively used in the determination of capital requirements in both the banking and 
securities sectors. At the same time, NRSROs are exclusively eligible to issue credit ratings 
for the purpose of capital requirements.32  
 
Like the European Union and United States, under the Basel framework, the broadest 
regulatory application of credit rating in China is to determine capital requirements. In 2012, 
the CBRC issued the Administrative Measures for the Capital of Commercial Banks33, which 
provides the existing rating-based regulation in the banking sector, especially for 
commercial banks, There are two aspects in this regulation relating to the reliance on external 
credit rating: (i) the external credit ratings are used to calculate the credit risk of risk-
weighted assets and risk-weighted assets for the securitisation exposures; and (ii) 
commercial banks should refer to external credit ratings when classifying eligible liquid 
assets.  
 
b. Asset Identification 
 
Credit ratings are used to ‘determine permissible assets and/or required investments for 
mutual funds, as well as the concentration limits for particular types of assets’.34 In the United 
States, the extensive rating-based regulation for asset identification purposes occurs in the 
banking and securities sector, including money market funds. 35  In addition, many state 
insurance laws control permissible assets and/or concentration limits with reference to credit 
ratings.36 in the European Union, the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities Directives37 on collective investment schemes does not refer expressly to credit 
ratings. Nevertheless, Articles 6 and 10 of Commission Directive 2007/16/EC do refer the 
 
31 The CRD consist of Directive 2013/36/EU on access to the activity and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms (Capital Requirements Directive IV) (OJ 2013 L 176) recital 79.  
32 17 CFR 240.17g-1 – 240.17g-6 and Form NRSRO. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (The Joint 
Forum) (n 27) 5. 
33  China Banking Regulatory Commission [中国银监会 ], ‘Administrative Measures for the Capital of 
Commercial Banks (for Trial Implementation) [《商业银行资本管理办法》（试行）]’ No. 1 [2012] of the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission. 
34 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (The Joint Forum) (n 27) 7. 
35 17 CFR 270.2a-7, setting out the risk-limiting provisions applicable to money market funds. See MacNeil (n 
30) 186. 
36 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (The Joint Forum) (n 27) 7–8. 
37  This framework is contained in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1619 of 12 July 2018 




credit ratings in their definition of permissible assets. 38  Notice of the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission on Issuing the Interim Measures for the Investment of Insurance 
Funds in Bonds (hereafter ‘Notice of CIRC’)39 can be regarded as a clear example in the 
insurance sector. Article 9(1)3&4 of Notice of CIRC requires insurance funds to invest in 
corporate bonds with least AA ratings issued by domestic CRAs or with BB and above 
ratings issued by international CRAs. 
 
c. Securitisation and Covered Bonds Offering40 
 
In general, the rating-based regulation regarding the securitisation requires that 
securitisations be rated by at least one CRA for investors. 
 
The development of securitisation, such as asset-backed securitisation, in various areas is 
significantly uneven. In China, the Notice of PBOC, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission and the Ministry of Finance on Relevant Matters Concerning Further 
Expanding the Pilot Securitization of Credit Assets (hereafter ‘FEPSCA’)41 requires that the 
structure of credit asset securitisation products shall be simple and clear and, therefore, the 
re-securitisation or synthetic securitisation in the expanded pilot stage shall not be allowed.  
 
As a result, there are not many relevant provisions in China. Article 4 of FEPSCA provides 
that securitisation should be rated by two approved CRAs when it is issued in the interbank 
market. However, when securitisation is issued on other platforms, such as the Shanghai 
Exchange and Shenzhen Exchange, credit rating is not a compulsory requirement. 42 
 
38 Raquel García Alcubilla and Francisco Javier Ruiz del Pozo (n 2) 17. 
39  China Insurance Regulatory Commission [中国保监会 ], ‘Notice of the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission on Issuing the Interim Measures for the Investment of Insurance Funds in Bonds [保险资金投资
债券暂行办法]’ (2012) No. 58 [2012] of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission <保监发〔2012〕58
号>.  
40 Securitisations mainly refers to the process of pooling assets and issuing securities representing interest in 
the pool of asserts. Covered bonds are debt instruments issued by banks and other credit institutions, the 
repayment of which is secured by a ring-fenced pool of assets backing the bond. See Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (The Joint Forum) (n 27) 8. 
41 People’s Bank of China, Ministry of Finance and China Banking Regulatory Commission, ‘Notice of the 
People’s Bank of China, the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the Ministry of Finance on Relevant 
Matters Concerning Further Expanding the Pilot Securitization of Credit Assets [中国人民银行、中国银行
业监督管理委员会、财政部关于进一步扩大信贷资产证券化试点有关事项的通知]’ (2012) No. 127 
[2012] of the People’s Bank of China (银发[2012]127号]. 
42 Many provisions state that as credit rating report is a voluntary requirement, and issuer is not required to 
compulsorily provide it. See in Article 6 of Guidelines on Information Disclosure of Asset Securitization 




However, credit rating is an indispensable tool during the creation of securitisation, because 
the credit ratings are used to identify and tranche the underlying assets of the structured 
financial products, as it will be discussed below in the Chapter 4, and so far, no alternative 
has been found. Following these regulations, the banks still utilise credit ratings to design 
and create securitised financial products.43 Even though these regulations do not regard 
credit rating as a compulsory element, the market still relies on credit ratings to access the 
credit risk of assets and identify them in different tranches. The United Kingdom determines 
the credit quality of securitisation through ratings by the external credit assessment 
institution. In terms of covered bonds, it also considers the quality of asset pool by whether 
or not the counterparty has an appropriate credit rating.44 In contrast, in the United States, a 
large number of banking and securities regulations and rules governing asset-backed 
instruments refer to external credit ratings.45 
 
d. Prospectus Rules  
 
External credit ratings are often used as part of prospectus requirements in the context of 
securities offering. In the United States, the SEC has a large amount of rating-based 
regulation in the context of prospectus requirements. Credit rating is used in the short-form 
prospectus in securities offering.46 In the United Kingdom, in the bond market, issuers must 
disclose credit ratings in the prospectus. 47  In China, there are plenty of rating-based 
regulations and rules in the context of securities offering. For example, on the stock 
exchange, Article 6 of the Guidelines of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange for the Issuance of 
 
司子公司资产证券化业务信息披露指引] (No. 49 [2014] of the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
[证监发[2014]49号]).; Appendix 1 of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, ‘Notice of the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
on Issuing and Implementing the Business Guidelines of the Shanghai Stock Exchange on Asset Securitization 
[上海证券交易所资产证券化业务指南]’ (2014) No. 80 [2014] of the Shanghai Stock Exchange [上证发
[2014]80号].; Article 9 (6) of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, ‘Notice of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange on Issuing 
the Business Guidelines of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange for Asset Securitization [深圳证券交易所资产支
持证券挂牌条件确认业务指引]’ (2014) No. 49 [2014] of Shenzhen Stock Exchange [证监会公告〔2014〕
49号].  
43  Yujie Xu [许余洁 ] and Bowen Deng [邓博文 ], ‘The Risk Analysis of Chinese Enterprise Asset 
Securitisation Market and Credit Rating [我国企业资产证券化市场的风险分析与信用评级关注]’ (2017) 2 
Jin Rong Fa Yuan [金融法苑] 109. 
44 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (The Joint Forum) (n 27) 8. 
45 ibid. 
46 17 CFR § 239.13¾Form S-3 (for registration) of Securities Act of 1933 (as amended through PL 112-106, 
approved April 5, 2012, 15 USC § 77a).  
47 Article 100-bis, part 4 of Consolidated Law on Finance pursuant to Articles 8 and 21 of Law no. 52 of 6 




Securities by Bidding48 requires issuers of corporate bonds to be rated at least triple A before 
these bonds can be issued on the Shenzhen Exchange. Another example is found in the 
interbank market, where the issuer of securities must be rated above an AA rating. 
 
3.4 The Negative Effects of Over-reliance on Credit Ratings 
 
3.4.1 Rating Downgrades and Rating Trigger Clauses 
 
Rating downgrades and rating trigger clauses exacerbate liquidity problems. A rating 
downgrade has a signalling effect in the financial market. Rating downgrades not only reflect 
some information of a rated entity, but also conveys information to the financial market, and 
investors usually react to these rating changes.49 Rating downgrades are usually regarded as 
a negative signal to convey the information on the deterioration of the borrower’s 
creditworthiness.50 Based on this, the possible response for investors is not to invest or to 
stop holding these downgraded securities.51 As a result, the rating downgrade escalates the 
borrower’s liquidity situation. 
 
Rating trigger clauses are widely used in the bond indentures and in financial contracts.52 
Once the rating downgrades go below a given threshold, the duty on the borrower will be 
activated and the lender has the enforceable right to impose on the borrower a specific action 
in accordance with the context in the agreements.53 Rating trigger clauses are designed not 
only to protect lenders against borrower credit deterioration, but also to reduce the cost of 
borrowing capital.54 There are three common types of rating triggers clauses: (i) collateral, 
letter of credit and bonding provisions; (ii) pricing grids or adjustments in interest rates or 
coupons; (iii) acceleration clauses. 55  First, the collateral, letter of credit and bonding 
provisions are often included in bank loan agreements. In the event of a rating downgrade, 
 
48 Guidelines of Shenzhen Stock Exchange for the Issuance of Securities by Bidding《深圳证券交易所债券
招标发行业务指引》 2017 (No. 119 [2017] of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange [深圳会〔2017〕119号]). 
49 Claire A. Hill, ‘Regulating the Rating Agencies’ (2004) 82 Washington University Law Quarterly, 68. 
50 Aline Darbellay, Regulating Credit Rating Agencies (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013) 183. 
51 ibid. 
52 Federico Parmeggiani, ‘Rating Triggers, Market Risk and the Need for More Regulation’ 14 European 
Business Organization Law Review, 428. 
53 ibid. 
54 Francesco De Pascalis, Credit Ratings and Market Over-Reliance: An International Legal Analysis (Brill 
Nijhoff 2017) 46.  
55 Fernando Gonzalez and others, ‘Market Dynamics Associated with Credit Ratings: A Literature Review’ 
European Central Bank, Occasional Paper Series No.16, 13-4 




the borrower is required to pledge assets to guarantee it financing over time.56 Second, 
pricing grids or adjustments in interest rates or coupons are often written into both bonds 
and bank loan agreements. The initial interest rate or coupon will be revised once the clause 
is triggered.57 Third, acceleration clauses may result in an acceleration of repayments or even 
early termination of credit when these clauses are activated.58 Among these types mentioned, 
the acceleration clauses have the most severe, or even critical impacts upon liquidity 
problems, because it may result in not only an increase in the cost of capital, but also in an 
immediate need for new capital.59  
 
Even though these clauses do not apply to CRAs directly, a rating downgrade is the key to 
activate these rating trigger clauses. Rating trigger clauses also have negative effects on the 
financial market. Besides this negative effect of the rating downgrade itself, once rating 
downgrades activate these rating trigger clauses, the borrower’s liquidity problems will be 
further exacerbated. When the company (borrower) is incapable of coping with the liquidity 
problem, eventually, it is often faced with insolvency. 60  To sum up, when a rating is 
downgraded, it reflects the poor performance of the downgraded company in some aspects 
and, at the same time, the signalling of a rating downgrade increases the cost of capital for 
the issuer. In addition, the possible subsequent ratings trigger further worsens the liquidity 
problem of the issuer. 
 
As a result, the interconnectedness of rating downgrades and rating triggers has a cascading 
impact on problems of liquidity.  
 
3.4.2 Credit Cliff Effect, Herding Behaviours and Rating-based Regulation 
 
Having illustrated the negative effects of rating downgrades and rating triggers on liquidity 
problems, the question becomes how rating downgrades eventually lead to a liquidity crisis. 
In addition, the 2007 financial crisis brought to attention the ‘hardwiring’ of credit ratings 
into legislation and regulatory frameworks. What is the role of the ‘hardwiring’ of credit 
ratings in the liquidity crisis? 
 
 
56 ibid 13. 
57 ibid 13-4. 
58 ibid 14. 
59 ibid. 




Rating downgrades and rating triggers probably contribute to a credit cliff situation. A credit 
cliff effect indicates numerous sell-offs of debt instruments in the event of one substantial 
rating downgrade.61 Specifically, when a rating drops below a certain level, in conjunction 
with the effects of rating triggers, large numbers of holders of relevant securities are likely 
to sell such securities in case of a rapid decline of securities price and possible liquidity 
problems.62 A credit cliff effect is often amplified by the herding behaviours of investors. 
Herding behaviours here means that investors tend to mimic investment behaviours of other 
investors.63 These selloffs caused by the credit cliff effect may be further escalated by other 
investors due to herding behaviours.  
 
The Over-reliance on credit ratings, especially rating-based regulations further amplifies 
these negative effects caused by the rating downgrades. The over-reliance on credit ratings 
is a cause of cliff effects, because rating-based regulation and standards exacerbate the 
negative effects of rating downgrades. References to credit ratings in the legislations, 
regulations and standards reinforce the market over-reliance on credit ratings, which 
amplifies the procyclicality through the cliff effect.64 For credit ratings, procyclicality refers 
to rating inflation in good times and massive rating downgrades in bad times. Without rating-
based regulation, a sell-off of investors affected by a rating downgrade of owned securities 
may be an autonomous response. Under rating-based regulation, this response could be more 
regarded as a constrained behaviour, because securities holders have to sell the speculative-
grade securities after a rating downgrade when there is a rule requiring these holders to only 
hold investment-grade securities. 65  As discussed above, there are a large number of 
regulations and rules associated with permissible assets identification by credit ratings. For 
example, owing to the rating-based capital requirements, when downgraded, banks were 
required to adjust their risk-weighted capital requirement upwards.66 In addition, the rating-
based rules associated with permissible assets identification require many banks and 
investors to invest and hold assets rated above a particular level. Once the rating drops below 
the required level, the investors have to sell such assets, which exacerbates the impacts of a 
 
61 European Commission, ‘Impact Assessment Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (Ec) No. 1060/2009 on Credit Rating 
Agencies’ (2010) SEC (2010) 13.  
62 Iain G MacNeil, ‘Credit Rating Agencies: Regulation and Financial Stability’ in Thomas Cottier and Others 
(eds), The Rule of Law in Monetary Affairs: World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press 2014) 189–190. 
63 See Avinash Persaud and State Street, ‘Sending the Herd off the Cliff Edge: The Disturbing Interaction 
Between Herding and Market Risk Sensitive Risk Management Practices’ [2000] BIS Papers No. 2 233, 235 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap02l.pdf> accessed 28 February 2020. 
64 Procyclicality refers to escalation of market trends in financial market. See Aline Darbellay (n 50) 186. 
65 Francesco De Pascalis (n 1) 55. 




rating downgrade. In addition, the over-reliance on credit rating is also a cause of herding 
behaviours, when regulations require or motivate numerous market participant to act in an 
almost identical fashion in the event of a rating downgrade.67 
 
3.4.3 Systemic Risk 
 
As can be seen from the analysis above, rating downgrades and a series of other negative 
events arising from these downgrades exacerbate the liquidity problems. Besides a liquidity 
crisis, rating downgrades may result in systemic disruptions through credit cliff effects.68 
This section will address how with the impetus of credit ratings, the liquidity problem 
transmits throughout the whole financial system. In addition, it will address how the over-
reliance on credit ratings amplifies systemic risk. 
 
As shown in recent financial crises, the liquidity problems were transmitted in the chain of 
financial institutions and further triggered systemic risk. The systemic risk stemmed from 
rating downgrades with two preconditions. The first is the oligopolies of the big three CRAs 
in the rating market. More accurately, the CRA that issued the credit rating should have a 
certain influence on the market, and the oligopolistic market structure of the big three fulfils 
the criterion. Second, the downgraded entity has a certain magnitude in the market. For 
example, the Greek sovereign rating downgrade gave rise to the euro area crisis. 
 
Rating downgrades have a systemic effect on the whole market through its spill-over effects. 
For example, If a big insurance company like American International Group, a largest global 
insurance corporation with more than USD 1 trillion dollars in assets prior to the financial 
crisis69, was downgraded, the assets that it has insured will subsequently be downgraded as 
well.70 This market contagion accentuates the effects of rating downgrades. In addition, the 
spill-over effects of rating downgrades can spread from a domestic to regional level, and 
even to the global level. Sovereign rating downgrades transmit a spill-over impact on 
domestic financial institutions and bond markets across financial markets. For instance, four 
main Portuguese financial institutions were downgraded after the sovereign downgrade of 
 
67 Financial Stability Board, ‘Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings’1 <https://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_101027.pdf> accessed 20 May 2020. 
68 ibid. 
69 Joel Ario and Peter A. Wayland, ‘AIG’s Impact on the Global Economy: Before, During and After Federal 
Intervention’, The AIG Debacle: Global Impact and the Need for Government Intervention (Nova Science 
Publishers 2010) 2-7. 




Portugal.71 The Italian sovereign downgrade in 2011 gave rise to downgrades of the main 
companies in the country.72 A further example is S&P’s downgrade of Greek sovereign debt 
near to speculative grade which triggered the following downgrades of other European 
countries and instability of euro zone countries. 73 It seems evident that rating downgrades 
have a systemic effect on the whole financial market beyond the national level. 
 
This kind of systemic effect of credit ratings is amplified by over-reliance through the 
following factors: First, the development of risk transfer techniques created a misconception 
about measuring actual risks within a financial system. Individual risk was transferred by 
various and novel risk transfer techniques, such as credit default swap (hereafter ‘CDS’). In 
fact, the risk transfer techniques cannot reduce the risk but transfers individual risk to others. 
Furthermore, this posed a greater risk to the whole financial market. Most importantly, credit 
ratings are applied in the creation of the risk transfer techniques,74 which presents the over-
reliance on credit ratings by the market in one respect. 
 
Second, the regulatory capital requirement associated with credit ratings further reinforces 
financial instability. When the price of financial instruments drops, investors tend to choose 
to sell in order to reduce loss. Under some relevant regulatory capital requirements or rating-
based rules that require financial institutions only to hold permissible assets, the chance is 
bigger that financial institutions would sell such financial instruments at the time when the 
price declines; 75  in other words, the over-reliance on credit rating exacerbates the 
implications of a rating downgrade and further destabilises the financial system. 
 
Third, the over-reliance on credit ratings rather than the credit rating itself causes a series of 
systemic disruptions. First, credit ratings are used to reduce the information asymmetry, but 
it cannot be regarded as a type of information disclosure because credit rating is an opinion 
based on processed information. This opinion cannot be verified as being true or false; which 
is to say, the possibility of inaccuracy of a credit rating should be considered by the financial 
 
71  Reuters Staff, ‘Portugal Banks Cut after Sovereign Downgrade’ Reuters (Lisbon, 14 July 2010) 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/portugal-moodys-banks/portugual-banks-cut-after-sovereign-downgrade-
idUSLDE66D1GW20100714> accessed 18 March 2020. 
72 Bertrand Candelon and Amadou NR Sy Rabah Arzeki, ‘Sovereign Rating News and Financial Markets Spill-
Overs: Evidence from the European Debt Crisis’ (2011) WP/11/68 International Monetary Fund 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1168.pdf> accessed 18 March 2020.  
73 ibid.  
74 As addressed early on in Chapter 2, credit rating is used as a tool to classify underling assets during the 
process. 




market. 76  Admittedly, credit ratings with errors will accentuate the negative effects 
stemming from the rating downgrades on the financial stability. However, it should be noted 
that even if assuming credit rating does not contain errors (even though it is inevitable that 
there are some errors in credit ratings in practice), rating downgrades still have the capability 
to cause cliff effects.77 This also supports the argument that the over-reliance on credit 
ratings instead of the credit rating itself is the root of financial instability. Inaccurate credit 
ratings may contribute to many more risks in financial markets, such as systemic risk. The 
root of the inaccuracy of credit ratings is that credit ratings are deemed to be more of an 
opinion or an evaluation that reflects an uncertain possibility. Compared to credit rating, 
disclosure, as another common tool for reducing information asymmetry, is applied to reflect 
relevant facts that can be verified or falsified.  
 
Simply put, rating downgrades and the consequent negative effects exacerbate the liquidity 
crisis and, ultimately, affects financial stability. All of the negative implications 
demonstrated above drew attention to the danger of over-reliance on credit ratings. Over-
reliance on the credit ratings aggravates rating downgrades and exacerbates the risks to 
financial stability. Regulators and policymakers began to realise and rethink the tie between 
the risks, such as liquidity risk and systemic risk, and rating-based regulation. The following 
section will address the current regulatory approach against the over-reliance.  
 
3.5 The Current Regulatory Approaches Against the Over-reliance on 
Credit Ratings 
 
3.5.1  The United States Regulatory Approach 
 
Leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-8, the SEC did not realize the potential problems 
deriving from the over-reliance, even though there had been two regulatory discussions 
regarding regulatory use of credit ratings before, namely SEC Release No. 34-34616 of 1994 
(hereafter ‘1994 Release’) 78  and SEC Release No 34-47972 of 2003 (hereafter ‘2003 
Release’)79. Under the 1994 Release, the SEC analysed the regulatory uses of credit ratings 
and discussed the formalized process for approving NRSROs.80 Even though the NRSROs 
 
76 ibid 189. 
77 ibid 189-90.  
78 SEC, ‘Concept Release: Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’ (n 17). 
79 SEC, ‘Concept Release: Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings under the Federal Securities Laws’ 
Release Nos. 33-8236; 34-47972; IC-26066; File No. S7-12-03 
<https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s71203/mbsturmfelz120503.pdf> accessed 2 April 2019. 




as a regulatory tool were widely used in financial regulations, the term of NRSRO was not 
defined at that time.81 Afterwards, a 1997 release82 proposed to provide a specific definition 
of NRSROs, but the SEC did not adopt the proposal.83 At the start of the twenty-first century, 
some credit rating scandals, namely those involving Enron and WorldCom, gave rise to a 
debate on the role of CRAs in both financial regulation and the markets. In 2003, the SEC 
considered the role of CRAs in the financial legislation in many aspects, ranging from 
conflicts of interest stemming from issuers-pay model to the lack of accountability of 
CRAs.84 Compared with the 1994 Release, one apparent change in the 2003 Release is that 
the SEC realized the potential risks stemming from the reliance on CRAs. However, like the 
1994 Release, the 2003 Release still did not explicitly indicate the hardwiring between credit 
ratings and financial regulation, and lacked acknowledgement of the danger of over-reliance 
on credit ratings.  
 
Later in 2008, the Release of No 34-5807085 (hereafter ‘2008 Release’) began to discuss the 
danger posed by the rating-based rules and the possibility of the elimination of rating-based 
rules and legislation from the existing regulatory framework.86 In order to address the effect 
of over-reliance on credit ratings, the 2008 Release discussed whether and to what extent 
investors rely on rating-based rules when they make investment decisions. Even though this 
approach targeted a reduction in the undue reliance on credit ratings, it remained unknown 
whether the SEC was able to verify and distinguish which rating-based rules caused undue 
reliance.87 Consequently, the rating-based regulations were still the significant component 
of the US regulatory framework in the aftermath of the 2008 Release.88 
 
 
81 SEC, ‘Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets’ 
(n 14) 11.  
82 SEC, ‘Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934’ (1997) 
Release No. 34-39457; File No. S7-33-97 <https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-39457.txt> accessed 20 
February 2019. 
83 SEC, ‘Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets’ 
(n 14) 15. 
84 SEC, ‘Concept Release: Request for Comment on Nasdaq Petition Relating to the Regulation of Nasdaq-
Listed Securities’ (2003) Release No. 34-47849; File No. S7-11-03 <https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-
47849.htm> accessed 2 April 2019. 
85 SEC, ‘References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization’ (2008) Release No 
34-58070, File No s7-17-08 <https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/34-58070fr.pdf> accessed 20 April 
2020. 
86 ibid 40089. 
87 Francesco De Pascalis (n 1) 79. 
88  The 2008 Release just targeted to the specific issues related to part of rating-based rules, see SEC, 




Until Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (hereafter ‘Dodd–
Frank Act’) in 201089, section 939A finally dealt with the regulatory source of over-reliance 
on credit ratings, namely the hardwiring of credit ratings in financial regulation. 90 In great 
detail, section 939A requires all US regulators to review each rating-based rule in their 
respective regulations and remove those rating-based rules that induce uncritical reliance on 
external credit ratings and to replace them with alternative standards.91  
  
This rule (section 939A) is based on the rationale that: (i) investors misconstrue the credit 
rating issued by NRSROs as ‘a stamp of approval’, and they therefore fail to carry out their 
due diligence; (ii) this laxness of credit risk assessment may lead to irrational investment 
decisions; and (iii) section 939A is thus designed to cease the external rating reliance of 
investors through eliminating governmental use of credit ratings.92 In addition, section 939B 
of the Dodd–Frank Act eliminates NRSRO’s exemption from Regulation on Fair Disclosure 
(hereafter ‘Regulation FD’)93.94 The reasons why credit ratings were once exempted by the 
SEC from Regulation FD is that CRAs were not involved in incidents of selective disclosure 
and the credit ratings, including the process and result, are publicly available.95 Even though 
the eliminated exemption of Regulation FD for credit ratings is unable to make the non-
public information equally available to all the rating agencies, this regulation at least reduces 
regulatory privileges. In short, section 939 A is a revolutionary change in US financial 
regulation. Section 939A of the Dodd–Frank Act not only requires ending the hardwiring of 
credit ratings in US legislation between US regulators and credit ratings, but also attempts 
to change the exclusive role of CRAs in the market.  
 
 
89 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (Public Law 111-203, 111th Congress). 
90 SEC, ‘Section 939: Credit Rating Agencies’ <https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank-section.shtml#939> 
accessed 20 April 2020. 
91 SEC, ‘Report on Review of Reliance on Credit Ratings’ (2011) 1 <https://www.sec.gov/files/939astudy.pdf> 
accessed 20 April 2020.  
92 US Housing Hearing 112 Congress, ‘Oversight of the Credit Rating Agencies Post Dodd–Frank’ (2011) 
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg67946/html/CHRG-112hhrg67946.htm> accessed 23 
April 2020. 
93 Regulation Fair Disclosure is subject to ‘the selective disclosure of information by publicly traded companies 
and other issuers.’ Regulation FD requires issuers to make the fair and full disclosure to the public, ‘when the 
issuers disclose material nonpublic information to a certain individuals and entities stock analysts, or holders 
of the issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of such information.’ See SEC, ‘Fast Answers: Fair 
Disclosure, Regulation FD’ (2014) <https://www.sec.gov/answers/regfd.htm> accessed 20 July 2018. 
94 Section 939B of the Dodd-Frank Act 
95 SEC, ‘Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading’ (2000) Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-





In terms of the implementation of section 939A for the regulatory use for asset identification, 
most relevant regulations have literally removed the reference to credit ratings. 96 According 
to Table 3.2 listed regulations by the US federal agencies have completed the removal 
mandated by section 939A. However, these implementations merely reached facial 
compliance with section 939A. For one thing, as can be seen from the many revised rules in 
Table 3.2, these regulations just remove the ‘letters’ of credit rating, but they do not put in 
place any effective alternative to the previous provision. For example, the CFTC deleted 
section 1.49, but it does not provide any alternative to the previous standard. A further 
example is the OCC provides a materially similar phrase, namely the ‘issuer has an adequate 
capacity to meet financial commitment’ to replace the previous expression ‘the issuer or 
instrument is rated investment grade by an internationally recognized rating organization’. 
The OCC also explains the ‘adequate capacity’ that ‘the risk of default by the obligor is low 
and the full and timely repayment of principal and interest is expected’. The SEC noted that 
funds could continue to rely on credit rating to consider external factors as part of the 
ongoing monitoring process, given the fact that ‘a fund adviser's obligation to monitor risks 
to which the fund is exposed would, as a practical matter, require the adviser to monitor for 
downgrades by relevant credit rating agencies’.97 Which is to say, in the absence of an 
effective alternative, regulated parties can still rely on the credit ratings where they deem 
appropriate; in the presence of an effective alternative to credit rating, regulated entities have 
freedom to choose.  
 
Table 3.2 the Comparison of Rating-Based Regulations pre and post the Dodd- Frank 
Act98 







17 CFR § 1.49(d)(3)(i)(B) requires bank 
or a trust company located outside the 
United States ‘whose commercial paper 
or long-term debt instrument or, if a part 
of a holding company system, its 
holding company’s commercial paper 
or long-term debt instrument,’ to be 
 This 17 CFR § 1.49(d)(3)(i)(B) 
provision has been removed. 
However, it does not provide any 
alternative. 
 
96 Zachary Mollengarden, ‘Credit Ratings, Congress, and Mandatory Self Reliance’ (2018) 36 Yale Law & 
Policy Review, 506 <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1728&context=ylpr> 
accessed 10 February 2020. 
97 SEC, ‘Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer Diversification 
Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule’ 7 CFR Parts 270 and 274, Release No. IC-31828; File No. S7-
07–11, 30 <https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/ic-31828.pdf> accessed 5 May 2020. 




Regulator Pre Dodd–Frank Act Post Dodd–Frank Act 
rated in one of the two highest rating 
categories by at least one NRSRO.  





12 C.F.R. § 28.15(a)(1)(iii) required that 
a foreign bank’s capital deposits must 
consist of: ‘Certificates of deposit, 
payable in the United States, and 
banker's acceptances, 
provided that, in either case, the issuer 
or the instrument is rated investment 
grade by an internationally recognized 
rating organization, and neither the 
issuer nor the instrument is rated lower 
than investment grade by any such 
rating organization that has rated the 
issuer or the instrument.’ 
12 C.F.R. § 28.15(a)(1)(iii) required 
that a foreign bank’s capital deposits 
must consist of: ‘Certificates of 
deposit, payable in the United States, 
and bankers’ acceptances, provided 
that, in either case, the issuer has 
adequate capacity to meet financial 
commitments for the projected life of 
the asset or exposure. An issuer has 
an adequate capacity to meet 
financial commitments if the risk of 
default by the obligor is low and the 
full and timely repayment of 





12 C.F.R. § 703.8(b)(3) provides that ‘if 
the broker-dealer is acting as the Federal 
credit the union's counterparty, the 
ability of the broker-dealer and its 
subsidiaries or affiliates to fulfil 
commitments, as evidenced by capital 
strength, liquidity, and operating results, 
the Federal credit union should consider 
current financial data, annual reports, 
reports of nationally-recognized 
statistical rating organizations, relevant 
disclosure documents, and other sources 
of financial information.’ 
12 C.F.R. § 703.8(b)(3) provides that 
‘If the broker-dealer is acting as the 
Federal credit union's counterparty, 
the ability of the broker-dealer and its 
subsidiaries or affiliates to fulfil 
commitments, as evidenced by 
capital strength, liquidity, and 
operating results. The Federal credit 
union should consider current 
financial data, annual reports, 
external assessments of 
creditworthiness, relevant disclosure 








12 C.F.R. §1267.3(a)(3)(ii) provides 
that a bank may not invest in debt 
instruments that are rated below 
investment grade except when ‘debt 
instruments that had been downgraded 
to a below investment grade rating after 
acquisition by the Bank’. 
12 C.F.R. §1267.3(a)(3)(ii) provides 
that a bank may not invest in debt 
instruments that are not investment 
quality, except when debt instrument 
that a Bank determined became less 
than investment quality because of 




Regulator Pre Dodd–Frank Act Post Dodd–Frank Act 
 
12 C.F.R. §1267.3(a)(4)(iii) provides 
another exception about ‘Whole 
mortgages or other whole loans, or 
interests in mortgages or loans’: 
Marketable direct obligations of state, 
local, or Tribal government units or 
agencies, having at least the second 
highest credit rating from an NRSRO, 
where the purchase of such obligations 
by the Bank provides to the issuer the 
customized terms, necessary liquidity, 
or favourable pricing required to 
generate needed funding for housing or 
community lending’ 
after acquisition of the instrument by 
the Bank’ 
 
12 C.F.R. §1267.3(a)(4)(iii) provides 
another exception about ‘Whole 
mortgages or other whole loans, or 
interests in mortgages or loans’: 
Marketable direct obligations of 
state, local, or Tribal government 
units or agencies, that are investment 
quality, where the purchase of such 
obligations by the Bank provides to 
the issuer the customized terms, 
necessary liquidity, or favourable 
pricing required to generate needed 







12 C.F.R. § 347.209(d)(3) provides that 
in terms of pledge of assets, 
‘commercial paper that is rated P-1 or P-
2, or their equivalent by a nationally 
recognized rating service; provided, that 
any conflict in a rating shall be resolved 
in favour of the lower rating’ 
The same as before  
 
Furthermore, US bank regulators use other models to replace the credit ratings in 
determining capital requirements. For example, federal regulators use two other models in 
the place of credit ratings in setting capital requirements for securitized products.99 However, 
the concern about this approach is that regulators cannot ensure the accuracy of the new 
models. This approach still needs further examination in practice.  
 
In short, the implementation of section 939A seems to have shown some progress in 
eliminating the hardwiring. Admittedly, the previous overreliance means that a certain level 
 
99 One model is Simplified Supervisory Formula Approach and the other is the Gross-up Approach. John 
Soroushian, ‘Credit Ratings in Financial Regulation: What’s Changed Since the Dodd–Frank Act?’ (2016) 16–
04 OFR Brief Series <https://www.financialresearch.gov/briefs/files/OFRbr_2016-04_Credit-Ratings.pdf> 




of reliance on credit rating is appropriate. A contained level of reliance on credit rating will 
not change until there is an effective alternative to credit ratings. Alternatives will bring new 
challenges and problems. 
 
In the United States, after examining the work done with regard to the implementation of 
section 939A, there were two findings: First, the elimination of credit rating references from 
the regulation deviates from the original aim. For one thing, the exclusivity of credit ratings 
has been eliminated, while the presence of credit ratings has not been; in other words, credit 
ratings are still in the US regulations and rules. For another, the users of credit ratings 
expressed concern about the possible prohibition on the use of credit ratings. Second, the 
chances of finding a replacement for credit ratings seem slim. An adequate and universally 
accepted alternative has yet to be found. For example, the credit spread was proposed as an 
alternative by one commentator from the National Credit Union Administration, but no 
agreement was reached in this regard.100 Furthermore, regulators are concerned that users of 
credit ratings will still, even exclusively, rely on credit ratings because they do not have an 
adequate alternative. These users choose credit ratings in the private sector, which may not 
reduce the risk of over-reliance on credit ratings. The current stage perhaps justifies the 
choice of market participants.  
 
3.5.2 The Regulatory Approach at International and European Level 
  
At international level, the Financial Stability Board (hereafter ‘FSB’) put forward Principles 
for Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings (hereafter ‘FSB Principles’), which is designed to 
reduce the mechanistic reliance on credit ratings. The FSB regulatory approach includes two 
stages: In the first stage, pursuant to Principle I101 of the FSB Principles, the FSB starts with 
the elimination of hardwiring of credit ratings in regulation and rules. 102  The herding 
behaviours and the cliff edge effect increase the negative effects of rating downgrades on 
the liquidity problem, and the rating-based regulations and rules again aggravate such 
negative effects. in this regard, the rationale behind the Principle I aims to remove the credit 
rating references from the regulations and rules. At the second stage, according to Principle 
 
100 National Credit Union Administration, ‘Alternatives to the Use of Credit Ratings’ (2012) Final Rule, 
Federal Register 77 (240) <https://www.ncua.gov/regulation-supervision/corporate-credit-union-guidance-
letters/final-rule-alternatives-use-credit-ratings> accessed 27 June 2020. 
101 Principle I. Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings in Standards, Laws and Regulations. See Financial Stability 
Board, ‘Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings’ 1 <https://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_101027.pdf> accessed 20 May 2020. 
102 Under Principle I, the references to credit ratings in standards, laws and regulations should be removed or 




II, FSB encourages investors and other market participants to undertake their credit risk 
assessment and due diligence independently instead of relying on external credit risk 
assessment.103 The two intertwined stages comprise the FSB’s approach. In addition, the 
FSB approach provides specific supplements to the two main principles regarding the 
establishment of internal credit risk assessment.104 
 
Like section 939A of the Dodd–Frank Act, the FSB Principles confirmed that, again, the 
source of over-reliance is the rating-based regulation and rules. Therefore, the SEC and FSB 
approaches reduce the over-reliance on credit ratings by ceasing the hardwiring of credit 
ratings in legislation, regulation and rules. In contrast, compared to section 939A, the FSB 
Principles are further explicit, because they create incentives for investors and market 
participants to build an internal credit risk assessment system. In other words, this requires 
users of credit ratings, such as banks, institutional investors and firms, to improve their 
capability to conduct credit risk analyses. The FSB Principles further target dealing with the 
external reliance on credit ratings, which, in turn, has a positive influence on internal credit 
risk assessment systems. 
 
The reason why FSB Principles are different from section 939A is that the rationale for the 
FSB Principles is to ameliorate the negative consequences of rating downgrades, namely 
herding behaviours and cliff edge effects. As addressed above, pursuant to some relevant 
regulatory requirements, asset managers have to sell their portfolio investments once ratings 
of such debt instruments have been downgraded to a speculative grade. Consequently, other 
investors are more likely to dramatically sell debt instruments, which can be regarded as 
mechanistic reliance on credit ratings. From a universal and sustainable perspective, the FSB 
argues that the herding and cliff effects are caused by the lack of independent credit risk 
assessment by investors themselves. Therefore, the regulatory strategy of the FSB Principles 
is to encourage investors to undertake their risk assessment and due diligence instead of 
relying on external credit ratings. In contrast, in the United States, the NRSRO, as a publicly 
reliable and approved entity, can be deemed to be a huge obstacle in reducing reliance on 
credit ratings. As a result, the SEC is inclined to weaken or cease governmental approval.  
 
 
103 Principle II ‘Reducing Market Reliance on CRA Ratings’. See in ibid 2. 
104 In order to implement the FSB basic principles regarding reducing over-reliance on external credit ratings, 
Principle III. Includes specific requirements for the central banks, banks, institutional investors, regulators and 




Until 2013, Regulation (EU) No. 462/2013 (hereafter ‘Regulation 2013’)105 attempted to 
deal with the over-reliance on credit ratings. Regulation 2013 fully endorsed the two main 
principles of the FSB Principles. In greater detail, Article 5(b)106 and Article 5(c)107  of 
Regulation 2013 implemented Principle I of the FSB Principles, while the contents of Article 
5(a)108 represent Principle II.  
 
Both the United States’ and European Union’s respective strategies are to reduce the 
regulatory reliance on credit ratings which, to some extent, confirms the existing challenge 
to the over-reliance on credit ratings. Before the elimination of the rating-based regulation, 
both the European Union and United States have the relevant regulations regarding 
reviewing the hardwiring of credit ratings in legislation, regulations and rules. Section 939A 
requires the US federal agency to undertake the responsibility to review the rating-based 
regulation, while Article 5(b) requires the European Supervisory Authorities and European 
Systemic Risk Board to conduct the same task.109  
 
However, there is a significant difference between the United States’ and the European 
Union’s regulatory approaches with respect to regulatory reliance on credit ratings: In the 
European Union, both Articles 5(b) and 5(c) suggest that when eliminating the hardwiring 
of credit ratings in legislation, regulation and rules, the precondition is that these credit 
ratings have the potential to trigger the sole and mechanistic reliance. In addition, with regard 
to alternatives to the existing rating-based regulation, Article 5(b) specifics that ‘where 
appropriate’, and Article 5(c) provides that when there are appropriate alternatives, such 
credit rating reference shall be eliminated, which are similar to the ‘wherever possible’ in 
Principle 1 of the FSB Principles. These provisions mean that the substitution of the rating-
based regulations is not mandatory but more flexible. By contrast, in the United States, 
section 939A requires that those regulations and rules referring to the credit ratings must be 
identified and then such credit rating references must be removed and replaced with 
 
105 Regulation (EU) No. 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 Amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies (OJ 2013 L 146). 
106 Article 5(b) requires the EU regulators and authorities to review and remove, where appropriate, the existing 
credit ratings in their regulation, guidelines, recommendations and standards, where such credit rating 
references have the potential to trigger the sole and mechanistic reliance on the credit ratings. ibid. 
107 Article 5(c) further requires the EU regulators and authorities to review and identify which credit rating 
references trigger or have the potential to trigger the sole and mechanistic reliance in the Union law and 
eliminate such credit rating references once there are appropriate alternatives. ibid. 
108 Article 5(a) requires financial institutions to conduct their own credit risk assessment and not exclusively 
or mechanistically rely on the credit ratings. ibid. 




alternatives. The elimination of rating-based rules in the United States is much more 
complete.  
 
In terms of the implementation, compared to the United States, the European Union has 
made less progress towards the removal of references to credit ratings from legislation, 
regulations and standards. The most important ground is that the EU approach is 
comparatively softer than the United States one, as compared above. According to 
Regulation 2013, two stages of reducing over-reliance includes review and removal. Before 
removing the relevant references to credit ratings, the regulators have to review whether or 
not a rating-based regulation can trigger mechanistic reliance. This review work does not 
proceed smoothly because the definition of mechanistic reliance is vague.110 In addition, 
regulators eliminate credit rating references until there is an appropriate alternative. As 
addressed in the United States implementation section, the effectiveness of existing 
alternatives to credit ratings has not been examined. Thus, it still remains uncertain when it 
would be appropriate for the EU to eliminate rating-based legislation, regulation and 
standards.  
 
In terms of capital requirements, the European Banking Authority (hereafter ‘EBA’) issued 
the Revised Guidelines on the Recognition of External Credit Assessment Institutions, which 
repealed credit rating references that were used in the standardized approach111 to calculate 
capital requirements for credit risk for banking institutions.112 However, owing to policy 
reasons, the level 2 guidelines cannot change the level 1 legislation.113 Which is to say, the 
EBA’s mandate cannot nullify any implementing legislation, such as Regulation 2009. This 
means that the EU implementation remains, to a larger extent, on paper. Like the United 
 
110 The European Commission gave EBA a mandate to conduct the review but there was no specific definition 
before. In order to carry out the review, EBA put forward a broad definition of mechanistic reliance, namely 
‘it is considered that there is sole or mechanistic reliance on credit ratings (or credit rating outlooks) when an 
action or omission is the consequence of any type of rule based on credit ratings (or credit rating outlooks) 
without any discretion.’ See European Banking Authority, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority and European Securities and Markets Authority, ‘Final Report on Mechanistic References to Credit 
Ratings in the ESAs’ Guidelines and Recommendations’ (2014), 8 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/jc_20 
14_004_final_report_mechanistic_references_to_credit_ratings_rect.pdf> accessed 7 August 2020. 
111 The standardized approach is a tool used by banking institutions to calculate capital requirements for credit 
risk in a simple manner under the Basel II. This approach was subsequently introduced in the European Union 
via the CRD III legislation (Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC7). Basel III follows the same approach 
even though it requires banking institutions to reduce the use of external ratings. See ibid 14. 
112  European Banking Authority, ‘Revised Guidelines on the Recognition of External Credit Assessment 
Institutions’ (2010) <https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/16094/40314f29-
99be-4de4-bedb-6abb41d35bef/Revised-Guidelines.pdf?retry=1> accessed 6 July 2020. 
113 European Banking Authority, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, and European 




States, a certain level of market reliance remains because there is no effective alternative to 
credit ratings.  
 
Another point of the EU approach is to enhance the internal credit risk assessment. Many 
central banks have expanded their own credit risk assessment system.114 The main obstacle 
to this task is that smaller financial institutions are unable to conduct their own credit rating 
analyses.115 Compared to small financial institutions, only these large and sophisticated 
financial institutions are capable of establishing internal credit assessment, because they 
have more access to capital and information.  
 
3.5.3 China’s Regulatory Approach 
 
The financial crisis of 2007–8 brought the discussion of credit ratings to China. Xiaochuan 
Zhou, former Governor of the PBOC, confirmed the significant role of credit rating in the 
financial system.116 Zhou indicated that the over-reliance on external credit ratings amplified 
the procyclicality in the financial system.117 in 2008, the PBOC issued the ‘Notice of the 
People’s Bank of China on Strengthening the Management of the Credit Rating Practices in 
Inter-Bank Bond Market’118 which further enhanced the regulation and supervision on credit 
ratings in the interbank market.119  On 25 December 2011, Zhou suggested that all the 
regulations and rules relying on external credit ratings should be removed, and the large 
financial institutions were supposed to enhance their credit assessment and reduce their 
reliance on external credit ratings. As a response, on 26 November 2011, the CBRC120 issued 
the ‘Notice of China Banking Regulatory Commission on Regulating Commercial Banks’ 
 
114 Financial Stability Board, ‘Thematic Review on FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Rating’ 
(2014) Peer Review Report <https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_140512.pdf> accessed 30 July 2020. 
115 European Commission, ‘Report from The Commission to the European Parliament and The Council on 
Alternative Tools to External Credit Ratings, the State of the Credit Rating Market, Competition and 
Governance in the Credit Rating Industry, the State of the Structured Finance Instruments Rating Market and 
on the Feasibility of a European Credit Rating Agency’ COM(2016) 664 Final, 6. 
116 Xiaochuan Zhou [周小川], ‘Some Questions and Outlooks about Credit Ratings [关于信用评级的若干问
题及展望]’ <http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/2856526/index.html> accessed 6 June 
2020. 
117 ibid. 
118 People’s Bank of China, ‘Notice of the People’s Bank of China on Strengthening the Management of the 
Credit Rating Practices in Inter-Bank Bond Market [关于加强银行间债券市场信用评级作业管理的通知]’ 
No.75 [2008] of the People’s Bank of China [银发[2008]75号].  
119 Annex I,‘On-Site Interview Practices of the Credit Rating Agencies’ [信用评级机构评级作业主要流程
单], ibid. 




Use of External Credit Ratings,121 which provides more restrictions regarding the use of 
external credit ratings for commercial banks.  
 
However, encouraging domestic CRAs becomes another important regulatory strategy 
against the over-reliance on external credit ratings. A 2010 report with regard to credit rating 
and financial stability states that the global rating system was, to a large extent, dominated 
by US CRAs,122 which is likely to pose a severe threat to Chinese finance security.123 Hence, 
according to the report, it is incumbent upon China to support domestic CRAs and greater 
competition.124 With reference to both the EU and US regulatory approaches, Zhou, during 
the 2018 China Economic Foresight Forum, offered two suggestions: (i) The domestic 
financial institutions should be encouraged to enhance their own credit risk assessment; and 
(ii) Like the rotation regime of the European Union, a dual ratings model (one rating 
provided by an international CRA, the other provided by a domestic CRA) could serve as a 
reform attempt in China.125 However, all of these discussions remain at a theoretical stage 
and need to be revisited in future. 
 
In short, the Chinese regulatory strategy includes two things: the first is to reduce the over-
reliance on external, even foreign, credit ratings, and the second is to establish a stronger 
internal credit assessment system within financial institutions. However, the implementation 
of such regulatory approaches has shown limited progress.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
Having illustrated the regulatory use of credit ratings in regulatory systems above and the 
existing regulatory approaches against the over-reliance on credit ratings, some 
considerations can be highlighted as follows: First, in terms of the elimination of rating-
 
121 China Banking Regulatory Commission, ‘Notice of China Banking Regulatory Commission on Regulating 
Commercial Banks’ Use of External Credit Ratings [关于规范商业银行使用外部信用评级的通知]’ (2011) 
No.10 [2011] of China Banking Regulatory Commission[银监发〔2011〕10号 ]. 
122 Two of big three (namely Moody’s and S&P) are US CRAs and Fitch is now majority-owned by a French 
CRA. See House of Lords European Union Committee, ‘European Union Committee 21st Report. Sovereign 
Credit Ratings: Shooting the Messenger?’ (Authority of the House of Lords 2011) HL Paper 189, 24. 
123 The topic of a series of reports is ‘Credit Rating and National Finance Security’ [信用评级与国家金融安
全]. See Xiukun Peng [彭秀坤], ‘Research on the International Community’s Regulation and Reformation of 
Credit Rating Agencies [国际社会信用评级机构规制及其改革研究]’ (PhD Thesis, University of Suzhou 
2012) 143–4. 
124 ibid 143. 
125 Xiaochuan Zhou [周小川], ‘Reducing the Reliance on Foreign Credit Rating Agencies [减少对国外信用
评 级 机 构 依 赖 ]’ (Banker’s Forum in China Banking Association, 2019) <https://www.china-




based regulation, the United States removed the exclusivity of credit ratings in US legislation, 
but the users of credit rating still rely on these ratings. At this point, the work of elimination 
in both the European Union and China is behind that in the United States. One of reasons 
for this is that the extent of regulatory reliance on credit rating in the European Union and 
China is lower than that in the United States. As opposed to the United States, credit ratings 
have not been as extensively incorporated into European Union’s and China’s financial 
legislation. In addition, the European Union and China never confer any special regulatory 
status on particular CRAs, compared to NRSROs in the United States. 
 
Second, the fear of over-reliance on foreign credit ratings in the European Union and China 
seems more significant, which provides incentives for both to support and encourage 
national or regional CRAs. This is because most of the financial legislation in the European 
Union and China does not include many credit ratings. As a consequence, the European 
Union put forward the rotation regime to deal with this fear, while China provides a similar 
regulatory attempt at a dual rating model. Apart from that, the progress made with the 
implementation in the European Union is more advanced than that in China. One possible 
explanation is that the risk of over-reliance on credit ratings in the financial market has 
severer influence on the European Union, which was verified during the financial crisis of 
2007–8 and the subsequent euro area crisis. This is perhaps caused by more mutual links 
between the EU and US financial market, and also results from the various extents in the 
development of the bond markets in the European Union and China. As mentioned above, 
the complex structured financial products, including re-securitisation or synthetic 
securitisation, cannot be allowed in the Chinese bond market. As a result, even though the 
Chinese regulators have realized the risk of over-reliance on credit ratings for the financial 
stability after the financial crisis to deal with the over-reliance on credit ratings it does not 
seem to be a regulatory priority.  
 
Third, without an effective alternative to credit ratings, the reliance on credit ratings by the 
market will remain for a certain period in the future. However, this does not mean there is 
no need to continue the current regulatory approaches. As seen above, in conjunction with 
Chapter 2, the regulatory and market reliance on credit ratings exist for long time. Currently, 
the market and relevant regulators still need to rely on the credit ratings in many respects. 
Therefore, the continuing implementation of these regulations against the over-reliance are 









As illustrated in Chapter 3, besides the over-reliance on credit ratings, another focus on 
CRAs is the rating quality. In order to improve the quality of ratings, three aspects, namely 
(i) conflicts of interest, (ii) oligopoly and (iii) the civil liability for CRAs need to be analysed 
(Chapters 4,5 and 6 of this thesis). The three relevant issues interreact with each other and 
have a joint impact on the regulatory approaches. In this chapter conflicts of interest will be 
discussed first. 
 
Credit rating, as a tool to reduce information asymmetry, was originally designed to assess 
the default risk of an obligor. As it adapts to the market demand, CRAs play various roles in 
the financial market, including pricing securities, restructuring financial instruments 
and sustaining the stability of financial institutions. However, CRAs were severely criticized 
with respect to the failure in structured finance during the global financial crisis of 2007–8.1 
There are many different explanations and rethinking behind the failure of credit ratings. 
The question is the same, namely why they fail to provide prompt accurate ratings. Analysts 
regarded various and complicated conflicts of interest within the credit rating industry as 
contributing factors that compromise the integrity and independence of CRAs. In this chapter, 
the common and typical conflicts of interest within CRAs, and whether they are the dominant 
factors of rating failure are analysed. If so, how do they affect the accuracy and independency 
of credit ratings; if not, what are the more severe factor contributing to the rating failure? 
 
Above all, the typical conflicts of interest from an individual level and an agency level will 
be examined, and then the efficiency of the relevant existing regulation against the specific 
conflict will be discussed individually. At the individual level, the conflicts of interest 
involve the ownership of securities of rated entities, unusual business relationships and the 
compensation system. There have been some effective regulation and internal control 
measures against such conflicts. However, in comparison, conflicts at the agency level are 
more complex than those at the individual level. There are also difficulties in the symmetrical 
regulation. Therefore, an attempt will be made to analyse what causes difficulties in 
 
1 Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘The Role of Credit 
Rating Agencies in Structured Finance Markets Final Report’ (2008) 2 




regulating CRAs in respect of conflicts of interest at the agency level, and why the existing 
regulations related to conflicts at the agency level are ineffective and weak.  
 
Last, the issuer-pays model was regarded as the root of conflicts of interest, and many 
proposals aim to change the business model. However, this chapter tries to solve the conflicts 
of interest from another perspective, namely structured finance. It will address the fact that 
both rating failure and the failure of reputation mechanism focus on structured finance. In 
addition, the financial crisis has less impact on China, because it has many limitations in 
structured finance. Given the complexity of structured finance, to ensure the rating quality, 
one possible solution may limit the issuance of structured financial products rather than the 
reform of the business model.  
 
4.2 Conflicts of Interest in Credit Rating Agencies 
 
Conflicts of interest regarding credit rating takes place where an agency or staff within the 
agency have an incentive to compromise their integrity for their own personal interest during 
a rating activity.2 There are various conflicts of interest within CRAs. This section will 
introduce the common conflicts of interest at the individual and the agency level, and show 
how such conflicts affect CRAs.3 At the individual level, conflicts feature in the possible 
situation of conflicts arising from the personal interests of employees, including the 
ownership of securities of rated entities and the dual positions of both a CRA and a rated 
firm, the unusual business relationship and the potential incentive under the compensation 
system relating to the rating fee. The last-mentioned conflicts mainly focus on the conflicts 
at the agency level, including the larger subscriber effect, ancillary services and rating 
shopping.  
 
4.2.1 Conflicts of Interest at the Individual Level  
 
From an individual perspective, this conflict may arise from the personal interests of 
employees within CRAs. If the rating activity itself affects the interest of employees in CRAs 
who are able to change or determine the rating, the employee is more likely to compromise 
his/her integrity in favour of his/her interests. The common situations involve the following: 
 
2 Cristian Marzavan and Tănase Stamule, ‘Conflicts of Interest’s Management within Credit Rating Agencies’ 
(2009) 4(3) Management & Marketing 111. 
3  Lynn Bai, ‘On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry’ (2010) 13(2) New York 





a. The Ownership of Securities of Rated Entities or Holding a Position in 
Rated Entities  
 
The first conflict of interest arises when an employee in a CRA who is both directly or 
indirectly associated with the rating process, owns the securities of rated entities or holds a 
position at a rated entity. In terms of ownership of securities from rated entities, both direct 
ownership and indirect ownership of employees in a CRA may give rise to an incentive for 
the employees to issue favourable ratings. For example, regarding the dual positions of a 
CRA and rated entity, Clifford L. Alexander, Jr once held a position on the board of 
WorldCom, and he was also the Chairperson of Moody’s at the same time. During this period, 
WorldCom held a favourable investment-grade credit rating, even though the market had 
regarded it as a bond at speculative level. Alexander resigned from WorldCom in December 
2001, and six months later WorldCom went bankrupt. During the four months starting from 
his resignation, the credit rating of WorldCom was still kept at investment level.4 
 
b. Unusual Business Relationship 
 
Another conflict takes place when an employee in a CRA who is both directly or indirectly 
associated with the rating process, and receives any kind of gift from rated entities, or there 
is any kind of unusual relationship between an employee in the CRA and a rated entity. For 
example, an employee at a CRA who borrows money at a market-down rate from a rated 
form, may be inclined to issue an over-optimistic credit rating. 
 
c. Compensation System 
 
Under the issue-pays model, as a prerequisite, if the compensation system of analysts 
associates with a rating fee in whole or in part, analysts would have the incentive to achieve 
a higher turnover for the sake of a higher salary. In order to pursue more business 
opportunities and increase turnover, rating analysts are likely to compromise their 
professional integrity and to compete with other rating analysts or CRAs through using lax 
rating criteria, because issuers usually choose the most favourable rating. That may give rise 
 
4 Alec Klein, ‘Moody’s Board Members Have Ties to Client-- Firm Says Such Links Have No Impact on 
Ratings’ Washington Post (22 November 2004) A09 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-




to rating inflation and rating shopping.5 Furthermore, this compensation system undermines 
the independence, credibility and neutrality of rating analysts. 
 
4.2.2 The Existing Regulation Conflicts of Interest at the Individual Level 
 
a. The Ownership of Securities of Rated Entities or Holding a Position in 
Rated Entities  
 
In the United States, according to Rule 17g-5(c)(2), an NRSRO shall not issue or maintain 
a credit rating where an employee or analyst in an NRSRO either engages in determining 
ratings or is able to approve ratings, and is also able to directly own securities of a rated 
entity or own any kind of direct ownership interest in a rated entity.6 Besides, Rule 17g-
5(c)(4) prohibits NRSRO from issuing or maintaining a credit rating where its analyst who 
engages in determining credit ratings or a person who is responsible for approving credit 
rating, is also an officer or director in the rated entity.7 
 
In the European Union, when a person in a CRA ‘directly or indirectly owns financial 
instruments of [a] rated entity or has any other direct or indirect ownership interest in that 
entity or party’, Regulation(EC) No 1060/2009 (hereafter ‘Regulation 2009’)8 requires a 
CRA to disclose immediately the relevant situation as well as assess whether to re-rate or 
withdraw the existing rating in case of an existing rating, or not provide a rating service.9 
Regulation 2009 also prohibits CRAs from issuing a credit rating or disclosing immediately 
in the context of an existing rating when a person in that CRA is ‘a member of the 
administrative or supervisory board of the rated entity’.10 
  
In China, Article 34 of the Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating 
Industry (hereafter ‘Interim Measures 2019’) prohibits a CRA from providing a rating 
 
5 Rating shopping takes place where an issuer selects a CRA provided that this CRA assigns a favourable rating 
for an issuer with the laxest rating criteria. See Mark Adelson, ‘Rating Shopping –Now the Consequences’ 
(Nomura Fixed Income Research 2006) 1 <http://www.markadelson.com/pubs/Rating_Shopping.pdf> 
accessed 10 October 2019. 
6 SEC adopted Rules 17g-1 to 17g-6 to meet the requirements of Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. 
See SEC, ‘Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations’ (2007) Release No. 34-55231; File No. S7-04-07, 10 and 171 
<https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2007/34-55231.pdf> accessed 10 November 2018. 
7 ibid 171-2.  
8 Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on 
Credit Rating Agencies (OJ 2009 L 302). 
9 Annex I section B3(a) of ibid. 




service when: (i) the de facto director of the CRA and rated entity are the same person; (ii) 
the de facto director of a rated entity or issuer directly or indirectly owns five per cent and 
above shares of the CRA; and (iii) the de facto director of the CRA directly or indirectly 
owns five per cent and above shares of the rated entity, or purchases the relevant securities 
of the rated entity within six months.11 According to section 8(7) of the Guiding Opinions of 
the People’s Bank of China for the Management of Credit Rating of 2006 (hereafter ‘Guiding 
Opinions 2006’),12 an executive in a CRA is prohibited from holding a position in another 
firm that may cause conflicts of interest.13 
  
b. Unusual Business Relationship 
 
In the United States, Exchange Act Rule 17g-5(c)(7) prohibits the person who is related to 
a rating process in an NRSRO from receiving gifts worth more than USD 25. Rule 17g 
(5)(b)(1)-(5) introduces various acts of bribery conflicts of interest, and Rule 17g (5)(b)(7) 
lists other unusual business relationships between a person in an NRSRO and a rated 
entity. 14 
 
Even though they both lack specific statuary regulation targeting business relationships that 
may cause conflict of interest, both the European Union and China incorporate corporate 
governance as a supplementary form of regulation. In the European Union, according to 
Regulation 2009, a CRA should establish appropriate internal policies and corporate 
governance to avoid possible conflicts of interest and ensure their independency.15 In China, 
according to section 4 of Guiding Opinions 2006, CRAs should establish internal corporate 
governance to avoid potential conflicts of interest. Section 5(4) adds a principle of avoidance 
relating to conflicts of interest. Furthermore, section 8(2) forbids employees within a CRA 
from providing credit rating for a third party who may cause any kind of conflicts of 
 
11 Article 34 of Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating Industry [信用评级业管理暂行
办法] 2019 (No. 5 [2019] of People’s Bank of China, the National Development and Reform Commission, the 
Ministry of Finance and the China Securities Regulatory Commission). 
12 Guiding Opinions of the People’s Bank of China for the Management of Credit Rating [中国人民银行信用
评级管理指导意见] (No. 95 [2006] of the People’s Bank of China [银发[2006]95号]). 
13 Article 8(7), ibid. 
14  SEC, ‘Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations’ (n 6) 87-91. 
15 Recital 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 




interest.16 This requires that the CRA and a person in that CRA shall avoid any kind of 
potential conflicts of interest. However, these regulations are vague and general. 
 
c. Compensation System 
 
In the United States, section 15E of Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 requires a 
separation between the compensation of a compliance officer or independent director and 
their financial or business performance.17 In addition, Rule17g-(3)(b)(1) requires an NRSRO 
to report the compensation of analysts to the SEC. However, it lacks a specific prohibition 
or separation between the compensation system of employees, especially analysts, and 
marketing activities. In the European Union, in order to cope with conflicts of interest and 
ensure the independence of credit rating, CRAs shall not associate compensation of 
employees with business performance.18 China did not provide legislation related to the 
separation between the compensation system of employees and marketing activities until the 
Interim Measures 2019.19 In addition, there are some relevant targeting rule in corporate 
governance and internal codes of CRAs. For example, CCXI20 separates the compensation 
system of staff from the rating fees.21 The conflicts with respect to the compensation system 
also leads to rating shopping, which will be discussed further below. 
 
4.2.3 Conflicts of Interest at the Agency Level 
 
a. Larger subscriber Effect  
 
Under the investor-pays model, the large subscriber, as an often-neglected cause, has an 
important influence on the rating behaviour of CRAs. When the interest of the large 
subscriber depends on the rating of some particular securities that are rated by CRAs, the 
 
16 Article 8(2) of Guiding Opinions of the People’s Bank of China for the Management of Credit Rating [中国
人民银行信用评级管理指导意见]. 
17 Section 15E (j)(4) and (t)(2)(C) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 amended by Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006 (Pub L No 109–291, 120 Stat 1327). 
18 Annex I section A(2), Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 on Credit Rating Agencies. 
19 Article 37, Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating Industry [信用评级业管理暂行办
法]. 
20  China ChengXin International Credit Rating Co., Ltd (CCXI) [中诚信国际信用评级有限公司 ] 
<http://www.ccxap.com/About.aspx> accessed 6 July 2019. 
21 CCXI, ‘Internal Code of Conflicts of Interest Regarding Non-Rating Service[中诚信国际利益冲突与回避





CRA under pressure is likely to issue some favourable rating or delay the downgrade for 
fear of losing this big client. For example, if a fund manager who is big client of one CRA 
and who, according to regulation or some rules is required to invest a security with a 
minimum A credit rating, has an interest in one security below an A rating, the CRA, for 
fear of losing revenue from the big client, may choose to provide an inaccurate rating. 22  
 
b. Ancillary Service  
 
The development of ancillary service gives rise to conflicts of interest. Early in 2003, the 
SEC had already reported that some ancillary services provided by NRSROs, such as pre-
rating assessments and corporate consulting, exacerbated conflicts of interest.23 The main 
concerns regarding this conflict are: On the one hand, a credit rating may be affected by 
whether or not the issuer purchases the ancillary service offered by the CRA. Based on this 
point, the CRA puts pressure on issuers in order to sell their ancillary services, given the 
issuer’s fear of a potential lower rating. On the other hand, under the issuer-pays model, the 
issuer conversely pressurizes the CRAs through threatening to stop purchasing ancillary 
services in pursuit of a higher rating.24 In addition, in 2013, an ancillary service was revealed 
to be involved in other conflicts of interest, that is, the CRA participated in the construction 
or design of structured financial products. Some CRAs provide ancillary services through 
their affiliates rather than themselves. Further to the concerns mentioned above, it raises a 
concern that providing ancillary services by the affiliates will increase the difficulty of 
regulating and managing the potential conflicts. 
 
Given the fact that some consultancy or advisory services related to credit rating activities 
present conflicts of interest, many regulatory prohibitions have been designed to prohibit 
these consultancy or advisory services. Owing to the huge profits created by extra additional 
services for CRAs or their affiliates, especially relating to structured finance, CRAs have 
sufficient incentives to offer additional services in practice.25  Therefore, except for the 
banned services, the other services provided by CRAs could be regarded as ancillary services, 
even though some of these services still present conflicts of interest. Because of the stricter 
disclosure and reporting requirement of conflicts of interest within CRAs, CRAs began to 
 
22 Lynn Bai (n 3) 263. 
23 SEC, ‘Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets’ 
(2003) 42 <https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf> accessed 20 April 2020. 
24 ibid. 
25 Harry McVea, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’ the Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Global Governance: The EU 




transfer ancillary services to their affiliates. It is worth noting before continuing that there 
are three cruxes to the issue: (i) the vague definition, (ii) the provision of ancillary services 
by an affiliate of a CRA and (iii) sufficient incentives to provide ancillary services in the 
context of structured finance.  
 
c. Rating Shopping 
 
Rating shopping, as discussed in relation to the individual compensation system above, 
occurs when issuers are inclined to choose a CRA that provides the most favourable rating 
for them.26 Under the issuer-pays model, the chance is high that CRAs would use lax criteria 
and downplay the credit risk in order to get more business opportunities or to retain a 
business relationship with issuers.27  According to recent German research, Standard & 
Poor’s (hereafter ‘S&P’) was criticized by the Fitch Ratings (hereafter ‘Fitch’) in public 
because S&P’ was suspected of drafting an inaccurate credit rating report on purpose so as 
to favour the issuers.28 The issuer-pays model creates a huge incentive for CRAs to provide 
favourable ratings for issuers. Furthermore, once a certain number of CRAs used to compete 
with each other by applying utilising lax criteria, other CRAs suffer from pressures of their 
clients and take the risk of losing revenue when they attempt to keep their integrity.29 This 
practice may not only lead to rating inflation, but also undermines the credibility of credit 
rating and the independence and neutrality of CRAs.  
 
Rating shopping is also one typical issue in China. For example, Dagong Global Credit 
Rating Agency (hereafter ‘Dagong’), as one of the major CRAs in China, was criticised for 
issuing the highest rating (i.e., AAA) 156 times in 2010, even though Dagong explained that 
156 was the overall rating given to all bond issuances and the actual amount of issuers given 
AAA was 39, accounting for 11.5 per cent of all rated issuers.30 However, that Dagong 
issued an AAA rating to a super short-term bond from the Ministry of Railways in August 
2011 was criticised by the public. At that time, the Ministry of Railways was trapped in the 
event where two high-speed trains crashed killing 40 people and injuring 192. At that 
 
26 Lynn Bai (n 3) 263. 
27 ibid 263. 
28 Thomas M. J. Möllers and Charis Niedorf, 'Regulation and Liability of Credit Rating Agencies: A More 
Efficient European Law?' (2014) 11(3) European Company and Financial Law Review 333  
29 Yinping Xu and Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng, ‘Introduction and Suggestions on the Chinese Securities Credit 
Rating System from a Comparative Perspective’ (2011) 6 University of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review 
217, 225. 
30  Wei Tian, ‘Dagong Refutes Claims of AAA “Generosity”’ (20 August 2011) 




moment, the public across the country doubted the future of high-speed railways. The stock 
market was also affected by this crash: shares in China Rail Construction, the biggest 
company that builds more than the half of all rail links, fell by 6.7 per cent31; shares in CSR 
Corp., the builder of one of the two trains in this crash, fell by 14 per cent, while shares in 
China Automation Group Ltd., which is responsible for the safety and control system of 
railways, fell by 19 per cent.32  Despite this, Dagong still issued an AAA rating to the 
Ministry of Railways, which is even higher than China’ s sovereign debt rating. 
 
Dagong explained that this bond was mostly backed by the Ministry of Railways, namely 
the government, and that it was hardly possible for the government to be insolvent. 
Nevertheless, this argument is untenable because a government does not go bankrupt 
nominally, which does not mean that material default of government bonds is impossible in 
practice. First, currency devaluation is the normal way in which to cope with the default of 
government bonds, which happens in many countries. Second, Chinese local governments 
are not allowed to be insolvent while the local government platform, which issues city 
investment bonds that is a kind of quasi municipal bond, is allowed to be legally insolvent.33 
Third, some SOEs in China went bankrupt. Because of the socialism in China, the bonds of 
SOEs have similar characteristics to government bonds, because government exercises 
power on behalf of Chinese citizens, while the theoretically real owner of SOEs is all citizens 
and the government, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission,34 
is the nominal owner. Therefore, rating shopping is another possible explanation for the fact 
that the rating is irrationally high. Apart from that, an analyst within one CRA disclosed that 
CRAs charge issuers depending on at which rating level it sells.35 The higher the credit rating 
was, the more the CRA charged.  
 
 
31  Chris Cooper, ‘China Crash May Give “Zero” Chance for Bullet-Train Exports’ (25 July 2011) 
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-07-26/china-has-zero-chance-on-high-speed-train-exports-
after-crash-kills-39> accessed 20 February 2019. 
32  Norihiko Shirouzu, ‘Beijing Seeks to Soothe Train Jitters’ (26 July 2011) 
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904772304576468094211307726> accessed 20 February 
2019. 
33  Article 5(5) of The Guiding Opinions on Strengthening Asset-Liability Constraints on State-owned 
Enterprises [关于加强国有企业资产负债约束的指导意见 ] 2018 (The General Office of the CPC 
(Communist Party of China) Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council [中共中央办公
厅和国务院办公厅]). 
34 [国务院国有资产监督管理委员会] 
35 Manli Su [苏曼丽], ‘Foreign Investment Frantically Infiltrate China’s Domestic Rating Agencies [外资“疯
狂 ” 渗 控 中 国 评 级 机 构 ]’ (China News [ 中 国 新 闻 网 ], 15 August 2011) 




4.2.4 Existing Regulation and Difficulty of Regulating Conflicts at the Agency 
Level 
 
a. Larger Subscriber Effect 
 
To cope with potential conflicts resulting from large subscribers, in the United States, Rule 
17g-5(b)(5) requires NRSROs to warn investors of the existence of such a conflict, and to 
maintain policies and procedures so as to manage this conflict. Even though there is no 
specific requirement, section 15E(1)(B)(viii)36 and Exhibit 10 of Form NRSRO37 requires 
NRSROs to disclose the 20 largest issuers and subscribers who purchased rating services 
and products by the amount of net revenue in the fiscal year. Furthermore, under Rule 17g-
2(a)(4), NRSROs are required to open an account for each subscriber, and the required 
information includes the identity and address of each subscriber. The European Union and 
China manage the potential influence of larger subscribers through disclosure and 
transparency.  
 
b. Ancillary Services 
 
There are some existing prohibitions against conflicts of interest arise from ancillary services. 
In the United States, Rule 17g-5 (b) (3)38 addresses the conflicts of interest associated with 
the provision of ancillary services by NRSROs, while Rule 17g-5(c)(1)39 addresses the 
prohibited conflicts of interest regarding ancillary services. In order to avoid conflicts arising 
from an affiliate of an NRSRO, Rule 17g-4 to 6 defines the meaning of relevant person, 
which includes the person within an affiliate of one NRSRO. Furthermore, Rule 17g-5(c)(5) 
addresses ‘the potential lack of impartiality that may arise when an NRSRO determines a 
credit rating based on a corporate structure that was developed after consultations with the 
NRSRO or its affiliate on how to achieve a desired credit rating’40, and it ‘prohibits an 
 
36 Section 15E(1)(B)(viii) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 amended by Credit Rating Agency Reform 
Act of 2006. . 
37  SEC, ‘Form NRSRO: Application for Registration as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization (NRSRO)’ Instructions to Exhibit 10 <https://www.sec.gov/aboutlforms/formnrsro.pdf> 
accessed 20 February 2019. 
38 The conflict is: ‘being paid for services in addition to determining credit ratings by issuers, underwriters, or 
obligors that have paid the nationally recognized statistical rating organization to determine a credit rating.’ 
See SEC, ‘Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations’ (n 6) 89-90. 
39 Rule 17g-5(c)(1) prohibits an NRSRO from issuing or maintaining a credit rating when a rating agency 
solicited by a person who provided the NRSRO with net revenue greater than or equal to 10 per cent of total 
net revenue of the NRSRO for the most recently ended fiscal year. ibid 92. 
40  SEC, ‘Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’ (2009) 




NRSRO from rating its own work or the work of an affiliate’41. In the European Union, 
Under Regulation 2009, CRAs were prohibited from offering consultancy or advisory 
services and making recommendations with respect to the construction of structured 
financial products.42 Later, in 2013, the prohibition was expanded to shareholders of CRAs. 
A CRA or any person who either directly or indirectly owns at least five per cent capital, or 
has a significant effect on the business activities of a CRA, is not allowed to provide 
consultancy or advisory services to the rated entity or related third party.43  
 
Both the United States and European Union have prohibitions against the provision of 
consultancy and advisory service, but there was no express prohibition in China until 2019.  
 
In August 2018, Dagong was punished by relevant regulators because it was involved in 
conflicts of interest when providing ancillary services. China’s National Association of 
Financial Market Investors 44  (hereafter ‘NAFMII’), a non-governmental self-regulatory 
organisation, gave Dagong a severe warning that Dagong would be prohibited from engaging 
in any business activities regarding debt financial instruments.45 Furthermore, the CSRC, as 
one of main regulators as mentioned in Chapter 2, prohibited Dagong from providing all 
kinds of rating services for one year, both in the interbank market and on the securities 
exchange.46 That was because Dagong had been involved in promising a higher rating or 
threatening with lower ratings in order to sell ancillary services. Dagong required issuers 
who intended to purchase rating services from itself to purchase a ‘management system of 
supply chain finance’47 before it provided a rating service. If an issuer refused to purchase 
this system, Dagong would give the issuer a lower rating until it had purchased the system. 
 
41 ibid. 
42 Annex I, section B, Point 4, Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 September 2009 on Credit Rating Agencies. 
43 Annex I (1) (d) and Annex II (1) (a) 22, Regulation (EU) No. 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 May 2013 Amending Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies (OJ 2013 
L 146). 
44 [中国银行间市场交易商协会] 
45 Yan Zhang [张燕], ‘Dagong Was Prohibited from Suspending Rating Services[大公国际被罚“暂停评级业
务”]’ (29 August 2018) <http://3g.ceweekly.cn/article/12048> accessed 21 February 2019. 
46  Dagong’s misbehaviors violated the relevant regulations and rules of Interim Measures for the 
Administration of the Credit Rating Business Regarding the Securities Market[证券市场资信评级业务管理
暂行办法] (No 50 [2007] of China Securities Regulatory Commission [证监发[2007] 50号]). See CSRC, 
‘CSRC Suspended Dagong Securities Rating Business for One Year [证监会暂停大公国际证券评级业务一
年]’ (2018) <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwdd/201808/t201808 
17_342750.html> accessed 22 February 2019. 
47 [供应链金融管理系统]. The service of ‘management system of supply chain finance’, a kind of ancillary 




According to an investigation by regulators, 31 issuers who had purchased this system from 
Dagong and their credit ratings were upgraded from AA+ to AAA later.48 
 
However, there are many impediments to manage the conflict arising from the ancillary 
service. First of all, the term ancillary service has not been clearly defined yet, even though 
some pre-rating ancillary services have been forbidden in the United States and European 
Union.49 Given the difficulty to distinguish between ancillary services and such consultancy 
or advisory services relating to conflicts, CRAs still provide many ancillary services. In 
practice, each CRA has various definitions of ancillary service, such as ‘permissible services’ 
provided by Moody’s, as well as ancillary and other services provided by S&P.  
 
More importantly, ancillary services comprise ‘market forecasts, estimates of economic 
trends, pricing analysis and other general data analysis as well as related distribution 
services’.50 Therefore, the difficulty in determining the scope of ancillary services is that 
many publications issued by big CRAs are alleged by the CRAs to be normal publications 
instead of derivatives of the rating service. Even though some publications provided by 
CRAs in the name of non-rating publications, these publications still have the same effect 
on the market. In the case of Moody’s Investors Service Hong Kong Limited v Securities and 
Futures Commission, Moody’s was fined by the Securities and Futures Commission 
(hereafter ‘SFC) because Moody’s had published a report entitled ‘Red Flags for Emerging-
Market Companies: A Focus on China’, which was regarded as misleading and inaccurate 
by the SFC.51 However, Moody’s sued the SFC on the grounds of the non-credit rating report. 
In terms of ancillary services, this conflict involved a CRA that rated securities at the same 
time as providing ancillary services for the issuer, such as debt restructuring or risk 
management consulting.52 CRAs have incentives to provide ratings that favour rated entities 
so that they can maintain ancillary services with such entities.53 In addition, this conflict of 
interest also puts pressure on issuers. In order to pursue high credit ratings, issuers may 
reluctantly purchase the ancillary services from CRAs that provide credit rating services at 
 
48 Yan Zhang [张燕] (n 47). 
49 Raquel García Alcubilla and Francisco Javier Ruiz del Pozo, Credit Rating Agencies on the Watch List: 
Analysis of European Regulation (Oxford University Press 2012) 145. 
50  ESMA, ‘Report on CRA Market Share Calculation’ (2018) 1 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/cra_market_share_calculation_2018.pdf> accessed 21 
March 2019. 
51 Moody’s Investors Service Hong Kong Limited v Securities and Futures Commission Hong Kong Special 
Administration Region HKCFA 42; (2018) 21 HKCFAR 456; FACV 6/2018. 





the same time. By contrast, if an issuer refuses to purchase the ancillary service from a CRA, 
it may incur downgrades in its credit rating.  
 
In addition, according to Moody’s policy regarding ‘other permissible service’, besides 
credit rating services, Moody’s only provides bond fund rating, credit estimates, indicative 
assessment and rating assessment services, which are all distinct from the ancillary service 
(consulting or advisory service). 54 All such ancillary services listed in this thesis appeared 
to be offered by Moody’s Analytics. As can be seen from Figure 4.1 below, Moody’s 
Analytics is a subsidiary of Moody’s Corporation which is also the Moody’s (Moody 
Investor Service) parent entity. Like Fitch Solution, Moody’s Analytics is a non-NRSRO 
company and provides many financial services, except rating services. The services provided 
by Moody’s Analytics mainly include market-implied ratings,55 financial institution research 
and performance data services.56 Market-implied ratings can be regarded as complementary 
to credit ratings offered by Moody’s (Moody’s Investor Service).57  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Moody’s Corporation Organizational Structure58 
 
Besides to credit rating services, S&P (S&P Global Rating) also provides ancillary services 
and other services. Ancillary services in S&P means a product or service is not a credit rating 
or credit rating activity, but is either a market forecast, an estimate of economic trends, a 
pricing analysis, other general data analysis, or distribution services related to a credit rating, 
a market forecast, an estimate of economic trends, a pricing analysis or general data analysis. 
 
54 Moody’s Investor Service, ‘The Rating Symbols and Definitions’ for the Part in ‘Other Permissible Services’ 
(2019) 14 <https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_7 
9004> accessed 30 December 2019. 
55 A market-implied rating ‘translates prices from the Credit Default Swap (hereafter ‘CDS’), bond, loan and 
equity markets into standard (Moody’s) ratings language’. See Moody’s Analytics, ‘Market Implied Ratings 
FAQ’ (June 2010) <https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/ProductAttachments/MI 
RFrequentlyAskedQuestions.pdf> accessed 12 March 2019. 
56  SEC, ‘2013 Report to Congress Credit Rating Agency Independence Study’ (2013) 35 
<https://www.sec.gov/files/credit-rating-agency-independence-study-2013.pdf> accessed 4 April 2018. 
57 Moody’s Analytics (n 57). 








Other services in S&P means a service that is neither a part of credit rating activity nor an 
ancillary service. 
 
According to Figure 4.2, S&P Capital IQ is a segment of S&P Global Market Intelligence 
rather than a part of S&P; in other words, S&P Capital IQ is not a part of NRSRO, while it 
provides a large amount of financial and analytical products and services. These products 
and services provided by S&P Capital IQ include ‘market derived ratings, Credit Model, 
Global Credit Portal and Market Derived Signals (MDS) that are derived from a statistical 
model that evaluates credit default swaps.’59  
 
 
Figure 4.2 S&P’s Global Inc. Organizational Structure60 
 
Fitch provides ‘core’ products and services, ranging from credit rating services to the 
provision of feedback to structured financial transaction parties with respect to rating levels 
based on information provided by the transaction parties and their advisers.61 Fitch defines 
ancillary business as ‘any business other than the provision of independent analysis and 
rating and other opinions regarding a variety of risks in the financial markets’.62 According 
to Figure 4.3, Fitch Solutions, as a non-NRSRO affiliate of Fitch Ratings and a subsidiary 
of Fitch Group that is the parent entity of Fitch Ratings, distributes Fitch Ratings research 
 
59 The definition is cited from the SEC report. Its first resource cannot be found now from the S&P’s official 
website because it is not part of NRSROs and thus does not need to report to the public. See SEC, ‘2013 Report 
to Congress Credit Rating Agency Independence Study’ (n 58) 79. 
60 Red rectangle indicates registered NRSRO; S&P Global was McGraw Hill Financial, Inc. from 2013 to April 
2016, and was McGraw Hill Companies prior to 2013). 
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and ratings, financial data and other market-based content products.63 Any ancillary services 
provided by both Fitch (Fitch Rating) and a division of Fitch Group should be separated  
from credit rating activity according to Fitch Group ‘s Firewall Policy.64  
 
Figure 4.3 Fitch Group, Inc. Corporate Structure65 
 
The existing regulations and measures against potential risk of ancillary include prohibiting 
CRAs from providing ancillary services and separation from rating services and ancillary 
services. However, as a response, parent company of CRAs tends to set up several 
subsidiaries so that other subsidiary can be responsible for ancillary services that may give 
rise to potential conflicts of interest with the rating service, but they are not subject to the 
prohibitions targeted to the CRAs. The current corporate system increases the opaqueness 
of relevant businesses between subsidiaries. Therefore, it remains difficult to manage this 
conflict by virtue of current countermeasures. 
 
Apart from that, the boom of structured finance created huge profits in ancillary services 
relating to structured finance. However, issuers who purchased a large amount of ancillary 
services may conversely affect credit rating decisions. Especially when revenue of ancillary 
services accounts for a large proportion, CRAs are more likely to issue or maintain a 
favourable rating under that pressure. According to Figure 4.4, the revenue of Moody’s 
Analytics has been more than the revenue from ratings of structured financial products since 
2006 and the gap between the revenue of Moody's Analytics and that from rating of corporate 
rating is comparably negligible.  
 
63 SEC, ‘2013 Report to Congress Credit Rating Agency Independence Study’ (n 58) 29. 
64 Fitch Ratings, ‘Bulletin 30: Ancillary Business and Ancillary Services’ (n 63) 2-3.  
65 Red rectangle indicates registered NRSRO; Figure 4.3 adapted from Fitch Ratings, ‘2018 Form NRSRO 
Annual Certification’ (2018) <https://sec.report/Document/0001144204-18-063337/tv508564_nrsro-ex4.pdf> 
accessed 5 September 2018. 
Fitch Group, Inc. 





Figure 4.4 The Comparison of Revenue from the Rating Services and Revenue from 
the Ancillary Services in Moody’s Corporation 2001–201666 
 
Last, but most important, the issuer-pays model gives rise to many different conflicts and 
has a huge influence on the whole credit rating industry. As Franklin Strier argues, the issuer-
pays model created several kinds of conflicts of interest.67 
 
c. Rating Shopping  
 
Rating shopping creates sufficient incentives for CRAs to offer overly high ratings to their 
clients.  At the individual level, rating shopping could be prevented by separation between 
rating sales staff and rating analysts or the separation between staff remuneration system and 
rating business. 
 
Even though some regulatory proposals attempt to disclose all the ratings during the bidding 
stage — the issuer selects a potential CRA before it finally makes a decision — they have 
 
66 Data collected the annual statements of Moody’s Corporation from 2001 to 2016 and the figure from Daniel 
Cash, Regulation and the Credit Rating Agencies: Restraining Ancillary Services (Routledge 2019) 136. 
67 Franklin Strier, ‘Rating the Raters: Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Firms’ (2008) 113(4) Business 




not been included in the regulation as yet.68 Even so, the issuer would still have the freedom 
to choose one CRA whatever the standards the issuer considers. In addition, rating shopping 
is often associated with ancillary services, which increases the cost and difficulty of 
inspection and avoiding it.  
 
Even though CRAs pay important attention to their reputation and try to keep the accuracy 
of their ratings, they will still feel adverse pressure from the whole industry. Rating shopping 
is a problem confronting the whole rating industry. If one CRA tries to counteract with it 
and refuses clients (issuers), it may suffer economic costs. For example, as a director in 
Dagong said, due to prioritizing professional integrity, the credit rating market shares held 
by Dagong changed from 40 per cent to 20 per cent. 69  That does not prove enough 
professional integrity on the part of Dagong, but implies the cost of refusing the rating 
shopping in the Chinese rating market. In short, the chance is low that rating shopping will 
be improved just by market self-discipline. Like ancillary services, rating shopping also 
stems from the issuer-pays model.70 Besides, some researchers state that intense competition 
in the credit rating industry exacerbate rating shopping, both in the United States and 
China.71 In short, the difficulty in regulation of rating shopping is that one has to realise that 
it is not an internal issue or the lack of incentive for the CRA itself, but a macro market 
failure under high concentration of the rating industry.  
 
By comparing the existing regulation at the individual level and the agency level against 
conflicts of interests, it may be found that it is easier to manage conflicts at the individual 
level than conflicts at the agency level.  
 
 
68 SEC, ‘Fact Sheet: Strengthening Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Open Meeting of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’ (2009) <https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-200-factsheet.htm> accessed 
20 December 2019 
69 National Business Daily [每日经济网], ‘156 Credit Rating Reports with AAA Issued by Dagong[大公国际
一年评 156个 AAA 成最高信用批发商]’ (2018) <http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2011-08-18/590042.html> 
accessed 20 February 2018. 
70 Franklin argues that the issuer-pays model arises due to three discrete conflicts of interest in CRAs. See Strier 
(n 69) 537. 
71 Some United States scholars are opposed to lifting the NRSRO bar because they think competition will cause 
rating shopping. See, for example, John C. Coffee, Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance 
(Oxford University Press 2006) 299–300.  
He MInhua discussed major problems still affecting Chinese CRAs, see Minhua He [何敏华 ], ‘Some 
Remaining Issues in the Work of Credit Rating Short-Term Financing Securities [短期融资券信用评级工作




4.3  The implementation of the Existing Regulations 
 
In the United States, pursuant to Rule 17g-5(a), all the conflicts of interest listed in Exchange 
Act Rule 17g-5(b) are not allowed in an NRSRO, unless they are disclosed according to 
Exhibit 5 to form an NRSRO, or it establishes or maintains policies and procedures to 
manage such conflicts, or it achieves the additional requirements with regard to asset-backed 
securities transactions. In contrast to Rule 17g-5(a), an NRSRO is definitely prohibited from 
involving conflicts of interest listed in Rule17g-5(c). In addition, Rule 17g-6 addresses 
prohibited acts and practices of an NRSRO.  
 
In the European Union, one of the main objectives of Regulation 2009 and Regulation 2013 
is to address the conflicts of interest. Article 6 of Regulation 2009 was designed to ensure 
the independence of CRAs through imposing the obligation of internal controls on CRAs in 
order to avoid potentially collusive behaviours under the issuer-pays model. Regulation 2013 
further prevents conflicts of interest by imposing requirements on shareholder structures of 
CRAs.  
 
In China, the existing regulations require each CRA to establish internal controls and 
corporate governance in order to manage and avoid potential conflict of interest. The Interim 
Measures 2019 provides some relevant requirements, ranging from an avoidance system to 
the independence of CRAs.72 Apart from that, the self-regulatory rules require that a CRA 
only initiate the rating process such as on-site inspection after its client has made the 
payment.73  
 
In addition to statutory regulation, the corporate governance and internal control structure 
are more common and more flexible measures to manage conflicts of interest. In the United 
States, NRSROs are required to establish, maintain and enforce ‘written policies and 
procedures to address and manage conflicts of interest’.74Based on the requirement, Moody’s 
Code of Professional Conduct provides more restrictive and detailed requirements against 
possible conflicts of interest. Section 2.13(a) and (b) mention that employees related to the 
 
72 Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating Industry [信用评级业管理暂行办法]. 
73 Borong Liu [刘柏荣] and others, ‘Securitisation [资产证券化法律实务指南]’ (Zhong Lun Law Firm [中
伦律师事务所] 2019) 36 <http://www.zhonglun.com/uploadfile/c/20190301_钱伯斯实务指南_资产证券化
-中国（中英对照版）_第九稿.pdf> accessed 2 December 2019. 
74 Section 15E (h) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 amended by Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006 and Rule 17g-5. See SEC, ‘Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized 




rating process and his or her family member are not allowed to own securities at a rated 
entity (including derivatives of securities). Under section 2.13(c) and (d), all relationships 
that are beyond the ordinary course of business relationships are not permitted. Section 
2.13(g) introduces the provision relating to gifts.75 Fitch and S&P also have a relevant 
internal code to cope with possible conflicts of interest.76 In China, big CRAs established 
internal codes to avoid possible conflicts of interest. For example, CCXI requires employees 
to avoid circumstance where they or their family member owns securities of rated entities 
and serve as an officer at rated entities.77  
 
In the United States, according to the SEC’s annual examination of NRSROs, the staff 
examined all the boards of directors or governing body, as well as independent directors, 
within NRSROs through interviews. In addition, all the relevant minutes and other 
documentation have been reviewed by the Office of Credit Ratings (hereafter ‘OCR’) which 
was created in 2012 pursuant to the Dodd–Frank Act. The SEC’s 2018 annual examination 
shows that it has some identified improvements for many NRSROs with respect to awareness 
and compliance of applicable laws, even though there are still some weaknesses in NRSROs’ 
performances.78  
 
The weakness pointed out in the 2018 annual examination are as follows: First, there were 
vague policies that failed to address or manage conflicts of interest in one NRSRO.79 Second, 
the current internal control structures in some NRSROs, in terms of managing conflicts of 
interest, were still weak. 80  Third, in terms of corporate governance, NRSROs should 
‘establish and maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to 
 
75  Moody’s Investors Service, ‘Moody Code of Professional Conduct’ (2011) 2.13 
<https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/ProductAttachments/Compliance/9-9-2011/MIS%20Code.pdf> 
accessed 30 December 2018. 
76 Fitch Ratings, ‘Fitch’s Code of Conduct & Ethics’ (2018) 3.3 <https://www.fitchratings.com/site/ethics> 
accessed 30 December 2018.; S&P, ‘S&P Global Ratings Code of Conduct’ (2018) 
<https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/delegate/getPDF?articleId=2 
017868&type=COMMENTS&subType=REGULATORY> accessed 30 December 2018. Further requirement 
could be found on S&P, ‘Global 2018 Code of Business Ethics for Employees’ (2018) 8 
<https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/delegate/getPDF?articleId=2017855&type=COMMENTS&sub
Type=REGULATORY> accessed 30 December 2018. 
77 CCXI, ‘Code of Conflicts of Interest and Avoidance Principle [中诚信国际利益冲突与回避管理制度]’ 
section 3.1 and 3.2 <http://www.ccxi.com.cn/cn/Init/baseFile/1096/584> accessed 30 December 2018. 
78 SEC, ‘2018 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examination of Each Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organization’ (2018) 10 <https://www.sec.gov/nrsro-summary-report-2018_0.pdf> accessed 8 March 
2019. 
79 ibid 20. 




prevent the misuse of material non-public information (hereafter ‘MNPI’)’ 81 , but one 
NRSRO did not apply MNPI to a new non-employee, a non-independent director.82 Apart 
from that, one NRSRO did not fulfil its oversight duties pursuant to section 15E(t)(3)83.84 
The independent directors lacked awareness of information relating to internal controls, 
conflicts of interest, ratings determination and employee compensation. 85  Thus, the 
transparency and information disclosure for independent directors within this NRSRO were 
not fully completed according to the requirement. In practice, both the NRSRO and the 
independent directors lacked activism and activity to enforce the requirement of 
transparency. The independent directors lacked activism to make reasonable and efficient 
inquires pertaining to significant arrangements during the NRSRO’s operation.  
 
However, given that the number of NSRSOs,86 the conclusion could be drawn that only a 
minority of NRSROs had been examined for their non-compliance with legal requirements, 
while most of them had fulfilled their duties.  
 
According to the SEC annual examination of 2018, one NRSRO failed to design adequate 
procedures to separate rating activities from marketing activities. Another NRSRO’s 
procedures designed to separate rating activities from sales and marketing activities were 
still weak. Besides, NRSRO personnel did not always adhere to the procedures regarding 
the separation of sales and rating activities.87 
 
In the European Union, according to the 2018 annual investigation of ESMA, the current 
procedures of CRAs did not fully conform to regulatory requirements.88 Some CRAs lacked 
 
81 Section 15E(g) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 amended by Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006 and SEC Rule 17g-4. See SEC, ‘Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’ (n 6) 107. 
82 SEC, ‘2018 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examination of Each Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organization’ (n 55) 20. 
83 It provides for duties of board of directors. See Section 15 E(t)(3) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
amended by Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006.  
84 SEC, ‘2018 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examination of Each Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organization’ (n 55) 29. 
85 ibid. 
86 In 2019, the incumbent ten NRSROs are as follows: A.M. Best Rating Services, Inc. (“AMB”), DBRS, Inc. 
(“DBRS”), Egan-Jones Ratings Company (“EJR”), Fitch , HR Ratings de México, S.A. de C.V. (“HR”), Japan 
Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. (“JCR”), Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. (“KBRA”), Moody’s Investors Service, 
Inc. (“Moody”), Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC (“MCR”), S&P Global Ratings (“S&P”). 
87 SEC, ‘2018 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examination of Each Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organization’ (n 55) 20–1. 
88 ESMA, ‘ESMA’s Supervision – 2018 Annual Report and 2019 Work Programme’ (2018) ESMA80-199–





effective internal control structures to manage conflicts of interest. More specifically, in 
corporate governance, some registered CRAs in ESMA had not established an effective 
board of directors to avoid potential conflicts of interest. 89 
 
To sum up, even though there are numerous scenarios that may cause conflicts of interest at 
the individual level, the current regulation and corporate governance have an effect on the 
mitigation of existing conflicts. Given humanity’s capacity for selfishness, more and novel 
kinds of conflict of interest from an individual perspective may arise. To better update the 
potential new issues, first, regulators should ensure disclosure and transparency. To cope 
with such issues flexibly, CRAs incorporate corporate governance and draft specific internal 
codes annually. However, according to the SEC 2018 Summary Report, the internal control 
codes of both larger and smaller NRSROs have weaknesses. In terms of governance, 
NRSROs lack disclosure and transparency, and independent directors thus lack sufficient 
information to engage in corporate governance. Independent directors also lack initiatives to 
fulfil their duties.90 
 
4.4 Critical Assessment 
 
Many proposals tried to reform the issuer-pays model so as to better avoid and manage 
conflicts of interests. For example, European Commission proposed to establish a publicly 
funded EU CRA. The publicly funded EU CRA could adopt a more measured approach to 
ratings and make more proper political judgment; nevertheless, the concern of this proposal 
is about the independence of this publicly funded EU CRA, and this proposal is likely to 
reinforce the over-reliance on credit ratings instead of reducing it. 91 Furthermore, another 
EU report discusses the possibility of a fully independent non-public European Credit Rating 
Foundation. 92  This independent non-public European Credit Rating Foundation was 
financed by the ‘financial community in the form of credits that will yield some interest 
payment’ instead of public fund.93 By contrast, even though this proposal improved the 
independency of former one, it seems pessimistic to the likelihood of the success of this 
project, not only because it is uncertain whether the new credit rating foundation is or not 
 
89 ibid 23–4. 
90 SEC, ‘2018 Summary Report of Commission Staff’s Examination of Each Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organization’ (n 80). 
91 House of Lords European Union Committee, ‘European Union Committee 21st Report. Sovereign Credit 
Ratings: Shooting the Messenger?’ (Authority of the House of Lords 2011) HL Paper 189, 29. 
92 Rapporteur: Wolf Klinz, ‘Report on Credit Rating Agencies: Future Perspectives’ (European Parliament 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 2011) A7-0081/2011, 7 and 13-4. 




able to survive from market competition, but also because the potential conflicts of interests 
and problems are similar to the current CRAs.94 In other words, the current reform attempts 
related to business model seems uncertain. Before continuing to deal with conflicts of 
interest, it is worth noting whether or not changing the issuer-pays model is the optimal 
option for rating quality.  
 
The issuer-pays model has a huge influence on the whole credit rating industry. At present, 
even though CRAs still provide subscription services, 90 per cent to 95 per cent of revenue 
is derived from fees paid by issuers.95 In the initial period of the credit rating industry, the 
business model had been the subscriber-pays model before 1969.96 In 1970, Moody’s and 
Fitch began to shift their business model from the subscriber-pays to the issuer-pays model. 
Later in 1974, S&P began to charge issuers.97 One rational argument for the adoption of the 
issuer-pays model is that the subscriber-pays model cannot meet the new demand of market 
expansion and afford the cost of the rating activity.98 There are four reasons for this shift 
from the subscriber-pays model to issuer-pays model. First of all, after the collapse of Penn 
Central, more and more issuers realized the importance of credit rating in rebuilding investor 
confidence in the bonds market. 99 In addition, on the heels of the liquidity crises, the 1970 
Penn Central default on USD 82 million in commercial paper drew attention to the credit 
risk.100 Therefore, issuers had incentives to actively seek ratings so that they could be more 
likely to be trusted by investors. Second, the development of photocopy technology leads to 
the fact that credit ratings are easily spread among both subscribers and non-subscribers at a 
lower cost. The revenue of CRAs has consequently decreased, and in order to meet the 
demand of the new market, CRAs have had to adjust their business model.101 Third, in the 
1970s, the SEC attempted to maintain the stability of the financial market via CRAs, and 
thus created NRSROs. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, these regulations based on 
NRSROs objectively grants a special market status to NRSROs. Apart from that, these 
 
94 ibid 29-30; Rapporteur: Wolf Klinz (n 92) 13-4. 
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regulations generated incentives for bond issuers to purchase rating services from NRSROs 
because if an issuer obtained a positive rating issued by a NRSRO it would be credible and 
thus obtain more finance. Fourth, the function of credit ratings in pricing securities has a 
more important effect on issuers compared to investors. Therefore, CRAs played a 
significant role in structured financial products in the later financial crisis of 2008. In a 
nutshell, the issuer-pays model was adopted at the appropriate time when both the market 
and regulator attached importance to CRAs. Apart from that, the extension of other services 
related to rating services, such as pricing securities and designing structured financial 
products, generated consistent dynamics for issuers. As a result, the role of the issuer-pays 
model cannot be changed readily. 
 
4.4.1 The Failure of the Reputation Mechanism 
 
CRAs have not been regulated for decades. During that period, the credit rating industry 
self-regulated through the reputation mechanism. The ‘reputation mechanism operates on 
the credit rating industry to solve problems of information asymmetry.’102 In essence, the 
reputation mechanism could be regarded as an integral part of private ordering.103 In the 
initial period of the credit rating industry, the business model had been the subscriber-pays 
model before 1969. The dominant theory in that period was the reputation mechanism. The 
reputation mechanism operates in a simple way: CRAs accumulate reputation through being 
monitored by market participants, based on the good records of credit ratings. Good records 
bring good reputation and CRAs thus gain more business. In this regard, CRAs have 
incentives to behave well and keep accurate rating records so that investors can believe them 
and purchase their rating services. Nevertheless, the recent financial crisis proved that the 
reputation mechanism failed to incentivize CRAs to ensure the rating quality, especially in 
structured finance.  
 
The reputation mechanism does not work well all the time. The mechanism dates back to the 
Middle Ages in Europe where the revival of trade gave a rise to burgeoning institutions that 
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underpinned commerce.104 During this period, most informal reputation mechanisms were 
gradually replaced with novel and diverse formal ones, which were based on the legal 
infrastructure that supported commercial contracts and protected private property. The 
formal reputation mechanism extended the geographical trade area and reached beyond the 
social constraints which traders neither knew well nor with whom they had biological and 
social ties.105 However, with the further development of commerce, the shortcoming of the 
reputation mechanism is gradually exposed. In the middle of the nineteenth century in 
America, as the grains market and construction of the railroad network among Chicago’s 
hinterlands grew, farmers transported wheat changing from packaging it into sacks, to taking 
it out and pouring it into elevators and railroad cars.106 This caused wheat from various farms 
to be mixed, and consumers thus could no longer distinguish from which farm which 
adulterated wheat was from. 107  Some farmers adulterated their wheat, secure in the 
knowledge they could not be accountable for this adulteration.108  To grapple with the 
problem, the Chicago Board of Trade proposed one solution, and that was that the way to 
measure wheat was to replace the volume with the weight. However, this solution was futile, 
and even had adverse effects, because farmers had less incentives to clean the wheat.109 Later, 
an inspection and regulation system designed by the Illinois state government replaced the 
reputation mechanism of individual farmers.  
 
As seen above, there are two obvious shortcomings with regard to the reputation mechanism. 
For One thing, when targeted information asymmetry is too complex, the reputation 
mechanism may not work well. As can be seen from the American wheat scenario, when the 
particular stage or procedure and its responsible party that result in the final negative 
outcome cannot be confirmed, the reputation mechanism will not work well. Back to the 
credit ratings: the reputation mechanism proved ineffective when CRAs failed to properly 
assess structured financial products. Credit ratings related to structured finance aims to 
reduce the information asymmetry between investors and the rated structured financial 
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products. However, the structured financial products are too complex to be assessed properly. 
Even though it has been recognized that CRAs had underestimated the risk in structured 
financial products, it is still hard to determine who should be the principal responsible party 
of the collapse of structured finance (such as an issuer of the underlying asset, a creator of 
structured debt instrument or a CRA). That information can efficiently flow among market 
participants is the prerequisite of the effectiveness of reputation mechanism.110 Therefore, 
when the rated entities are overly complex, the limited information flow cannot ensure the 
reputation mechanism to work well. 
 
For another, companies are sometimes more willing to pursue short-term gains in the cost of 
reputation. A good reputation cannot be established in the short term. The reputation 
mechanism utilizes the threat of bad reputation to deter individual misconduct. However, 
when an individual has a short-term fraudulent motive the fraudulent conduct may at the 
same time create huge profits, the incentive of huge profits is more likely to suppress the 
threat of a bad reputation. As can also be seen from the US wheat example cited above, the 
ineffectiveness of the reputation mechanism is apparent when the one-time transaction can 
create enough profits. Rating structured finance quickly provides large amounts of profits 
for CRAs as well. Even though CRAs are unable to assess the structured financial products, 
they still choose to provide such relevant services in the cost of their reputation. Besides, 
fierce competition may force CRAs to focus on the short-term profits.111 As will be analysed 
in Chapter 5, the oligopolistic market structure further accelerates the failure of the 
reputation mechanism. In short, the key to the failure of the mechanism is structured finance. 
 
4.4.2 Structured Finance  
 
Structured finance can be regarded as ‘a form of financial intermediation, based upon 
securitization technology’.112 There are three characteristics to structured finance: First, it 
involves the pooling of assets and selling the right to claim on the cash flows backed by 
these assets to investors. The underlying backed assets include cash instruments (such as 
residential mortgages) and synthetic exposures (such as credit default swaps). Second, these 
cash flows from the backed underlying assets are repackaged into several tranches, usually 
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including senior, mezzanine and junior tranches. Each tranche is rated by CRAs. A senior 
tranche with the highest rating often has the lowest interest, while a junior tranche has the 
lowest rating and provides the highest interest. A senior tranche is paid first by the interest 
and principal payment from the underlying collateral pool, and the mezzanine tranche then 
receives the additional principal amount and interest, and the junior is the last one to be 
addressed. Once the underlying collateral assets default, the junior tranche absorbs the initial 
losses first, followed by the mezzanine tranche, which absorbs the additional losses, 
followed by the senior tranche.113 Third, is the ‘delink[ing of] the credit risk of the collateral 
asset pool from the credit risk of the originator, usually through use of a finite-lived, 
standalone special purpose vehicle’.114  
 
Unlike the rating of corporate bonds, structured financial products are structured to obtain a 
targeted rating by the pooling and tranching of assets. CRAs play a dual role in the creation 
and design of these structured financial products. For one thing, CRAs provide credit 
assessments underlying collateral assets during the pooling process.115 For another, CRAs 
engage in designing the structures of these financial products and often provide structure 
advice during the tranching process.116 The rating for structured financial products has an ex 
ante character, because each tranche of structured financial product is designed for a 
particular rating before CRAs are involved in the creation and design process.117 When a 
credit rating is sought, CRAs need to design the proportion of underlying collateral assets 
according to their credit assessments for each tranche so that each tranche can get the 
targeted rating as envisaged beforehand.118  
  
As a result, structured finance is complex and opaque, but most investors misunderstood the 
credit rating of structured financial products prior to the financial crisis. On the other hand, 
the role of CRAs during the whole process lacked independence. CRAs provide structure 
advice in accordance with the need for a credit rating for each tranche which was designed 
beforehand by issuers. The complexity of structured finance acts as a veil for this conflict of 
interest. Conflicts of interest in structured finance exacerbated to a large extent the rating 
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failure during the financial crisis. Some researchers believe that the issuer-pays model 
escalated the conflicts of interest, especially in structured finance, and thus attempted to 
reform the model to manage the severe conflicts in structured finance.  
 
Under the issuer-pays model, the revenue of CRAs depends on the issuer, and CRAs are 
likely to provide favourable rating for their clients, namely issuers. The inherent drawback 
also exists in the traditional corporate bonds rating. If one thus assumes that the inherent 
limit finally brings about conflicts of interest, even a rating failure or delay, it should have 
same effect on both traditional corporate bonds and structured finance. However, as the 
analysis below based on Tables 4.1 and 4.2 and Figures 4.5 and 4.6 below indicate, the credit 






Table 4.1 The Comparison of S&P Annual Global Corporate and Structured Finance 
One-year Default Rates from 2000 to 2017119 
Year 
Global Annual Corporate Default Rates 
(%) 
Global Structured Finance One-year Default 
Rates 
(%) 
AAA AA A BBB BB B 
CCC/
C AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC 
2000 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.37 1.16 7.70 35.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.47 1.85 4.55 6.25 
2001 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.34 2.96 11.53 45.45 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.42 0.65 2.79 31.91 15.00 
2002 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.01 2.89 8.21 44.44 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.52 1.87 8.27 29.55 13.64 
2003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.58 4.07 32.73 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.52 0.92 2.29 34.78 15.69 
2004 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.44 1.45 16.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.72 2.19 14.72 11.11 
2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.31 1.74 9.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.19 1.33 11.44 23.53 
2006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.82 13.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.26 0.47 17.13 18.28 
2007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.25 15.24 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.61 2.37 1.41 22.22 24.18 
2008 0.00 0.38 0.39 0.49 0.81 4.09 27.27 0.33 0.66 1.04 2.00 4.78 11.77 57.15 27.11 
2009 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.55 0.75 10.94 49.46 0.22 1.37 2.88 5.71 9.14 16.03 49.04 64.57 
2010 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.86 22.62 0.14 0.50 0.71 1.84 2.59 5.25 16.08 38.30 
2011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.67 16.30 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.43 1.02 5.46 13.46 51.93 
2012 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 1.57 27.52 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.32 0.66 1.46 19.59 44.79 
2013 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.64 24.50 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.22 0.64 1.32 8.90 37.59 
2014 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 17.42 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.17 1.33 7.43 28.08 
2015 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 2.40 26.51 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.48 1.43 8.89 27.38 
2016 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.47 3.70 33.17 0.00 0.27 0.07 0.19 0.22 1.26 5.91 30.58 
2017 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.98 26.23 0.01 0.08 0.23 0.36 1.11 1.38 5.64 17.17 
 
 
119 Data collected from Tables 3 of S&P, ‘2017 Annual Global Corporate Default Study and Rating Transitions’ 
(2018) 8-9 
<https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/774196/2017+Annual+Global+Corporate+Default+Study/a4c
ffa07-e7ca-4054-9e5d-b52a627d8639> accessed 19 January 2019, and Table 10 of S&P, ‘2017 Annual Global 
Structured Finance Default Study and Rating Transitions’ (2018) 38-9 
<https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/86957/2017AnnualGlobalStructuredFinanceDefaultStudyAnd






Figure 4.5 Comparison of S&P Annual Global Corporate and Structured Finance 
One-year Default Rates from 2000 to 2017120 
 
The numbers from the tables and figures serve to demonstrate the following:  
 
a. According to Table 4.2 and Figure 4.5, the overall default rates of traditional 
corporate bonds rating are apparently lower than the overall default rates of structured 
finance ratings, even during financial crisis. More specifically (Table 4.1), most of the 
default rates of each various-grade rating in corporate bonds are lower than their counterparts 
in structured finance. Since the financial crisis of 2007, defaults have even been found in 
structured financial bonds with AAA ratings and, needless to say, bonds with AA or A 
ratings have higher default rates. By contrast, the corporate bonds with a AAA rating 
appeared to no defaults from 2000 to 2017, and even bonds with AA or A ratings appeared 
to have comparatively lower default rates. By comparing each column of the same ratings 
between corporate default rates and structured finance default rates, each default rate of 
corporate bonds is lower than the counterpart in structured finance bonds. This shows that 
the credit rating inflation was obviously in the structured finance rating. The lower default 
rates in each column of corporate bonds implies the stability of corporate ratings.  
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Table 4.2 Comparison of IG Default Rates and SG Default Rates in S&P Global 
Annual Corporate and One-year Structured Finance Credit Ratings from 2000 to 
2017121 
 
Global Annual Corporate Default 
Rates (%) 
Global Structured Finance one-year 











2000 2.48 0.24 6.23 0.05 0.00 1.18 
2001 3.78 0.23 9.87 0.16 0.04 2.76 
2002 3.59 0.42 9.50 0.36 0.05 5.66 
2003 1.92 0.10 5.07 0.34 0.06 4.17 
2004 0.78 0.03 2.02 0.20 0.02 2.24 
2005 0.60 0.03 1.50 0.17 0.01 1.77 
2006 0.48 0.00 1.19 0.13 0.01 1.24 
2007 0.37 0.00 0.91 0.39 0.12 3.00 
2008 1.80 0.42 3.69 2.64 0.70 15.97 
2009 4.18 0.33 9.90 10.74 1.54 34.58 
2010 1.20 0.00 3.01 8.34 0.53 17.50 
2011 0.80 0.03 1.84 10.28 0.14 21.41 
2012 1.14 0.00 2.58 11.47 0.10 23.06 
2013 1.06 0.00 2.30 6.93 0.07 14.53 
2014 0.69 0.00 1.43 4.29 0.01 9.23 
2015 1.36 0.00 2.76 3.97 0.06 8.75 
2016 2.08 0.03 4.21 3.02 0.12 6.91 
2017 1.20 0.00 2.44 2.12 0.15 4.94 
 
b. According to Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6, the overall default rates in structured finance 
have remained high from 2008 to 2012, while the corporate default rates peaked in 2009 and 
then reverted down to the same levels as before. This implies that, to some extent, structured 
finance bonds are more vulnerable than corporate bonds. Apart from that, the corporate 
default rates remain stable before and after a financial crisis, which implies the accuracy and 
validity of credit ratings in corporate bonds. 
 
121 IG means investment grade; SG means speculative grade; Data collected from Tables1 of S&P, ‘2017 
Annual Global Corporate Default Study and Rating Transitions’ (n 119) 3-4. and Table 10 of S&P, ‘2017 







Figure 4.6 Comparison of IG Default Rates and SG Default Rates in S&P Global 
Annual Corporate and One-year Structured Finance Credit Ratings from 2000 to 
2017122 
 
As can be seen from the numbers and lines in Tables 4.1,4.2 and Figures 4.5, 4.6, the default 
rates in structured finance after the aftershocks of the financial crisis were still distinctly 
higher than those before the financial crisis. Besides the vulnerability of structured finance, 
one of the possible explanations is that CRAs rethought and confronted the real default risks 
of structured finance during the financial crisis and, after that, the real default rates of 
structured finance have been disclosed and revealed. 
 
Simply put, corporate bonds rating presents lower defaults rates and stronger stability than 
the credit rating in structured finance. These obvious differences contradict the assumption 
made before that if the issuer-pays model leads to serve conflicts of interest, that should have 
the same effect on both corporate ratings and structured finance ratings. Therefore, that 
implies the inherent limit of the issuer-pays model itself that it does not contribute 
sufficiently to the severe conflicts of interest or, at least, the mere issuer pays has no severe 
 




effect on structured finance or, at least, the issuer-pays model alone cannot lead to severe 
failure of structured finance. 
 
More importantly, the rating in structured finance generated huge amounts of revenue, which 
provides sufficient incentives for CRAs to issue ratings regardless of the quality of these 
ratings. The CDO123 issuance alone boomed from USD 157 billion to USD 552 billion from 
2004 to 2006. 124  The amount of revenue of CRAs with respect to CDO and RMBS125 
increased rapidly from 2002 to 2006 and business relating to structured finance became the 
main source.126 For example, according to Moody’s annual report, the rating of structured 
financial products increased substantially by 87 per cent from 2003 to 2006, which occupied 
more than half of the whole revenue in 2006.127 Thus, the conclusion that can be drawn is 
that the special traits of structured finance stimulates the inherent incentive under the issuer-
pays model for CRAs. In a nutshell, the credit rating related to structured finance is mainly 
attributed to the collapse of the financial market.  
 
4.4.3 Proposals for Structured Finance Instead of a Business Model  
 
In terms of the issuer-pays model, the model can be regarded as the current typical conflicts 
of interest. The possibility of changing the issuer-pays model is being discussed.128 However, 
neither the European Union nor the United States has changed this model, even though they 
are fully aware of it.129  
 
Some researchers, especially in China, called for a change of business model from the issuer-
pays model to the investor-pays model after the financial crisis.130 The reasonable part of 
 
123 A collateralized debt obligation (hereafter ‘CDO’) is a kind of asset-backed security. 
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125 Residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) are a type of mortgage-backed debt obligation created from 
residential debt, such as mortgages, home-equity loans and subprime mortgages. 
126 SEC, ‘2008 Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit 
Rating Agencies’ (2008) 10 <https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf> accessed 
19 January 2019. 
127 John Patrick Hunt, ‘Credit Rating Agencies and the Worldwide Credit Crisis: The Limits of Reputation, 
the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement’ (2009) 2009 Columbia Business Law Review 
109, 173. 
128 Mohammed B. Hemraj, ‘The Role of Public Policy in Regulating Credit Rating Agencies in the US and EU: 
Potential Drawbacks’ (2015) 36(9) The Company Lawyer 288, 289. 
129 ibid. 
130 Yuhui Wu [吴育辉] and others, ‘“Investor-Paid” vs. “Issuer-Paid”, Which Credit Rating Quality Is Higher? 





this proposal is that the Chinese market has not formed the oligopolistic structure and the 
regulatory limits in structured finance, and the resistance against the change is lower. 
However, the proposal for a simple investor-pays model ignores the influence of larger 
investors.  
  
To cope with the issuer-pays model, as Lynch proposed, one possible solution is that credit 
ratings be paid by the public, provided that ‘(1) A taxpayer-funded public institution could 
be created to conduct risk analysis; (2) The government could pay selected private CRAs for 
their services; (3) Tax incentives could be provided to CRAs who provide accurate 
ratings’.131 The proposal further develops the business model change, and it may avoid such 
conflicts involving the issuer-pays model. The problem is how to determine or ensure the 
accuracy of rating. Another proposal is to establish an international non-profit CRA that is 
designed to conduct sovereign-risk assessment and provide sovereign credit ratings. This 
aims to establish transparent and legitimate governance structures. The inevitable problem 
is the funding source. As assumed, funding sources include governments, companies, non-
governmental organisations, foundations and private donations. The operation and 
maintenance would require USD 400 million.132 The overhead costs and unstable funding 
source are the apparent issues. For example, European Commission proposed to establish a 
publicly funded EU CRA. The publicly-funded EU CRA could adopt a more measured 
approach to ratings and make more proper political judgment; nevertheless, the concern of 
this proposal is about the independence of this publicly-funded EU CRA, and this proposal 
is likely to reinforce the over-reliance on credit ratings instead of reducing it.133 Furthermore, 
another EU report discusses the possibility of a fully independent non-public European 
Credit Rating Foundation. 134  This independent non-public European Credit Rating 
Foundation was financed by the ‘financial community in the form of credits that will yield 
some interest payment’ instead of public fund.135 By contrast, even though this proposal 
improved the independency of former one, it seems pessimistic to the likelihood of the 
success of this project, not only because it is uncertain whether the new credit rating 
foundation is or not able to survive from market competition, but also because the potential 
 
131 Timothy E. Lynch, ‘Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the Current Regulatory 
Environment’ (2009) 59(2) Case Western Reserve Law Review 227, 292-304. 
132 Bertelsmann Foundation, ‘Bertelsmann Foundation Releases Blueprint for INCRA – An International Non-
Profit Credit Rating Agency’ (18 April 2012) <https://newsletter.biia.com/bertelsmann-foundation-releases-
blueprint-for-incra-–-an-international-non-profit-credit-rating-agency> accessed 20 January 2019. 
133 House of Lords European Union Committee (n 91) 29. 
134 Rapporteur: Wolf Klinz, ‘Report on Credit Rating Agencies: Future Perspectives’ (European Parliament 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 2011) A7-0081/2011, 7 and 13-4. 




conflicts of interests and problems are similar to the current CRAs. 136 In other words, the 
EU reform proposals related to business model seems uncertain. 
 
The discussion of all kinds of conflicts of interest aims to manage or avoid the potential 
misconduct of CRAs. The three assumed reasons causing conflicts of interest in structured 
finance under the issuer-pays model, include the inherent limits of this model, the huge profit 
incentive generated from structured finance and the oligopolistic structure of the big three 
CRAs. The evidence to exclude the first one is that the shift of the business model from the 
investor-pays model to issuer-pays model gave rise to conflicts in structured financial 
products rather than the traditional corporate bonds.137 At least, the conflicts of interest with 
respect to credit rating in traditional bonds needs to be improved, while the counterpart in 
structured finance needs to be solved. The reputation theory proved the inadequacies of the 
second reason.  
 
As discussed above, the root of the problem focuses on structured finance. In China, the 
PBOC, CBRC and Ministry of Finance issued Notice of the People’s Bank of China, the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission and the Ministry of Finance on Relevant Matters 
Concerning Further Expanding the Pilot Securitization of Credit Assets, which forbids the 
re-securitisation and synthetic securitization in a certain period of time.138 In practice, re-
securitisation and synthetic securitization have thus far not been allowed to be traded.139 
Apart from that, other structured financial products are also strictly controlled by relevant 
financial regulators and only such structured financial products created in a simple way could 
be allowed to be traded.140 This reform is not only designed to be in line with the goal of 
serving the productive economy, but also avoids conflicts of interest in structured finance. 
The benefits of this reform are evident: first, it to a large extent solves the incentive problem 
that motivated CRAs since much profit stemmed from rating structured financial products, 
even though the relevant businesses for CRAs decreased largely. Second, the prohibition on 
re-securitization and synthetic securitization make structured finance simpler, because the 
two are more complex forms of structured financial products. However, the legislator and 
 
136 ibid 29-30; Rapporteur: Wolf Klinz (n 92) 13-4. 
137 Deryn Darcy (n 124) 623. 
138 Section 1, People’s Bank of China, Ministry of Finance, and China Banking Regulatory Commission, 
‘Notice of the People’s Bank of China, the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the Ministry of Finance 
on Relevant Matters Concerning Further Expanding the Pilot Securitization of Credit Assets [中国人民银行、
中国银行业监督管理委员会、财政部关于进一步扩大信贷资产证券化试点有关事项的通知]’ (2012) No. 
127 [2012] of the People’s Bank of China (银发[2012]127号）. 





regulator may not be capable of putting or willing to put these limits on structured finance, 
not only because structured finance provides huge amounts of wealth to the national or 
reginal economy, but also because these regulatory limits will be strongly resisted by the 
market. For the economic concern, this reform proposal could be regarded as a periodical 
regulation, and it is flexible to the various regulatory demands. The current regulatory focus 
is the financial stability. Thus, this proposal seems to fit the present regulatory demand. 
When need to stimulate the economy, this proposal can be revoked. For the concern 
regarding the market resistance, the perquisite of this reform is a strong legislator and 
regulator. It explains why this proposal is not the EU and US’ s preference but China’s. As 
it will be discussed in the Chapter 5, enhancing regulation is necessary to deal with the CRA 
issue. In short, to better avoid conflicts of interest, prohibition on the issuance of structured 








Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are analyses of how the rating quality could be improved from three 
different perspectives. Chapter 4 focuses on conflicts of interest, while Chapter 6 focuses on 
the civil liability for CRAs. Oligopoly, is a big concern for all involved in a regulatory 
solution related to rating quality, is analysed in Chapter 5. To better address this concern, 
the following questions should be answered first: How should credit rating oligopoly status 
be addressed, especially in three areas? What are the differences in oligopolies in the 
European Union, United States and China respectively? How do oligopolies affect the credit 
rating industry? What are the existing regulatory approaches to deal with these negative 
influences? Are the regulations in place effective? If so, how; if not, why and is there any 
possible alternative to improve on them? 
 
Before addressing the oligopolies in the United States, European Union and China, it is 
worth noting the following economic concepts, namely Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(hereafter ‘HHI’) and HHI inverse, which will be applied to determine the specific 
oligopolistic market structure in each area. The HHI and inverse of the HHI (hereafter ‘HHI 
inverse’) are often employed for discussing market structure as they are recognised 
techniques in the analysis of market structure for competition law and policy. Later, the 
negative influences associated with oligopolistic market are analysed. This chapter also 
discusses the impact of oligopoly on the reputation mechanism. In addition, the rent seeking 
theory aims to address the role of oligopoly in the relevant regulatory approaches. Next, to 
cope with these negative effects of oligopolies, the common regulatory strategy is to create 
incentives for incumbent rating agencies to improve rating quality through enhancing market 
competition. The regulations related to enhanced competition in the European Union, United 
States and China are discussed. Having illustrated the existing regulations, a possible 
regulatory reform to improve the rating quality is offered.  
 
5.2 Oligopoly in the European Union, United States and China 
 






An oligopoly (a Greek word meaning ‘few sellers’) can be defined as a market structure in 
which a few firms dominate.1 In other words, where most shares of a market are owned by 
a few firms, this high concentration of market is an oligopoly.2 It is worth noting before 
explaining the influence of oligopoly in the history of credit rating, to determine how CRAs 
are highly concentrated. 
 
The current global credit rating market is an oligopoly dominated by a few CRAs, namely 
the big three3. The recognition of the oligopolistic nature of the rating industry is critical to 
assess the consequently negative influence in approaching the possible regulation. 
Lawmakers and researchers have recognised the oligopolistic nature of the credit rating 
industry.4 There are approximately 150 local and international CRAs, while the big three 
occupy approximately 98 global per cent of the credit rating market share. 5  Table 5.1 
provides the data with regard to the EU market shares of the big three from 2012 to 2018. 
Specifically, in 2018, the big three consisted of 93.4 per cent of the EU market share, and 
S&P and Moody’s had 78.3 per cent market share (S&P consisted of 46.26 per cent shares 
while Moody’s occupied 32.04 per cent).6 Furthermore, in 2018, the big three occupied 
roughly 95 per cent of the US market share.7 Moody’s and S&P separately have 33.1 or 49.2 




1 Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach (8th, International student edn, WW 
Norton 2010) 497. 
2 ibid. 
3 The big three means Standard & Poor's (hereafter ‘S&P’), Moody's Investment Service (hereafter ‘Moody's’), 
and the Fitch Group (hereafter ‘Fitch’). 
4 Lawrence J. White, ‘Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies’ (2010) 24 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 
211, 216.  
5 ibid.  
6  ESMA, ‘Report on CRA Market Share Calculation’ (2018) 6 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/cra_market_share_calculation_2018.pdf> accessed 21 
March 2019.  
7  SEC, ‘2018 Annual Report on Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’ (2018) 15 
<https://www.sec.gov/files/2018-annual-report-on-nrsros.pdf> accessed 8 November 2019. 




















Moody's 39.18 37.51 36.50 34.67 31.29 31.27 32.04 
Fitch 20.37 18.44 19.47 16.80 16.56 15.65 16.62 
S&P 36.80 39.58 40.17 40.42 45.00 46.26 42.09 
Total 96.35 95.53 96.14 91.89 92.85 93.18 90.75 
 
More specifically, economists generally measure the extent of industry concentration by 
using the HHI10 and the HHI inverse11, because market shares may not fully reflect the extent 
of market concentration and competence.12 As it seen in Table 5.2, the number of HHI below 
1 500 means an unconcentrated market; the number of HHI between 1 500 and 2 500 means 
a moderately concentrated market; the number of HHI above 2 500 means a highly 
concentrated market. In short, the higher the figure, the greater the concentration. By contrast, 
a market with an HHI inverse of below 4 can be deemed highly concentrated; a market with 
an HHI inverse from 4 to 6.67 can be deemed moderately concentrated; and a market with 
an HHI inverse above 6.67 is considered to be unconcentrated. For example, in the US 
market, SEC reports indicate that an HHI for all NRSRO ratings outstanding is 3 47213, as 
well as the HHI inverse number for the credit rating industry is 2.7014. Referring to the Table 






9 Data collected from the ESMA annual report of CRA Market Shares Calculation (from 2012 to 2018) 
10 ‘HHI, is generally used to measure market concentration, which is a measure of the size of firms in relation 
to the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition among them.’ SEC, ‘2011 Annual Report on 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’ (2011) 8 
<https://www.sec.gov/files/nrsroannrep0111.pdf> accessed 8 November 2019.; the figure of HHI ranges 
between 0 and 10 000 points, which indicates the various extents of industry concentration. See U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, ‘Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ (2015) Section 1.5 
<https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-0> accessed 8 November 2019. 
11 ‘HHI inverse, also can be used to represent the number of “effective competitors”, or the number of firms 
with equal market shares that would produce an equivalent HHI score.’ Toby Roberts, ‘When Bigger Is Better: 
A Critique of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index’s Use to Evaluate Mergers in Network Industries’ (2014) 34(2) 
Pace Law Review 908 <https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1863&context=plr> 
accessed 10 November 2019. 
12 U. S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (n 10). 
13  SEC, ‘2012 Annual Report on Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’ (2012) 12 
<https://www.sec.gov/files/nrsroannrep1212.pdf> accessed 10 November 2019. 




Table 5.2 Two Ways to Measure the Extent of Market Concentration Through HHI 
and HHI Inverse 
 HHI15 HHI Inverse16 
Highly concentrated market Above 2 500 Less than 4.0 
Moderately concentrated 
market 
Between 1 500 and 2 500 Between 4.0 and 6.67 
Unconcentrated market Less than 1 500 Above 6.67 
 
Table 5.3 the US HHI Inverse of Credit Rating 
Year HHI inverse of all rating 
HHI inverse of all rating (excluding 
government securities) 
2008 2.99 3.56 
2009 2.86 3.58 
2010 2.88 3.55 
2011 2.74 3.7 
2012 2.75 3.68 
2013 2.72 3.65 
2014 2.68 3.81 
2015 2.65 3.67 
2016 2.67 3.78 
2017 2.70 3.94 
 
Things seem different in the Chinese credit rating market. The Chinese rating market is 
mainly held by China’s rating agencies. First, the foreign CRAs were not allowed to enter in 
the Chinese credit rating market until the enactment of the 2017 PBOC announcement17 that 
provides the detailed entry eligibility criteria for foreign CRAs. Consequently, the big three 
have provided rating services in China for long time by virtue of holding domestic CRAs. 
The big three hold 80 per cent shares of China’s rating market.18 For example, Moody’s has 
 
15  Data collected from The United States Department of Justice, ‘Herfindahl–Hirschman Index’ (2018) 
<https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index> accessed 20 August 2019. 
16 Data collected from SEC, ‘2018 Annual Report on Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’ 
(n 7) 12. 
17 Announcement on Issues Concerning Providing Credit Rating Services by the Credit Rating Agencies on the 
Interbank Bond Market Announcement [信用评级在银行间债券市场开展信用评级业务有关事宜公告] 
(Announcement No. 7 [2017] of the People’s Bank of China [中国人民银行 公告[2017]第 7 号]). 
18 Yunzhi Lu, ‘The Development of China’s Credit Rating [论我国信用评级发展]’ [2012] Modern Business 




held 49 per cent shares of the CCXI19 and took over the management right. Another example 
is that Fitch has held 49 per cent shares of Lianhe20 and took over the management right as 
well. In January 2019, S&P, as the first foreign rating agency, was authorised by the National 
Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors (hereafter ‘NAFMII’) to enter the 
market, which means that S&P received approval to issue credit rating in the inter-bank 
market.21 Next, one CRA should get the approval of at least one relevant regulator and can 
then enter in Chinese rating market. As is shown in the Table 5.2, up to December 2018, 
there have been 9 CRAs in the Chinese rating market. Furthermore, the incumbent large 
rating agencies received at least one approval from various regulators. Certification from 
various regulators means approval for various platforms. For instance, the Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission (hereafter ‘CSRC’) supervises and regulates the Security Exchange 
and the Securities Association of China (hereafter ‘SAC’) assists in self-regulation and 
management of CRAs registered on the Security Exchange. Therefore, one rating agency 
should first register on SAC and obtain approval from SAC, before issuing credit ratings on 
the Securities Exchange platform. In short, even though the big three hold Chinese rating 
markets shares, the level of the big three oligopoly is less severe than in the European Union 
and United States. As addressed in the Chapter 2, the multi-regulators system further 
separates market concentration because various regulators offered approvals to various 




19  China Cheng Xin International Credit Rating Co. Ltd [中诚信国际 ], ‘Introduction of Company’ 
<http://www.ccxi.com.cn/247/Company.html> accessed 20 August 2017. 
20 China Lianhe Credit Rating Co. Ltd, [联合资信评估有限公司], ‘Introduction of Shareholders’ (2015) 
<http://www.lhratings.com/about/gudong.html> accessed 20 August 2017. 
21  Lianting Tu, ‘S&P Global Gets Approval for China Local Rating Business’ People’s Bank of China 
(Bloomberg, 2019) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-28/s-p-global-gets-regulator-nod-




Table 5.4 China’s CRAs Approved by Various Regulators 
CRA NDRC22 CSRC23 PBOC24 CIRC25 
Dagong26  √ √ √ √ 
Golden27 √ √ √ √ 
CCXI28  √  √ √ 
SB&IS29 √ √ √ √ 
Lianhe30 √  √ √ 
Fareast31  √   
Pengyuan32  √ √   
CCXR33  √  √ 
United Ratings34  √  √ 
China Bond Rating35   √ √ 
 
Before S&P obtained approval, there had been no foreign CRA that had been given approval 
to enter in the Chinese rating market. As a consequence, China’s domestic rating agencies, 
rather than the big three, owned market shares of credit ratings. According to Figure 5.1, six 
of all the nine rating agencies own most of the market share. Between 2008 and 2014, 
Dagong, United Ratings and CCXI held roughly 85 per cent of the market share. By contrast, 
 
22 National Development and Reform Commission, [国家发展和改革委员会]. 
23 China Securities Regulatory Commission, [中国证券监督管理委员会]. 
24 People's Bank of China, [中国人民银行]. 
25 China Insurance Regulatory Commission, [中国银行保险监督管理委员会]. 
26 Dagong Global Credit Rating Co., Ltd (hereafter ‘Dagong’), Dagong Credit[大公国际资信评估有限公司] 
<http://en.dagongcredit.com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&catid=11> accessed 6 July 2019. 
27 Golden Credit Rating International Co., Ltd (hereafter ‘Golden’), Golden [东方金诚国际信用评估有限公
司] <http://www.dfratings.com/news/info/15> accessed 27 July 2019. 
28 China Chengxin International Credit Rating Co. Ltd (hereafter ‘CCXI’), China ChengXin International 
Credit Rating Co., Ltd (CCXI) [中诚信国际信用评级有限公司] <http://www.ccxap.com/About.aspx> 
accessed 6 July 2019. 
29 Shanghai Brilliance Credit Rating & Investors Service Co. Ltd (hereafter ‘SB&IS’) , Shanghai Brilliance 
Credit Rating& Investors Services(SB&IS) [ 上 海 新 世 纪 资 信 评 估 投 资 服 务 有 限 公 司 ] 
<http://www.shxsj.com/en/inside.php?menuid=106&catid=116> accessed 6 July 2019. 
30 China Lianhe Credit Rating Co. Ltd (hereafter ‘Lianhe’), Lianhe [联合资信评级有限公司 ] 
<http://www.lhratings.com/about/jianjie.html> accessed 6 July 2019. 
31  Fareast Credit Rating Co., Ltd (hereafter ‘Far East’), Far East [ 远 东 资 信 评 估 有 限 公 司 
<http://www.sfecr.com/ydgk/index_13.aspx> accessed 6 July 2019. 
32  Pengyuan Credit Rating Co., Ltd (hereafter ‘Pengyuan’), Pengyuan Rating[鹏元资信评估有限公司] 
<http://www.pyrating.cn/zh-cn/about/zizhizili> accessed 6 July 2019. 
33 China Chengxin Securities Rating Co., Ltd (hereafter ‘CCXR’), China Chengxin Securities Rating (CCXR) 
[中诚信证券评估有限公司] <http://www.ccxr.com.cn/about.asp?link=4> accessed 6 July 2019.  
34 United Credit Rating Co., Ltd (hereafter ‘United Ratings’), United Ratings [联合信用评级有限公司] 
<http://www.lianhecreditrating.com.cn/News.aspx?m=20140627095017653668> accessed 6 July 2019. 
35 China Bond Rating Co., Ltd.(hereafter ‘China Bond Rating’), China Bond Rating[中债资信评估有限责任




since 2014, the other CRAs have held more market shares; in other words, the market 
competition gradually improved.  
 
Figure 5.1 Market Shares of Chinese CRAs36 
 
In addition, as can be seen from the Figure 5.2, the trend of HHI of China’ credit rating has 
started to decrease since 2003. The recent HHI is around 2 000, and as related to Table 5.4, 
this figure means that the market concentration of China’s credit rating falls in the 
moderately concentrated range. Compared to the United States and EU rating market, the 
Chinese rating market competition is higher.  
 
 
36 Hongyu Yao [姚红宇, ‘The Reputation Mechanism of Credit Rating Agencies and Rating Upgrades— the 
Evidences from Chinese Credit Rating [评级机构声誉机制与评级上调 — 来自中国信用评级的证据]’ 





Figure 5.2 The HHI of China’s Credit Rating37 
 
5.2.2 Comparison of Oligopolies in Each Area 
 
The oligopolies of the big three in the United States are attributed to the government 
certification NRSROs, as well as the expanding use of credit rating in regulation. For one 
thing, the government certification created a barrier to entry for CRAs. In 1975, the SEC 
created the concept of NRSROs and approved it for the largest CRAs, namely the big three.38 
As can be seen from Figure 5.3, only the big three were granted NRSRO authorization for 
many decades, and were thus conferred such a privileged status in the rating market. For 
another, the regulations over-reliance on NRSROs further underpinned the oligopolies of the 
big three. Early in the 1930s, credit rating was firstly used by regulators as a tool to 
distinguish investment grade from speculative grade securities.39 Later in the 1970s, the SEC 
began to rely on CRAs as a regulatory tool. Subsequent to approvals of NRSROs, the SEC 
and other regulators linked numerous financial regulations to the credit ratings provided by 
one NRSRO,40 which granted special market status to the NRSROs. As the substantive 
regulations relied on the NRSRO ratings, those ratings issued by NRSROs (namely the big 
 
37 Data collected from Mingming Li [李明明, ‘Research on Functions, Defects and Market Structure of Credit 
Rating[信用评级业的功能，缺陷与市场机构研究]’ (Doctoral Thesis, Shandong University 2016) 135. 
38 Andrew Fight, The Ratings Game (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2001) 7. 
39 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency defined the term investment 
securities and required banks to exclusively invest in investment-grade bonds, which meant that bank holdings 
of publicly traded bonds had to be rated BBB or higher by at least one credit rating agency. See Lawrence J. 
White, ‘Financial Regulation and the Current Crisis: A Guide for the Antitrust Community’ 30 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1426188> accessed 28 September 2019. 
40 Emily McClintock Ekins and Mark A Calabria, ‘Regulation, Market Structure, And the Role of the Credit 
Rating Agencies’ (2012) No.704 Policy Analysis 9-10 
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three in that period) became more influential and valuable; in other words, the regulatory 
privilege further enhanced the barrier to entry for other small CRAs. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Credit Rating History of Current NRSROs from 1900 to 201041 
 
Apart from that, in the 1970s, the bond market entered an era of globalization. Bond markets 
expanded, ranging from the United States to the world, and CRAs reformed the business 
model to the investor-pays model. Consequently, the credit rating market further enlarged. 
During this period of market expansion and transition, the big three seized the opportunity 
to occupy most of the market share of the credit rating. 
 
In the EU market, the reputation mechanism once became a barrier to entry for other small 
agencies. With the globalization and the interaction of the US financial market, the EU credit 
rating market was significantly affected by the US credit rating industry at the beginning. In 
this regard, the long-term reputation capital of the big three plays a vital role in the EU credit 
rating oligopoly. Leading up to the big three entering the EU market, they had accumulated 
abundant positive reputation capital. A positive reputation cannot be built by a CRA in one 
day because it takes time to verify the accuracy and quality of the rating services that the 
agency provides. Further, the credit rating industry has not been regulated for many decades, 
and thus the reputation mechanism was the only self-regulation tool in the rating market.  
 
The dynamics of the credit rating industry is more complicated. Why do the three rating 
agencies occupy the bulk of the market? Besides the governmental certification and 
 
41  SEC, 'Action Needed to Improve Rating Agencies Registration Program and Performance-Related 





reputation capital, there must be another reason, otherwise, the oligopolistic market 
structures should have changed in the US market or the EU market after the SEC had 
designated more CRAs as NRSROs and more rating agencies were approved to enter into 
EU rating market by European Securities and Market Authority (hereafter ‘ESMA.’)42. 
However, most of the market shares are still owned by the big three. For these new CRAs, 
if they compete with the big three on price, issuers are still more likely to choose the big 
CRAs, because the savings that issuers enjoy from a rating service by new CRAs are more 
likely to be less than the financial and reputational costs that an issuer bears when the 
issuance is not accepted by the investors or market.43 Put another way, the common way to 
lower price for a small rating agency is to cut the cost and this certainly may be at the cost 
of reducing rating quality, which is the key to market and investor confidence in credit rating. 
As a result, the final cost is still paid by the issuer. Therefore, competing on price cannot 
make inroads into the rating market. In contrast, competing on expertise does. For instance, 
when the big two (Moody’s and S&P) each held roughly 40 per cent of market share, Fitch 
promptly made inroads into the rating market by its expertise in structured finance.44 In short, 
another possible reason is expertise.  
 
Besides the expertise, economic power is another big competitive advantage for incumbent 
CRAs.45 Specifically, structured financial products or other novel securities, such as MBSs46 
and collateralized debt obligations (hereafter ‘CDOs’), have high requirements for the rating 
staff and rating analysis. In general, the incumbent and large rating agencies are more likely 
to have better capability to collect and analyse the private information of rated entities and 
afford higher sunk cost in rating methodologies. The huge entry cost became another barrier 
to entry for other small CRAs. In other words, the big three, compared with other EU small 
rating agencies, have more advantages in market competition. Consequently, the 
oligopolistic market of the big three was again more intensive in the EU rating market.  
 
In China, the oligopolies in the market structure are not so distinct, even though the market 
is still moderately concentrated. Like the United States, governmental certification also plays 
 
42  Since 2011, the EU CRAs should apply for registration or certification from ESMA. Regulation No. 
513/2011 of 11 May 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies (OJ 2011 L 145). 
43 Claire A. Hill, ‘Limits of Dodd–Frank’s Rating Agency Reform’ [2011] Chapman Law Review 141. 
44 Alec Klein, ‘Smoothing the Way for Debt Markets: Firms’ Influence Has Grown Along With World’s 
Reliance on Bonds’ [2004] The Washington Post A18 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A5573-2004Nov22.html> accessed 6 June 2018. 
45 Jack T. Jr. Gannon, ‘Let’s Help the Credit Rating Agencies Get It Right’ [2012] 31 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 
1015, 1020. 




a significant role in the oligopolistic market structure. As mentioned above, government 
approval from one relevant regulator is the precondition to enter the rating market. 
Furthermore, even registration and the establishment of CRAs should be authorised by one 
relevant regulator.47 These regulations can be deemed as the primary barrier to entry. During 
long periods, the big three did not obtain approval to enter the Chinese market for long 
periods until S&P was authorized in 2019.48 Thus, China’s rating market is divided by a 
handful of domestic rating agencies. According to Table 5.3 and Figure 5.1, the large rating 
agencies that own more market shares generally received more government licences from 
regulators. It is because one government licence means a gate pass to one securities platform. 
The more gate passes rating agencies have, the more rating markets they could enter into. 
For example, the approval from PBOC implies a gate pass to the inter-bank market, while 
the approval from the CSRC is the pass to the Securities Exchange market. In short, it is 
obvious that, like the United States, government approval has a huge influence on the current 
market shares of credit rating in China. 
 
The oligopolies of both the EU market and the Chinese market are affected by the big three. 
Leading up to the financial crisis, the European Union did not set government authorisation 
for CRAs; in other words, the big three entered into the EU rating market without regulatory 
barriers. The big three occupied the EU rating market rapidly through their reputation capital, 
economic power and professional staff. By contrast, even though due to regulatory limits, 
the big three were not able to enter into China’s rating market for long periods, they could 
still hold shares of domestic rating agencies. In addition，S&P received approval and 
entered China’s rating market in 2019. This approval implies that China is willing to allow 
one of the big three to enter its rating market, which is also support for the fact that the 
market concentration by the big three is not serious compared to the other areas.  
 
5.3 The Negative Influences Caused by Oligopoly  
 
As addressed above, the current credit rating industry fits the classic mould of an oligopoly. 
The characteristics of oligopoly manifest in the barriers to entry, few market competitors 
and independency of oligopolies members. Oligopoly itself can be regarded as a common 
 
47 Article 169 of Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (2014 Amendment) [中华人民共和国证
券法(2014修正)] 2014 (Order No 14 of the President of the People’s Republic of China). 




market structure, but the negative consequences oligopoly is accused of make it a regulatory 
object. 
  
5.3.1 The Characteristics of Oligopoly 
 
a. Barrier to Entry 
 
At first, the government certification is the most common barrier to entry. As discussed in 
the United States and China rating market, a CRA must get approval from the relevant 
regulator to be able to enter into the domestic rating market. For example, an NRSRO is a 
typical government certification. This kind of barrier to entry, on the one hand, ensures the 
basic expertise of market participants in one particular industry and, on the other hand, it 
prevents new and small market participants from entering the particular market. 
 
Second, a positive reputation is another barrier to entry in one industry, because a good 
reputation needs a long time to be built.49 Markets and investors are inclined to choose 
market participants with a positive reputation, and the new market participants thus have to 
appeal to customer with more time capital or other efforts. In the EU rating market, the big 
three naturally and promptly acquired numerous market shares, depending on their positive 
reputation built up before. By contrast, new CRAs are faced with strong barriers to entry. 
 
The final barriers are the expertise and economic power of incumbent agencies.50 Especially 
in some industries with highly technical requirements, high-quality expertise will be a 
stranglehold that large market participants will have on this industry for entry. For the rating 
industry, the technical barrier manifests in the novel structured finance, such as RMBSs51 
and CDOs. Additionally, the strong economic power is a big advantage for incumbent rating 
agencies. Compared with small rating agencies, the large rating agencies are more capable 
of affording the sunk cost, as well as development cost.  
 
b. Few Market Competitors 
 
 
49 John Patrick Hunt, ‘Credit Rating Agencies and the Worldwide Credit Crisis: The Limits of Reputation, the 
Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement’ (2009) 2009(1) Columbia Business Law Review 
109. 
50 Jack T. Jr. Gannon (n 45) 1020. 




As a consequence of barriers to entry, we also observe another characteristic in oligopolistic 
market, namely few market participants. Specifically, the number of capable market 
competitors among those market participants for oligopolies members are much fewer. 
Furthermore, actions by the oligopoly members will affect one another. 
 
5.3.2 The Negative Consequences of Oligopoly in the Credit Rating Industry 
 
Why does an oligopolistic rating market need to be changed? The main risk of the 
oligopolistic rating market structure is the rating quality decline, which mainly manifests in 
two aspects: (i) rating inflation and (ii) inaccurate rating methodologies. Once oligopolistic 
CRAs are aware of their dominant market positions, they are less likely to fear other market 
competitors, and they thus lack incentives to improve their rating quality. In theory, an 
oligopoly market is inclined to decreased productivity.52 In the credit rating industry, the 
decreased productivity manifests in the forms of inflated rating and methodology flaws.53 
During the global financial crisis of 2007–8, the big three were criticized for overrating 
structured financial products with inaccurate rating methodologies.54  
  
For one thing, oligopolistic members do not fear the losses of market shares to other new 
competitors and, at the same time, oligopolistic market structure intensifies the limited 
competition among incumbent oligopolistic members. The big three who have privileged 
market positions and lack threats from other competitors are less than the cutting-edge level 
of their capabilities. Among the whole market, oligopolistic members do not need to compete 
on rating quality, because they are able to easily maintain the market share. Once CRAs do 
not fear the losses of market share or removal by alternative CRAs, the deterrence under the 
reputation mechanism no longer works. This addressed the failure of reputation mechanism 
in the credit rating market, as will be further analysed in the following section. Within the 
group of oligopolistic members, they may compete by favouring their clients, even at the 
cost of reputation. The issuer-pays model55 created incentives for CRAs and they are thus 
likely to use lax standards and provide overly optimistic ratings in favour of their clients, 
that is, issuers. For example, as the emails record, Gale Scott, a potential rating service client 
 
52  Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics: Theory and Applications (Norton 1970) 330; Economics Online, 
‘Oligopoly: Defining and Measuring Oligopoly’ 
<https://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Oligopoly.html> accessed 24 September 2019.  
53 Jack T. Jr. Gannon (n 45). 
54 In some cases, the quality of synthetic CDO-squared securities was overstated by S&P, as Kai Gilkes, a 
former S&P quantitative analyst, argues. See Claude A Reese, et al v the McGraw-Hill Companies Inc, et al 
[2008] United States District Court, Southern District of New York Civil Action No.1:08-cv-07202-PKC,44. 




as well as issuer, threated to lose business against S&P unless S&P relaxed its rating 
methodologies.56 Then Gugliada, the S&P top CDO-rating executive, replied with ‘OK with 
me to revise criteria’.57 Kai Gilkes, a former S&P quantitative analyst, discovered a flaw in 
the main CDO model of S&P. 58  As Gilkes believes, because of the competitive 
considerations, S&P system overstated the many synthetic CDO-squared securities. 59 
Therefore, negative competition, or even malignant competition may arise. This risk 
stemmed from the conflicts of interest under the issuer-pays model.  
 
For another, oligopoly members lack incentives to continually improve their rating quality 
and accuracy, especially when they aware of them dominate market status. 60  This 
demotivation for rating agencies explains the failure of reputation theory in the credit rating 
industry from another aspect. The risk of oligopoly is to suppress innovation in rating 
techniques and methodologies.61 In an ideal market, rating agencies utilise various rating 
methodologies and they compete with one another depending on their rating quality by 
continually updating their rating models and methodologies. As a result, the rating agency 
with the best rating methodology survives. Nevertheless, in reality, the big three utilise 
similar rating methodologies. As mentioned in Chapter 4, rating the structured financial 
products offers huge amounts of short-term profits for CRAs, and CRAs are incapable of 
accurately providing credit ratings associated with structured finance. When the most rating 
agencies pay attention to the short-term interest instead of long-term reputation, the cost of 
good behaviour may be higher. The worse thing is that oligopoly may not only deter other 
new CRAs entrants with updated rating methodologies from entering the rating market, but 
also demotivate incumbent CRAs from improving their rating quality. These negative 
consequences of oligopoly, and the interaction between oligopoly and conflicts of interest 
have a joint influence on the credit rating market. A vicious circle may eventually be formed 
in the rating industry. 
 
Apart from that, an oligopolistic market structure may also increase regulatory costs and 
impediments, even when dealing with other issues, such as conflicts of interests, in the rating 
industry. In the absence of motivation in an oligopolistic market, Justensen states that it 
would be very hard to design a regulatory regime to motivate rating agencies to provide 
 
56 Claude A Reese, et al v. the McGraw-Hill Companies Inc., et al (n 54) 43. 
57 ibid. 
58 ibid 44. 
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responsively leading likely prospects in terms of novel investment products.62 In general, an 
oligopolistic market is more likely to decrease alternative options of rating agencies and 
increase costs paid by rating users. These costs will finally transfer to investors and even the 
whole market.63  
 
More importantly, at the EU level, besides the negative consequences cited above, the 
European Union has a political motivation for breaking up the oligopoly of global CRAs. 
The big three64 risk threatening regional financial stability. Following the financial crisis of 
2007–8, many commentators criticized them for causing sudden sovereign downgrades, 
precipitating or exacerbating the euro area crisis.65 For example, Mr Jurgen Klute MEP 
argued that the CRAs created false panic and encouraged speculation by implausible 
sovereign downgrades in the southern European Union. Furthermore, Dr Wolf Klinz MEP 
stated that CRAs held a specific rating for longer than really justified and suddenly issued 
the downgrade at a specific time, particularly a few days before decisive meetings, which 
exacerbated the situation.66 Even though, according to the current investigation and analysis 
by the European Union Committee, it cannot be determined whether these sovereign 
downgrades precipitated or exacerbated the euro area crisis,67 many EU leaders supported 
greater competition in the credit rating industry. For example, as the German Finance 
Minister argued, breaking the oligopoly of the big three was needed and it was thus necessary 
to increase competition.68 
 
5.3.3 The Failure of Reputation Mechanism in Credit Rating Industry 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the conflicts of interest and oligopoly interreacted with each other, 
and the complexity and profitability of structured finance are the main causes for the failure 
of the reputation mechanism. 
 
62 Paul J. Justensen, ‘Ratings Recall: Will New Reform Proposals Make Lasting Impact?’ (2009) 35 Journal of 
Corporation Law 193. 
63 Linying Ma [马林影], ‘Behaviour Analysis of the U.S. Credit Rating Agencies in the Financail Crisis and 
the Study on Their Regulatory Reform [金融危机中美国信用评级机构行为分析及监管研究改革]’ 
(Doctoral Thesis, University of Jilin 2014) 103.  
64 The Moody’s and S&P are US CRAs. while Fitch is now majority-owned by a French CRA. See House of 
Lords European Union Committee, ‘European Union Committee 21st Report. Sovereign Credit Ratings: 
Shooting the Messenger?’ (Authority of the House of Lords 2011) HL Paper 189, 24. 
65 See Europarl interview with Jurgen Klute MEP, Rein in the rating agencies, says Jurgen Klute, 7 June 2010 
ibid 17. 
66 ibid 19. 
67 ibid 26. 
68  BBC News, ‘Rating Agencies Criticised by European Commission’ (July 2011) 





In terms of poor rating quality, oligopoly provides essential market perquisites. In addition, 
the failure of the reputation hypothesis explained the causality between regulations regarding 
enhancing market competition and oligopolistic market structure. This chapter will address 
this.  
 
Under the reputation mechanism, the credit rating industry had not been regulated for many 
decades. In essence, the reputation mechanism could be regarded as an integral part of 
private ordering.69 The credit rating industry remains self-regulated. Entering the twenty-
first century, the Enron and other relevant scandals have raised the question whether or not 
regulation is needed for the credit rating market. 70 As a response, the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006 was enacted later.  
 
According to the reputation mechanism, if CRAs issue inaccurate ratings, their reputation 
that they have built up over many years would be damaged and their business would also 
suffer. In theory, market participants self-discipline themselves and behave well under the 
reputation mechanism when they fear the long-term and huge losses caused by bad 
reputation. For the credit rating industry, a rating agency is more likely not to risk its 
reputation by issuing low-quality ratings, because the core competency of rating industry is 
its reputation through high-quality, accurate ratings. This is reputation capital theory.71 Prior 
to the financial crisis, reputation theory was regarded as the dominant view that CRAs could 
be driven by their reputation to maintain their integrity because their profitability was 
directly associated with reputational capital.72 However, during the recent financial crisis, 
even though the CRAs issued large amounts of inflated rating of structured financial product, 
 
69 Barak D. Richman, 'Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private 
Ordering' (2004) 104(8) Columbia Law Review 2328, 2367 
70 In 2001, the rating of Enron’s debt was not downgraded to ‘speculative grade’ until four days before Enron 
announced insolvency. Before its downgrade, Enron’s debt kept ‘investment grade’ for a long time, but it 
should earlier have been rated as ‘speculative’ status. See Claire A Hill, ‘Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: 
The Case of Enron’ (2003) 35 Conecticut Law Review 1145; other relevant scandals include WorldCom which 
was rated ‘investment’ status three months before filing for insolvency; Global Crossing was rated ‘investment’ 
status in March 2002 and defaulted on loans in July 2002 and so on. See SEC, ‘Egan-Jones Ratings Company’ 
(10 November 2002) <https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/eganjones2.htm> accessed 29 September 
2019. The Enron Scandal raised the alarm that self-discipline regulation in the credit rating industry was far 
from enough. 
71 John Patrick Hunt (n 49). 
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the CRAs did not lose business due to the decline in quality. This is considered as the failure 
of the reputation mechanism.  
 
As analysed in Chapter 4, the complexity and short-term profitability of structured finance 
are the obstacles against the reputation mechanism. Oligopoly further exacerbates the failure 
of reputation mechanism. First, once the big three are aware of their dominant market status 
of the rating market, this oligopolistic market structure, to some extent, takes away the fear 
of reputation loss under the reputation mechanism. Specifically, in an oligopolistic market, 
due to the strong barriers to entry, the big three receive abundant payoff at the cost of little 
reputation capital. Apart from that, the ‘herding’ behaviour73 in the oligopolistic market 
further reduces the final costs of the big three. If all the oligopolistic members choose to 
make the mistake in a conformable manner, they are more likely to bear low cost because 
there is no other competitive alternative in the market. Therefore, these oligopolies members 
pay less attention to their long-term reputation and do not worry about their loss of market 
share.  
 
Second, the reputation mechanism has a limited effect on structured finance, because 
positive reputation needs long periods to be built up, while the rating agencies have not 
accumulated sufficient reputation in the novel structured financial products.74 Put another 
way, especially when the big three are secure in the knowledge of their dominant market 
status as well as the limited rating methodology in structured finance throughout the whole 
rating industry, they tend to issue large quantities to ratings of structured financial products 
with no fear of reputation capital.  
 
From a regulatory perspective, in order to create incentives that motivate rating agencies, 
they persistently update their rating methodology. Enhancing market competition can 
provide alternative deterrence for incumbent rating agencies. In short, the oligopolistic 
market provides an explanation for the failure of the reputation theory. The essence of failure 
of the reputation mechanism in the credit rating industry is that in the oligopolistic market, 
the motivation and deterrence under the reputation mechanism are no longer effective. For 
one thing, in an oligopolistic market, oligopoly members lack the incentives to behave well, 
such as updating advanced techniques and corporate governance codes so as to keep their 
good reputation, because the payoff of keeping a good reputation remains low in this 
 






situation. For another, the reputational cost becomes less for the oligopoly members and the 
deterrence if reputation loss is thus weak. As a result, the chance of misbehaviour by 
oligopoly members is high in that they do not fear the economic and reputation costs accused 
with their bad behaviour; in other words, what accounts for the losing fear of market share 
or replacement for credit ratings agencies? Because of the failure of the reputation theory, 
oligopolistic market status for the large CRAs removes their fear of removal or replacement 
of other new CRAs. Therefore, it is incumbent for regulators and the market to create another 
deterrence. 
 
5.3.4 Rent Seeking Theory and Public Good Theory 
 
Robert Tollison defined economic rent here as the excess return of the resources owner’s 
opportunity cost. 75  Put differently, Economic rent = revenue – opportunity cost. Rent 
seeking can be regarded as an attempt for rent. In some economic definition, rent can equal 
profit, and thus rent seeking activity can also be regarded as profit seeking activity. The most 
distinct difference between rent seeking and profit seeking activities is that rent seeking itself 
is non-productive and it does not create social wealth.  
 
Anne Krueger defined rent seeking as ‘the activity of pursuing the higher wages available in 
the monopolized sectors’,76 in other words, she regarded it as a waste of social resources 
relying on a special monopoly or oligopoly market status. Therefore, the monopoly is the 
precondition why market participants can gain more revenue through rent that is even non-
productive. The rent seeker often takes advantage of the policy privilege or the market status 
of monopoly or oligopoly in pursuit of more revenue. However, this makes poor allocation 
of social resources and decrease social incomes as a whole.  
 
To discuss the monopoly status, the public good theory should be applied here. According 
to the public good theory, pure public good normally cannot be provided by the private sector 
because the profit is insufficient. Also, owing to the huge cost, government cannot offer such 
public good either. Apart from that, the free-rider problem often occurs associated with 
public good, which need to be overcome with government innervation. Government often 
ensures market status of some sort in the private sector through the issuance of licences.77 
 
75 Robert D Tollison, ‘Rent Seeking: A Survey’ (1982) 35(4) Kyklos 575. 
76 Roger D. Congleton, ‘The Nature of Rent Seeking’ in Roger D. Congleton and Arye L. Hillman (ed), 
Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking (Edward Elgar Pub Ltd 2015), 3. 
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Some scholars regard credit rating as a kind of public good because it reduces the 
information asymmetry between investors and the financial market, even though the rating 
is paid for by the issuer. 78  In the late 1960s, with the introduction of photocopying 
technology, under the investor-pays model, CRAs were able to generate enough profits and 
then shifted to the issuer-pays model. Later in the 1970s, the SEC created NRSRO as 
regulator licences and offered the licences to the three big CRAs. However, this good-faith 
government intervention tends to become the political or regulatory privileges for rent 
seekers. 
 
As Cash states,79 revenue through the provision of ancillary services is rent. The investment 
in ancillary services rather than other businesses is rent seeking behaviour for a CRA and its 
affiliate. The return of investment in the other normal industry (i.e., non-oligopolistic 
industry) is opportunity cost. The oligopoly market of credit rating has been gradually 
formed since the SEC offered NRSRO, namely regulatory licence, to the big three. The big 
three take advantage of the oligopolistic status to sell ancillary services, some of which is 
something that CRA already did and just packaged it to be re-sold.  
 
There are three points that could be summarised: as follows first, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
regulatory licences enhance the oligopolistic market structure, and the over-reliance on 
credit ratings should continue to be decreased. Second, as introduced in Chapter 4, the 
ancillary service and rating services related to structured finance provides numerous rents 
for CRAs. Therefore, the ancillary services need to be separated from the rating service, 
while the complex securitization with regard to structured finance should be forbidden. Third, 
once the oligopolistic market formed, market self-regulation seems less effective to cope 
with the relevant problems. Financial regulation and government interference thus need to 
be enhanced.  
 
5.4 The Existing Regulatory Approaches to Cope with Oligopoly 
 
The main regulatory purpose is to boost rating accuracy. It may be very hard to design a 
regulatory regime to motivate rating agencies to actively revise their rating methodologies 
and optimize rating models regularly. Some scholars argue that the quality of ratings would 
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improve if the market competition increased. 80  Referring to analysis in the failure of 
reputation theory, creating new deterrence for the big three to innovate and improve rating 
quality is the solution. In this regard, the common regulatory strategies are to enhance market 
competition. More specifically, this mainly includes two methods: the first one is to lower 
barriers to entry and the second one is to weaken the regulatory privileges.  
 
In the United States, the first regulatory approach is to decrease barriers to entry, or in other 
words, reduce the regulatory privileges of the big three, through approving more NRSROs 
after Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (hereafter ‘CRARA’).81 The financial crisis 
of 2007–8 to some extent proves the inefficacy of this regulatory approach of increasing 
market competitors through approving more governmental certification. Apart from that, 
later in 2010, another kind of regulatory approach under the Dodd–Frank Act attempted to 
increase market competition through weakening the regulatory privileges of the big three.82 
Given that the approval of NRSROs offering a special market status to a limited group of 
CRAs, section 939A of the Dodd–Frank Act requires all the US regulators to review each 
rating-based rule in their regulations and remove those rating-based rules that induced 
uncritical reliance on external credit ratings, as well as substitute them with the alternative 
standards.83 This implies that the Dodd–Frank Act not only requires ending the hardwiring 
of credit ratings in the US legislation between US regulators and credit ratings, but also 
attempts to change the dominant role of NRSROs in the rating market. Secondly, in order to 
encourage small CRAs, the Dodd–Frank Act has some provisions in favour of small CRAs. 
For example, section 932 of the Dodd–Frank Act entitles the SEC to exempt small NRSROs 
from public disclosure duty when the duty is considered unreasonably onerous. 84 
Additionally, given the difference in capability to acquire information between small CRAs 
and the big three, improving information transparency and reducing this difference may 
foster competition in the credit rating market. Specifically, Rule 17-5 requires issuer to 
 
80 Hill states that what is necessary in the long term in the current credit rating industry is vigorous competition. 
See Claire A. Hill (n 43). 
81 Prior to CRARA, the NRSRO concept lacked detailed definition or a guidebook. As a consequence, it was 
hard for other CRAs to apply for an NRSRO regulatory licence. This set a higher barrier to entry in the US 
rating market. See Emily McClintock Ekins and Mark A Calabria, ‘Regulation, Market Structure, And the Role 
of the Credit Rating Agencies’ (2012) No.704 Policy Analysis, 11 
<https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA704.pdf> accessed 29 September 2019. 
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enable equal access to the obligation to rate regarding structured financial securities.85 If an 
issuer provides a CRA with information with respect to a structured financial product, it 
should make the information fairly and fully available to other NRSROs so that these 
NRSROs are able to issue their own ratings.86  
 
However, all the relevant regulations under the Dodd–Frank Act do not change the 
oligopolistic market structure nor provide an effective mechanism which therefore 
encourages small rating agencies to participate in the rating market. On the surface level, 
these regulations may seem like a lower barrier to entry, the regulations have less impact on 
the oligopolistic market due to the combined advantages of the big three which are too big 
to challenge, including expertise, financial and reputational capital.  
 
According to the 2010–2012 Report of the European Union Committee, the EU leaders 
showed concern about the current oligopolistic rating market and suggested that greater 
competition was needed to improve the oligopoly.87 In 2013, ESMA designed a rotation 
mechanism involved in the regulatory framework so as to enhance market competition in 
the credit rating industry. According to Article 6(b) of Regulation 2013, the maximum 
duration of a contractual relationship with the same CRA is four years. In addition, the 
maximum duration is excluded for small CRAs who have fewer than 50 employees or whose 
annual turnover from credit rating activities is less than EUR 50 million.88 This regulation 
provides more business opportunities for small CRAs, and also prevents long-term and 
overfamiliar contractual relationships between issuers and the big three. In other words, it 
indicates the European Union’s attempt to change the current oligopolistic market structure 
of the big three. 
 
There are two main regulatory purposes of such regulation: first, the rotation mechanism 
created business opportunities for other small CRAs, thus improving market competition. 
Second, the regulation also aims to improve the oligopolistic market through weakening the 
regulatory privileges. Nevertheless, the efficiency of the rotation mechanism should be 
further examined. Even though, under the rotation mechanism, small rating agencies obtain 
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more opportunities to participate in the market, especially in structured financial products, 
they lack sufficient expertise to make the professional rating report.89 They still cannot 
improve their rating quality to a satisfactory level in the short time because of their limited 
expertise and finance. Therefore, the credit ratings provided by small rating agencies may 
not be accepted by the market and investors;90 in other words, small CRAs may not obtain 
sufficient capability to compete with the big three in the short term. This implies that the 
rotation mechanism has a limited impact on motivating the big three to improve their rating 
quality on the fear that small CRAs gain the market share from the big three. In short, 
whether or not the rotation mechanism is able to achieve the regulatory objects remains to 
be seen in the future.  
 
Given that the moderate market competition in the credit rating industry, the current 
regulations regarding oligopolies in China seem obviously different. On the one hand, the 
current regulation does not change higher barriers to entry for new CRAs. CRAs should get 
approval to engage in the securities market from the relevant regulator.91 The requirements 
of application for registration are strict. For example, the registration capital is RMB 20 
million.92 Another example would be, if one rating agency applies for approval, it should 
have more than ten rating analysts, and each rating analyst should have at least three years’ 
relevant working experience.93 In practice, market or investors naturally gravitate towards 
those CRAs that have strong expertise and economic power. These regulations further 
intensify this trend. As a result, the oligopolies of incumbent rating agencies in China are 
more likely to remain. On the other hand, the practice that foreign CRAs are allowed to enter 
China’s rating market indicates the regulatory purpose of enhancing market competition.  
 
5.5 A Supplementary Proposal for the Existing Regulations  
 
Many regulatory approaches attempted to improve market competition so as to reduce such 
negative effects under an oligopolistic market. However, most of the existing regulations 
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have proven to be insufficient and ineffective. As discussed in section 5.2, the current EU 
and US credit rating markets are still highly concentrated, while the current China rating 
market is moderately concentrated; in other words, all these regulations have not changed 
the oligopoly of the big three. In the US rating market, more NRSRO approvals seldom 
change the oligopolistic market of the big three. In the EU market, the rotation mechanism 
has its flaws in many respects. In the Chinese market, it tries to enhance market competition 
through approving S&P’s entering domestic market. One possible reason is that oligopoly 
makes the oligopolistic members stronger and more powerful than the regulators and thus 
regulators are unable to minimize the rent or add more regulatory requirements on CRAs. 
However, whether the regulatory attempt exerts any influence over the Chinese domestic 
market competition requires more time to verify.  
 
These existing regulations brings up the question of whether greater market competition will 
or will not boost rating accuracy. Figure 5.4 compares amounts of bonds categorised by each 
rating level between high-competition and low-competition market. From 1995 to 2006, the 
distinct change in terms of rating market shares is that Fitch’s made inroads into the rating 
market and became the final oligopolistic member in the rating industry. Thus, in Figure 5.4, 
we assumed when the market shares of Fitch’s are more than the average market shares, the 
market is high-competition; otherwise, that is a low-competition market.94 It takes Fitch’s as 










Figure 5.4 Comparisons of Bonds Ratings Between a High-Competition and Low-
Competition Market 95 
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.4, in a high-competition market, the number of rating issuances 
of BBB- and above is more than the number of rating issuances of BB+ and below. In 
contrast, in a low-competition market, the number of issuances of BBB- and above is less 
than counterparts of BB+ and below; in other words, in a high-competition market, the rating 
inflation is more obvious. Rating inflation is one typical form of low-quality ratings. 
According to the common perception, the rating inflation should have improved when the 
market is more competitive. This comparison of Figure 5.4 does not fit our expectation 
pertaining to the relationship between market competition and rating quality. One possible 
explanation is that in a high-competition market, Fitch’s suffers more pressure, and it is thus 
more inclined to use lax rating standards in favour of its clients so as to obtain more 
businesses. This scenario could be inferred for each CRA in a high-competition market. 
Which is to say, the chance of rating shopping for the new marker entrants in a high-
competition market may be higher.96 In this regard, one conclusion could be drawn that to 
improve the rating quality, does not merely increase competition and does not ensure rating 
quality. In conjunction with the relevant regulatory approaches discussed in Chapter 4, rating 
shopping at the individual level is easier to manage, while rating shopping at the agency 








For the existing regulations, even though the rating quality cannot be entirely ensured 
through increasing market competition, there are still many other advantages to enhancing 
market competition, such as lowering regulatory barriers and regulatory cost. On this basis, 
a supplementary proposal here is to improve the deficiency in the current regulatory 
approach. Given that greater competition could motivate CRAs to compete with one another, 
the existing regulations are deigned to incentivize CRAs to update their rating methodologies, 
but CRAs tend to lower their rating standards to favour their clients instead of updating 
models. To avoid potential rating inflation and rating shopping, one additional proposal for 
the existing regulations is to enhance the supervision for these CRAs that provide positive 
ratings, such as a AAA rating, too often. Regulators could set a proportion standard for each 
investment-grade rating level, such as 10 per cent. If one CRA issues too many AA ratings 
(the issuance of an AA rating is over the 10 per cent of the whole rating issuance), it will 
become regulatory focus in a certain period. As analysed above, in the failure of the 
reputation mechanism, it is incumbent upon regulators and markets to create another 
deterrence. The conditional regulatory focus is designed to become a new deterrence.  
 
Under this proposal, it should be noted that calculating the issuance of rating should not 
include unsolicited ratings.97 There are two common reasons for CRAs issuing unsolicited 
ratings. The one is to charge higher fees for other solicited ratings. An unsolicited rating may 
bring new business when the unsolicited issuer under pressure of an unfavourable rating 
pursues a higher rating.98 Another ground is that CRAs balance inflated solicited ratings as 
a whole by issuing a lower unsolicited rating. For example, in 1998 Hannover Re, as one of 
the world's largest reinsurance companies, chose S&P and A.M. Best Company (a smaller 
CRA) rather than the offer from Moody’s. Then, the credit rating of the Hannover Re by 
Moody’s was obviously lower than other credit ratings by S&P and A.M. Best Company. 
Also, the credit rating of Hannover Re by Moody’s was lower than that given by Moody’s 
before its rejection. With respect to the downgrade in the credit rating by Moody’s, the 
related information is not sufficient to prove its rationality. Thus, Hannover Re regard it as 
‘pure blackmail’.99 In addition, as Winnie P.H. Poon found in his research, unsolicited credit 
 
97 Unsolicited ratings could be defined as ‘ratings that CRAs conduct without being formally engaged to do so 
by the issuer’. See Patrick Van Roy, ‘Is There A Difference between Solicited and Unsolicited Bank Ratings 
and If So, Why?’ (National Bank of Belgium 2006) Working Paper Research N 27, 1 
<https://www.nbb.be/doc/ts/publications/wp/wp79en.pdf> accessed 18 December 2018. 
98 Paolo Fulghieri, Günter Strobl and Han Xia, ‘The Economics of Solicited and Unsolicited Credit Ratings’ 
(2014) 27 (2) The Review of Financial Studies 484 <https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/27/2/484/1581201> 
accessed 18 December 2018. 
99 Lynn Bai, ‘On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry’ (2010) 13(2) New York 




ratings are lower than the solicited credit ratings.100  Even so, that does not imply that 
unsolicited ratings have a downward bias. Another valid explanation is that a low-quality 
entity does not request a credit rating. 101  Therefore, in case a CRA issues too many 
unsolicited ratings to balance the inflated solicited ratings, the unsolicited rating should not 





100 Winnie P. H. Poon, ‘Are Unsolicited Credit Ratings Biased Downward?’ (2003) 27(4) Journal of Banking 
and Finance 593. 









As demonstrated the negative effects of other issues in the previous chapters,1   this chapter 
continues to examine whether or not the current civil liability regime is an effective approach 
to deter CRAs from their low rating quality. During the 2007–8 financial crisis, CRAs were 
broadly criticised for their inaccurate rating, and many actions for damages claims against 
CRAs were brought to the courts. Whether the CRAs should or should not be held liable for 
their inaccurate rating has often been discussed.  The pre-crisis civil liability regime imposed 
few liabilities on the CRAs, especially when CRAs have no contractual relationships with 
claimers. However, the civil liability for CRAs became a regulatory focus after the financial 
crisis. In 2010, the United States introduced expert liability of CRAs under Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act2 (hereafter ‘Dodd–Frank Act’). In 2013, 
Regulation (EU) No. 462/2013 (hereafter ‘Regulation 2013’)3 introduced the civil liability 
regime for CRAs in the European regulatory framework. In China, Securities Law of the 
People's Republic of China (2014 Amendment) 4  (hereafter ‘Securities Law of China’) 
provides a framework for civil liability in relation to CRAs. 
 
This chapter addresses the role that private law should play in the issues of CRAs. Private 
law remedies began to be used to supplement the CRA regulation by deterring the 
misconduct of CRAs and compensating for losses suffered by investors. In general, investors 
who have no contractual relationships with CRAs are the majority of claimants, based on 
the allegation that CRAs should be responsible for their ratings that are relied on by investors 
when making investment decisions. In order to establish civil liability against CRAs, existing 
private law remedies have many hurdles that need to be overcome. In addition, it also 
compares the implementations between the public enforcement and private actions in order 
to determine which one has a more effective deterrence for CRAs. This chapter mainly 
addresses and critically challenges the approaches to redress claims arising from civil 
liability regimes in the European Union, United States and China, so as to decipher the 
 
1  As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, the conflict of interest provides incentives for CRAs to provide inflated 
rating services and oligopolistic members (namely the big three) lack motivations to update rating models and 
methodologies. 
2 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (Public Law 111-203, 111th Congress). 
3 Regulation (EU) No. 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 Amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies (OJ 2013 L 146). 
4 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (2014 Amendment) [中华人民共和国证券法(2014修正)] 




rationales for the introduction of civil liability regimes and to reflect upon future 
developments. 
 
6.2 The United States 
 
6.2.1 The Approaches to Private Law Remedies 
 
In the United States, when investors were misled by inaccurate credit ratings and suffered 
loss, they could pursue private law remedies against CRAs. In theory, the possible private 
law remedies in the US law include several approaches, which are based on securities law, 
tort law and contract law respectively. However, the effectiveness of these approached needs 
to be further explored.  
 
If an investor (subscriber) under the investor-pays model (subscriber-pays model) or an 
issuer under the issuer-pays model sues a CRA, it can hold this rating agency liable under 
contract law. Credit rating disputes, to a large extent, happens in the absence of contractual 
relationships. Under contact law, a third-party beneficiary without a contractual relationship 
can still bring a claim to court against one party to the contact.5 The third-party beneficiary 
rule is an exceptional remedy for the general rule of contact law. Therefore, the requisite for 
the application of the third-party beneficiary rule is whether the contacting parties have or 
do not have the intention to benefit a third party.6 
 
In terms of credit ratings, when an investor has not a contractual relationship with a CRA, 
the contract between a CRA and an issuer should have express declaration that investors are 
the beneficiaries, otherwise, investors cannot invoke the third-party beneficiary rule to sue 
in case of breach of contract.7 Investors are the end-users of credit ratings in the bond 
markets. Without the potential purchase or transaction of investors, the credit rating would 
be valueless for bond markets. Investors are thus third-party beneficiaries irrespective of 
whether or not there is a declaration on the contact.8 However, in the case of Quinn v. the 
McGraw-Hill Companies, the court argued that in the absence of express intention, the fact 
that investors obtained valuable information from rating contracts were not suffice to prove 
the precondition of the third-party beneficiary rule that contracting parities had the intention 
 
5 Mohammed Hemraj, CRAs: Self-Regulation, Statutory Regulation and Case Law Regulation in the United 
States and European Union (Springer 2015). 
6 XL Disposal Corp v John Sexton Contractors Co No. 78505. 659 N.E.2d 1312 (Ill. 1995). 





to benefit investors.9 The court explained that even though investors might be the indirect 
beneficiaries, the argument of investors was not direct evidence to show that they were the 
direct beneficiary of contracting parties, but a structural view of the role of credit ratings 
based on the way the bond market operated.10 In practice, no CRA is willing to issue a 
declaration that implies intent to benefit investors.  
 
In the case of Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co, plaintiffs attempted to 
apply the third-party beneficiary rule against rating agencies in a breach of contract claim, 
but the plaintiffs still failed to draw a reasonable inference through contact provisions in 
order to prove that the contracting parties had intent to benefit a third party;11 in other words, 
it is impossible for investors to receive compensation under the law of contract. Therefore, 
in this chapter, the possibility of the following approaches, namely common law fraud, tort 
of negligence and fraudulent misstatement under securities law is discussed.  
 
The first option for investors to recover loss is to bring a common law fraud claim against 
CRAs. Common law fraud is the ‘intentional misrepresentation of material facts presented 
to and relied upon by another party to his detriment’.12 In order to prevail a common law 
fraud, the plaintiffs must show: ‘(1) a misrepresentation or omission of material fact; (2) 
which the defendant knew to be false; (3) which the defendant made with the intention of 
inducing reliance; (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied; and (5) which caused injury 
to the plaintiff.’13 
 
Similar to common law fraud, another option for plaintiffs is to bring a fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim under securities law. Section 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (hereafter ‘Exchange Act’) and the Rule 10b-5 further constitutes the statutory 




11 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. [2009] United States District Court, SD New York 
651 F. Supp. 2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
12 Mohammed Hemraj, CRAs: Self-Regulation, Statutory Regulation and Case Law Regulation in the United 
States and European Union (Springer 2015) 183. 
13 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (n 11) 171. 
14 Section 10 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as amended through PL 112- 158, approved August 10, 
2012). Section 10(b) is the primary anti-fraud statutory provision, which prohibits ‘fraudulent, material 
misstatements or omissions in connection with the sale or purchase of a security’. 
 To enforce section 10, the SEC enacts Rule 10b-5 against ‘manipulative and deceptive practices’ in securities 
trading. Rule 10b-5 also ‘impose[s] liability for any misstatement or omission of a material fact, or one that 
investors would think was important to their decision to buy or sell a security.’  
15 Carrie Guo, ‘Credit Rating Agency Reform: A Review of Dodd–Frank Section 933(B)’s Effect (or Lack 




security fraud misrepresentation claim, plaintiffs have to prove the misstatement in relation 
to the transaction of a security that satisfies the following elements: ‘(1) a misstatement or 
omission, (2) of a material fact, (3) made with scienter, (4) justifiably relied on by plaintiffs, 
and (5) proximately causing them injury.’16 For credit rating cases, the elements under 
common law fraud are substantially identical to the counterpart under the Rule 10b-5 
claim.17 Thus, in this chapter it is shown that the key impediments are extremely similar in 
both approaches.  
 
Next, the plaintiff can bring a negligent misrepresentation claim in tort law. As Pinto argued, 
the tort of negligent misrepresentation may be the possible basis for users of credit ratings.18 
Each state has different elements to be proven for negligent misrepresentation in the United 
States.19 For example, the negligent misrepresentation claim plaintiffs in Illinois is required 
to prove: ‘(1) a false statement of material fact, (2) carelessness or negligence in ascertaining 
the truth of the statement by defendant, (3) an intention to induce the other party to act, (4) 
action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the statements, (5) damage to the other 
party resulting from such reliance, and (6) a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff to 
communicate accurate information.’20 Negligent misrepresentation has similar elements to 
fraudulent misrepresentation (common law fraud). The obvious difference between 
fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation is that the statement of 
negligent misrepresentation is a false statement of fact that needs to be made not with 
intention but with negligence.21Another difference is that, in a negligent misrepresentation 
claim, defendants should be liable only when they had a breach of duty – this duty required 
the defendant to be responsible about its statement – that caused damage to the plaintiff who 
reasonably relied on the statement. 22 In addition, to prevail in a negligent misrepresentation, 
plaintiffs have to prove other important elements, such as reasonable reliance and proximity.  
 
 
16 In re National Century [2008] United States District Court, SD Ohio, Eastern Division 580 F. Supp. 2d 630. 
17 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (n 11) 171. 
18  Arthur R. Pinto, ‘Control and Responsibility of CRAs in the United States’ (2006) 54(Suppl. 4) The 
American Journal of Comparative Law. 
19 Rachel Jones, ‘The Need for a Negligence Standard of Care for CRAs’ 1 (1) William & Mary Business Law 
Review <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context= 
wmblr> 227 accessed 20 August 2020. 
20 Quinn v. the McGraw-Hill Companies (n 7). 
21 Michael M. Krauss, ‘Common Law Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Negligent Misrepresentation’ [2019] 
Business Disputes: Claims and Remedies, 1-1 <https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2015/1/common-law-
fraudulent-and-negligent-misrepresentation> accessed 10 October 2020. 




Section 11 of Securities Act of 193323  also provides for a liability arising from false 
information in a registration statement against CRAs. Section 11 specifies the expert liability 
arising from the false registration statement, and investors can hold CRAs liable for an 
‘untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact’ contained in a 
registration statement.24 Nevertheless, in 1981, Rule 436(g) was designed to encourage more 
NRSROs25  to disclose their ratings in their registration statements through granting an 
NRSROs an exemption that the credit rating by this NRSRO was not considered part of a 
registration statement.26 Therefore, CRAs were immune from certain liability under Section 
11 until the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. This will not be discussed until the Dodd-
Frank Act part.  
 
6.2.2 The Obstacles within The Approaches 
 
a. The First Obstacle: Freedom of Speech  
 
Before analysing the particular obstacle to each element on both common law fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation, it needs to be noted the first line of defence for CRAs against a 
private cause of action is the protection under the First Amendment of the US Constitution.27 
For a the long time, because credit rating was regarded as an opinion and thus not actionable, 
CRAs were insulated from civil lability due to the constitutional protection under the First 
Amendment.  
 
Freedom of speech can be dated back to the case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in 1964. 
In this case, the US Supreme Court first affirmed ‘freedom of speech’ for journalists.28 This 
offered journalists protection for their statements and they are thus immune from civil suits, 
 
23 Section 11 of Securities Act of 1933 (as amended through PL 112-106, approved April 5, 2012, 15 USC § 
77a). 
24 Registration statement for securities offering includes a set of documents, namely prospectus and addition 
information that does not need to disclose to the investors but must file with the relevant regulator. See SEC, 
‘What Is A Registration Statement?’ (29 November 2017) 
<https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/registrationstatement> accessed 10 October 2020. 
25 Nationally recognized statistical rating organization (hereafter ‘NRSRO’ or ‘NRSROs’.) 
26 Rule 436(g)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g)(1) (2003). 
27  The First Amendment of the US Constitution states: ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances’. See The Constitution of the United States of America as Amended (House Document No 110-50, 
2007, 110th Congress, 1st Session). The CRA was regarded as media and, hence, it was protected by the First 
Amendment for ‘freedom of speech’. The issue will be discussed in this section. 




unless the plaintiff can prove that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’.29 Freedom 
of speech determined through this case was designed to provide protection of speech for the 
media against public authorities. Later, in the case of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss 
Builders, Inc., the court further provided that in the absence of actual malice, if the 
defendant’s statement did not involve any matter of ‘public concern’, the defendant could 
not be protected by freedom of speech under the First Amendment.30 In this case, the credit 
rating reports were provided to five subscribers and was thus not in relation to public 
concern.31 On this point, credit rating was not protected under the First Amendment.32  
 
The two cases constitute the three elements for protection of freedom of speech under the 
First Amendment: the first one is the speech provider is a journalist or other media; the 
second is there is no actual malice; and the third is the context of speech is related to public 
concern.  
 
In the case of credit rating, the third element is the common reasons for courts rejecting 
constitutional protection to CRAs. The case of In re National Century in 2008 illustrates that, 
given that the credit rating is provided to a ‘select class of institutional investors’, the 
defendant cannot get constitutional protection. (However, the plaintiff still failed to prove 
scienter, as mentioned below).33 In 2009, another case in which the court rejected First 
Amendment protection is the Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. The 
CRAs (one of the defendants) could not be protected under the First Amendment, because 
the rated structured financial products were never widely disseminated but, instead, were 
provided to a select group of investors.34  
 
However, CRAs in most relevant cases enjoyed constitutional protection. In 1989, under the 
First Equity Corporation of Florida v. Standard & Poor’s Corporation, the court stated that 
CRAs could be deemed media, such as newspapers, and it was thus not liable for negligent 
misrepresentation due to the protection under the First Amendment.35 In 1999, in the case of 
 
29 ibid. The US Supreme Court defined actual malice as a statement made ‘with knowledge that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not’. The reason why the US Supreme Court decided to 
protect ‘freedom of speech’ is that the ‘erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and it must be protected 
if the freedom of expressions are to have the “breathing space” that they need . . . to survive’. 
30 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, [1985] US Supreme Court 472 U.S.749. 
31 ibid. 
32 ibid. 
33 In re National Century (n 16). 
34 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (n 11). 
35 Judge Goettel provided that ‘it is widely recognized that in the absence of a contract, fiduciary relationship, 




Jefferson County School District v. Moody’s Investor’s Services, Inc., the court affirmed 
protection for CRAs under the First Amendment.36 In this case, the plaintiff failed to prove 
the falsity of the credit ratings by the defendant, because the court stated that credit rating 
was deemed an expression of opinions that could not be proven false. The rationale behind 
this judicial judgement is in order to withstand constitutional protection under the First 
Amendment, when the statement by a defendant (credit rating) is related to public concern, 
the only option for the plaintiff is to prove the actual malice. However, the precondition to 
prove malice is that credit ratings can be proven false. In this case, the court explained that 
the opinion could be categorized by ‘evaluative opinions’ or opinions that cannot be proven 
false and the ‘deductive opinions’ or opinions that can be proven false, and the credit ratings 
were categorized as the former.37 Later, in 2007, the case of Compuware Corp. v. Moody's 
Investor Services also supported the argument. In response to the allegation by Moody’s 
(defendant) that its rating was mere prediction about the financial future of the issuer, the 
court held that credit rating is not a statement that can be proven false because this prediction 
was ‘inherently subjective nature of Moody’s ratings calculations’.38  
 
The freedom of speech for credit rating cases essentially protects the efficiency of the 
financial market by compromising part of investor protection. As Husisian states, the 
compensation on investors ‘must give way to the First Amendment’s concern for the free 
flow of commercial information,’ because to hold CRAs operating beyond the negligent 
threshold should rely on the market and competition instead of courts.39 In the case of First 
Equity Corporation of Florida v. Standard & Poor’s Corporation, the court also affirmed 
that granting recovery may give rise to claims in relation to the resembling bonds service by 
the entire public.40 In other words, once it opens the floodgates, the excessive lawsuits may 
affect the effective operation of the bonds market and judicial system.  
 
 
negligent misstatement of an item of news, "unless he wilfully . . . circulates it knowing it to be false, and it is 
calculated to and does . . . result in injury to another person."’ First Equity Corporation of Florida v Standard 
& Poor’s Corporation [1989] United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989). 
36 Jefferson County School District v. Moody’s Investor Services, Inc 175 F.3d 848, 856 (10th Cir. 1999). 
37 ibid. 
38 Compuware Corporation v. Moody’s Investors Servs, Inc., [2007] United States Court of Appeals, Sixth 
Circuit 499 F.3d 520, (6th Cir.) No. 05-1851. ‘A Moody's credit rating is a predictive opinion, dependent on a 
subjective and discretionary weighing of complex factors. We find no basis upon which we could conclude 
that the credit rating itself communicates any provably false factual connotation.   Even if we could draw any 
fact-based inferences from this rating, such inferences could not be proven false because of the inherently 
subjective nature of Moody's ratings calculation.’ 
39 Gregory Husisian, ‘What Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s Shortest Editorials? An Analysis of 
Bond Rating Agency Liability’ (1990) 75 Cornell Law Review, 460 
<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/216740359.pdf> accessed 28 July 2020. 




As can be seen from the cases above, investors can withstand the constitutional protection 
by not involving public concern (credit ratings were disseminated to a select class of people) 
or holding actual malice (the precondition is that credit ratings can be proven false). The 
former has limited applicable scope and the latter cannot be justified because the courts once 
regarded credit ratings as opinion. As a result, CRAs are largely immune from civil liability 




Common law fraud has a high degree of proof requirement with respect to state of mind, 
namely scienter.41 The court provides the definition of scienter as ‘a mental state embracing 
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud’.42 Scienter is used to denote the level of intent of 
the defendants. In practice, it is hard for a plaintiff to prove the scienter in many civil cases.43 
For example, in the insider trading case of Rothman v. Gregor, the fact that the defendant 
had obtained USD 1.6 million profit is still insufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement.44  
 
The high degree of scienter creates an obstacle for plaintiffs to establish civil liability against 
CRAs. In common law fraud, plaintiffs should prove: ‘(a) (the speaker) knows or believes 
that the matter is not as he represents it to be (b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy 
of his representation that he states or implies; or (c) knows that he does not have the basis 
for his representation that he states or implies.’45 In a Rule 10b-5 claim under securities law, 
it is also difficult for plaintiffs to prove the mental state of defendants. Furthermore, the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (hereafter ‘PSLRA’) states a stricter 
pleading standard for a fraud claim under securities law.46 The PSLRA aims to prevent 
excessive civil lawsuits for fraud claims under securities law and enhances the protection of 
corporate defendants in securities lawsuits.47 In the case of Tellabs, Inc v. Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd, the court interpreted the pleading standard of scienter under the PSLRA, which 
 
41 ‘Scienter (Latin word meaning ‘knowingly’) is a guilty knowledge that is sufficient to charge a person with 
the consequences of his or her acts.’ See Mohammed Hemraj (n 5). 
42 Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder [1976] the Unites States Supreme Court 425 U.S. 185, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 47 L. 
Ed. 2d 668. 
43 Thomas M. J. Möllers and Charis Niedorf, ‘Regulation and Liability of CRAs: A More Efficient European 
Law?’ (2014) 11(3) European Company and Financial Law Review 333. 
44 Rothman v. Gregor 220 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000) 94-5. 
45 American Law Institute, ‘Restatement (Second) of Torts’, (1977), § 526.  
46 The PSLRA requires a plaintiff alleging securities fraud to ‘state with particularity facts giving rise to a 
strong inference that the defendant[s] acted with the required state of mind’. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) of Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-67, 104th Congress). 




held that ‘to qualify as strong an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible 
or reasonable – it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of 
nonfraudulent intent’.48 As a result, a stringent scienter requirement was further underpinned. 
 
In the case of In re National Century, in terms of the scienter under a Rule 10b-5 claim, the 
court applied the strong inference standard pursuant to the PSLRA.49 In great detail, the 
plaintiffs attempted to justify the scienter through the reliance on the case of LaSalle Nat’l 
Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co.,50 but the court held that this reliance was not 
persuasive, because LaSalle was a pre-PSLRA case, while in the case at issue a stringent 
pleading standard of scienter under the PSLRA should be applied.51 The complainant failed 
to justify scienter, because the plaintiff merely proved that the defendant had access to the 
documents of rated entities, rather than that the particular information alerted the defendant 
to knowledge of the fraudulent behaviour of the rated company.52 That the defendant failed 
to review the rated entities is insufficient to establish scienter.53 Furthermore, the plaintiff 
contended that the defendant had issued a favourable rating in order to maintain a lucrative 
relationship with the rated company.54 The court held that the desire to retain the fee from 
the rated company was not sufficient to draw strong inference of scienter.55 As a result, the 
plaintiff failed to satisfy the scienter requirement. 
 
In the recent case of Tolin v. Standard & Poor’s Fin Servs, the plaintiffs failed to prove 
scienter in a common law fraud claim that the defendant had not believed its ratings when it 
issued them.56 The allegation merely explained that defendants have motivation to issue a 
favourable rating, but did not prove what the defendant’s state of mind was at the time it 
made each particular ratings.57 In 2012, in the case of Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. 
Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC (hereafter ‘Ohio Police’), the plaintiffs failed to 
show scienter, on tort of negligence, that the defendant did not believe its ratings.58 
 
48 Tellabs, Inc v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd [2007] Supreme Court of the Unite States 551 U.S. 308,314. 
49 In re National Century (n 16) 641. 
50 LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co., 951 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y.1996). 
51 In re National Century (n 16) 642. 
52 ibid 643. 
53 ibid 643–4. 
54 ibid 644. 
55 ibid. 
56 Tolin v. Standard & Poor’s Fin Servs [2013] United States District Court, SD New York 950 F. Supp. 2d 
714 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 722.  
57 For example, a particular rating analyst of a defendant who was responsible for formulating a rating did not 
believe the rating it had given. ibid. 
58 Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC [2012] United States Court 





Insider trading cases, also pursuant to the PSLRA and Rule 10b-5, have established a set of 
standards to prove scienter: ‘either (a) by alleging facts to show that defendants had both 
motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong 
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehaviour or recklessness.’59 In another case of 
Novak v. Kasaks, the court provides strong inference of scienter more specifically: ‘(1) 
benefitted in a concrete and personal way from the purported fraud; (2) engaged in 
deliberately illegal behaviour; (3) knew facts or had access to information suggesting that 
their public statements were not accurate; or (4) failed to check information they had a duty 
to monitor’.60 Among these, the first one is the same as the first standard in Kalnit v. Eichler 
and the others specifically address the second standard in Kalnit v. Eichler.  
 
The case of Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. showed that scienter 
could be satisfied. In this case, the plaintiffs succeeded in justifying scienter in three respects: 
first, conflicts of interest existed between the CRAs and the issuers of rated structured 
financial products. Second, CRAs held some critical non-public information that was 
contradictory to the high ratings, but the CRAs never updated their ratings. For example, 
ratings agencies knew the portfolios consisted of much more than 55 per cent Residential 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (hereafter ‘RMBSs’) that did not conform to the statement 
that ’no more than 55 per cent of RMBSs’ as set out in Information Memoranda. Third, 
CRAs applied lax models to these complex structured financial products. This case applied 
the first standard established for inside trading, as mentioned above, and successfully 
fulfilled the scienter requirement by proving the defendant’s motive and opportunity to 
assign misleading ratings. 
 
In 2009, another credit rating case of In re Moody's Corp. Securities Litigation also applied 
the same standards to a Rule 10b-5 claim.61 Even though the plaintiff failed to show that 
Moody’s had the motive and opportunity to commit deceit, it successfully proved the 
scienter through a specific statement indicating that the top officials of the defendant were 
cognizant that its independency, ratings and rating methodologies had been compromised.62 
This also conforms to the third standard in the Novak v. Kasaks. 
 
 
59 Kalnit v. Eichler 264 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2001)138. 
60 Novak v. Kasaks 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000) 311. 





As can be seen from all the cases mentioned above, scienter has a high degree of proof 
requirement on fraud claims and negligent misrepresentation. Especially for the fraud claims, 
the insider trading standards provide an approach to proving scienter. In terms of the motive 
and opportunity to fraud, the reason why the single motive cannot suffice to scienter is that 
this pressure that CRAs generally suffered is ‘a systemic problem’ and widespread through 
the whole rating industry. One possible concern for the court is that once the court accepts 
this kind of allegation of motivation regarding the scienter requirement, there numerous 
lawsuits will follow on for this allegation. Next, the Novak v. Kasaks case further specifies 
that the strong inference of scienter in fraud claims could be established by pleading either 
motive and opportunity that a defendant has (the simple pleading of motive and opportunity 
may be rejected by the court), or the strong circumstantial evidence of conscious 
misbehaviour or recklessness.63  As a result, scienter is a tough obstacle within all the 
approaches. Importantly, the new scienter under 933b of the Dodd–Frank Act is more 
stringent, as will be discussed below. 
 
c. Reliance  
 
In order to prevail in a common law fraud or negligent misrepresentation claim, plaintiffs 
have to show reasonable reliance.64 For the lawsuit against CRAs, investors have to prove 
that their reliance on the credit rating was foreseeable and justifiable.65  
 
Another reference arising from insider trading is the fraud-on-the-market theory. The fraud-
on-the-market theory66 is applied to determine the reliance on a security fraud claim. To 
invoke the presumption of reliance based on fraud-on-the-market theory, a plaintiff should 
demonstrate: ‘first, the defendants made public misrepresentations; second, the 
misrepresentations were material; third, the stock was traded on an efficient market; fourth, 
the misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying investor to misjudge the value of 
the stock; fifth, the plaintiff traded in the stock between the time the misrepresentations were 
made and the time the truth was revealed’.67 US courts commonly accept the third element.68 
 
63 Novak v. Kasaks (n 60) 310. 
64 Kuch Watson, Inc v. Woodman 331 N.E.2d 350, 354 (Ill.App.Ct. 1975) 354.  
65 Perschall v Raney 484 N.E.2d 1286 (Ill.App.Ct. 1985) 1290. 
66 ‘Fraud-on-the-market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the 
price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company and its 
business . . . Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not 
directly rely on the misstatements’. See Peil v. Speiser, 806 F. 2d 1154 (CA3 1986) 1160-1. 





A defendant can rebut the presumption by showing that either the misrepresentation did not 
cause a distortion in the stock price,69 or that the stock price remained the same as before 
when the misrepresentation was disclosed.70  
 
In the credit rating case of In re Moody's Corp. Securities Litigation, on a Rule 10b-5 claim, 
Moody’s rebutted the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance by showing that there is 
no statistically link between changes in the stock price and the any alleged misrepresentation. 
Which is to say, the alleged misrepresentation did not lead any distortion in price, because 
the market had knowledge of the potential conflicts and absorbed the false information.71 
Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to prove the reliance.  
 
By contrast, another case provides a positive example to meet the reliance requirement. In a 
common law fraud claim of Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., the 
motion that the plaintiff relied on the  alleged credit ratings was granted, because the court 
considered the factors as below:‘(1)the complexity and magnitude of rated structured 
financial products; (2) such critical information that CRAs hold even the sophisticated 
investors cannot obtain; (3) the NRSRO status that most market participants rely on their 
ratings’.72 It should be noted that the court did not apply the fraud-on-the-market in this case 
because this theory is commonly adopted in securities fraud claims.  
 
On a negligence of tort claim, the plaintiff also should prove the reliance element. The 
reliance in tort of negligence must be shown to have been reasonable. In this regard, the 
proof requirement of reasonable reliance in negligent misrepresentation claim is higher than 
that in (securities) fraud claim. For example, in the case of Quinn v. the McGraw-Hill 
Companies, When the plaintiff purchased the debt instrument, the credit rating of the debt 
instrument was ‘A’ ; later, while S&P (defendant) downgraded the rating, the plaintiff lost 
plenty of money.73 The plaintiff failed to prove its reasonable reliance, not only because 
when it decided to purchase the debt instrument, its decision was merely based on the ‘A’ 
rating rather than the whole actual representation of S&P, but also because the issuer of the 
debt instrument informed the plaintiff that the debt instrument contained substantial risks.74 
 
69 Basic Inc. v. Levinson 485 U.S. 224 (1988) 108 S. Ct. 978, 248-49. 
70 In re American Intern Group, Inc Sec Litig 265 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 180. 
71 In re Moody’s Corp Securities Litigation 274 F.R.D. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 493. 
72 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (n 11). 
73 Quinn v. the McGraw-Hill Companies (n 7) 333. 




Therefore, the court decided that in this case reliance on the credit rating of the investment 
was not reasonable.  
 
In short, the plaintiffs are faced with an extremely high burden of proof in the reliance 
element. On the Rule 10b-5 claim, the fraud-on-the-market theory serves as the presumption 
of reliance. However, some doubts have been cast on the application of the fraud-on-the-
market theory in credit rating cases. The application of the fraud-on-the-market theory aims 
to reduce the burden of proof for plaintiffs by reversing part of the burden on defendants. In 
credit rating cases, given that the bond market is less efficient than the stock market,75 it is 
less difficult for defendants to rebut the presumption of reliance by proving that there is no 
causal link between the alleged misrepresentation and the stock price. This is opposite to the 
original objective. On the tort of negligence, the requirement of reliance is more like an ex. 
ante guideline, which requires plaintiffs to show the evidence that they did undertake their 
own due diligence prior to the investment. Associating with the US regulations to reduce the 
over-reliance of the market participants, both rules encouraged investors not to solely rely 
on credit ratings. However, the existing cases have not provided a clear standard for plaintiffs 
on how to justify reasonable reliance on the tort of negligence. As a result, the reliance 
appears a major hurdle in civil liability claims against CRAs.  
 
d. Duty of Care or Privity  
 
In order to prevail in a negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff should prove that the 
defendant owed a duty of care to communicate accurately.76 In the United States, there are 
various ways to determine duty of care in various states. For example, in the state of New 
York, a plaintiff should prove the near-privity relationship between itself and a defendant in 
a negligent misrepresentation claim under tort law.77 In terms of credit rating cases, it is 
difficult to prove the privity between a common investor and a CRA. In the case of First 
Equity Corporation of Florida v. Standard & Poor’s Corporation, the plaintiff was one of 
the subscribers of a CRA (defendant), but it failed to prove the privity between itself and the 
CRA on a tort of negligence.78 In this case, the court carefully avoided exposing (such as 
accountants) ‘a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
 
75 Deryn Darcy, ‘Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the Issuer Pays Conflict Contributed and 
What Regulators Might Do about It.’ (2009) 2 Columbia Business Law Review 605, 656. 
76 Quinn v. the McGraw-Hill Companies (n 7). 
77 Anschutz Corp v. Merrill Lynch & Co. 690 F3d 98 (2d Cir2012) 114. 




indeterminate class’. 79  The court compared a CRA to an accountant or a newspaper 
publisher, 80  and argued that whatever the relationship between a subscriber it more 
resembled a reader and a publisher or an accountant, and the court would decline to extent 
the liability of a CRA, because granting this recovery may expose the whole credit rating 
service to claims by the entire public. 81 
 
Another example is in the state of Ohio, to determine whether or not the duty of care existed, 
the court argued that the liability was imposed (for negligent misrepresentation) only if the 
provider of information intended to disseminate the information to a limited group of 
people.82 The court also explained in the case of Picker Intern, Inc v. Mayo Found that a 
special relationship, as a core requirement for negligent misrepresentation, should exist 
under which the defendant provided information to the plaintiff and this information was 
utilized as guidance for plaintiffs in business transactions.83 For instance, accountants owe a 
duty of care not only to their clients, but also to any ‘third party that is a member of a limited 
class whose reliance on the accountant’s representation is specifically foreseen’. 84  In 
contrast, a newspaper reader85 or a radio listener86 is not a limited class and they therefore 
cannot hold the newspaper publisher or radio show liable for negligent misrepresentation. 
 
In essence, the modus operandi of law in both the states of New York and Ohio are similar. 
They both require having a special relationship or proximity between plaintiffs and 
defendants. However, this requirement is far more difficult to achieve for investors suing 
CRAs in the absence of a contractual relationship. The duty of care derives from a special 
relationship between the CRAs and some particular investors. In order to justify the special 
relationship, a plaintiff can prove that a CRA just offered ratings to a limited group of 
investors. In the Ohio Police case in 2012, the plaintiffs failed to prove that they were a 
‘limited’ group of qualitied investors and the CRA (defendant) thus did not owe a duty of 
care.87 On this point, the requirement of privity and the requirement of public concern to 
withstand constitutional protection bear a resemblance. However, this privity element nearly 
 
79 Ultramares Corp v. Touche 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441(1931) 446. 
80 ‘(An) accountant typically entails a report concerning a single company disseminated to an interested public 
consisting largely of professionals, (while) a newspaper publisher entails reports on numerous matters to the 
general public.’ First Equity Corporation of Florida v. Standard & Poor’s Corporation (n 35). 
81 The court stated that ‘granting recovery would expose the ticker service to claims by the entire public’. ibid. 
82 Amann v Clear Channel Communications 165 Ohio App. 3d 291 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) 2006 Ohio 714, 297. 
83 Picker Intern, Inc. v. Mayo Found 6 F.Supp.2d 685 (N. D. Ohio 1998) 689.  
84 Haddon View Investment Co. v. Coopers Lybrand 70 Ohio St. 2d 154 (Ohio 1982) 436 N.E.2d 212,215. 
85 Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 490 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1986)900. 
86 Amann v. Clear Channel Communications (n 81) 299. 




shields an indeterminate common investor without contracts from asking for a civil law 
remedy against a CRA on tort of negligence.  
For the foregoing impediments, it is less possible for plaintiffs without contractual 
relationships to establish a civil liability against CRAs on the approaches above. Fraud 
claims (common law fraud and Rule 10b-5 claims) are faced with a high level of scienter. 
Even though credit rating cases borrow their standards from insider trading, the scienter 
requirement on securities fraud claims appears still far more severe. The First Amendment, 
in fact, limits the scope of private law remedies, because the most common way to withstand 
constitutional protection is to prove that credit ratings are disseminated to a limited group of 
people. This is also the requirement to establish a special relationship for duty of care on tort 
of negligence. Expert liability may be a breakthrough for the duty of care and privity. 
However, the Dodd–Frank Act failed to establish a defined expert liability for CRAs. This 
will be discussed as follows: 
 
6.2.3 An Attempt to Reduce Obstacles: The Dodd–Frank Act 
 
In 2010, the Dodd–Frank act aimed to introduce an expert liability regime of CRAs and 
reduce some obstacles to the approaches to remedies, as listed above. At first, according to 
section 933(a) of the Dodd–Frank Act, CRAs should be held accountable the same as 
accounting firms or securities analysts under securities law.88 Section 931(3) found credit 
rating to be ‘fundamentally commercial’ in character.89 In addition, section 931 recognised 
that the role of a CRA should be regarded as ‘gatekeeper’ in the financial market,90 and it 
thus should be subject to the same standard of accountability as other gatekeepers. 91 
Considering the difference between CRAs and accounting firms or securities analysts, rating 
analysts focus on the assessment for the backward performance that is evaluative, while 
accountants or auditors focus more on the verification of past performance that is deductive; 
the same standard of accountability for CRAs can apply in different contexts. Nevertheless, 
 
88 Section 933(a)(m)(1) of the Dodd–Frank Act provides: ‘The enforcement and penalty provisions of this title 
shall apply to statements made by a CRA in the same manner and to the same extent as such provisions apply 
to statements made by a registered public accounting firm or a securities analyst under the securities laws, and 
such statements shall not be deemed forward-looking statements for the purposes of section 21E.’ 
89 Section 931 of the Dodd–Frank Act, which provides: ‘Because CRAs perform evaluative and analytical 
services on behalf of clients, much as other financial ‘‘gatekeepers’’ do, the activities of CRAs are 
fundamentally commercial in character and should be subject to the same standards of liability and oversight 
as apply to auditors, securities analysts, and investment bankers.’  
90 Section 931(2) and (3) of the Dodd–Frank Act, which states that ‘CRAs, including nationally recognized 
statistical rating organizations, play a critical ‘‘gatekeeper’’ role in the debt market that is functionally similar 
to that of securities analysts, who evaluate the quality of securities in the equity market, and auditors, who 
review the financial statements of firms. Such role justifies a similar level of public oversight and 
accountability.’ 




the Dodd–Frank Act did not clarify what kind of gatekeeper liability should be imposed on 
CRAs, or at least draw a scope of the professional liability.  
 
Besides, the Dodd–Frank Act aims to mitigate the difficulties for scienter in securities fraud 
claims against CRAs (namely Rule 10b-5). According to the section 933(b),92 CRAs have 
two options, namely (i) conducting reasonable investigations or (ii) obtaining reasonable 
verification, otherwise in private actions against CRAs, a strong inference of scienter could 
be made. As a response, some CRAs have adopted corporate codes of reasonable 
investigation of factual elements.93  In terms of reasonable verification, CRAs prefer to 
delegate the duty of investigation to other sources in order to avoid potential risks in 
litigation.94 Even though CRAs still need to do the necessary verification of the due diligence 
service rendered by third parties, they soften the degree of liability for inaccurate verification 
through outsourcing investigations, because the requirement of verification, such as the 
sampling technique, is less stringent. The highly possible result will be that they shifted duty 
of actual or constructive cognizance to duty of reasonable verification. In this regard, it 
seems still difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate scienter. In short, compared to the scienter 
standards95 established in insider trading, section 933(b) does not radically reduce the burden 
of proof of scienter.  
 
For liability in the registration statement, section 939G of the Dodd–Frank Act nullified the 
exemption for NRSROs under Rule 436(g) and made CRAs liable under section 11 of the 
Securities Law of 1933. As mentioned above, the exemption of Rule 436(g) shielded CRAs 
from expert liability in the registration statement prior to the Dodd–Frank Act. Apparently, 
this rule targeted the establishment of expert liability, at least in the registration statement. 
However, as a response to the repeal of Rule 436(g), CRAs refused to be content with 
 
92 Section 933(b) of the Dodd–Frank Act, which provides that ‘EXCEPTION.— In the case of an action for 
money damages brought against a CRA or a controlling person under this title, it shall be sufficient, for 
purposes of pleading any required state of mind in relation to such action, that the complaint state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the CRA knowingly or recklessly failed— (i) to conduct 
a reasonable investigation of the rated security with respect to the factual elements relied upon by its own 
methodology for evaluating credit risk; or (ii) to obtain reasonable verification of such factual elements (which 
verification may be based on a sampling technique that does not amount to an audit) from other sources that 
the CRA considered to be competent and that were independent of the issuer and underwriter.’ 
93 Andrea Miglionico (n 21) 219; Carrie Guo (n 15) 209. 
94 Andrea Miglionico (n 21) 219. 
95  As mentioned above, scienter standards can be satisfied by: ‘either (a) by alleging facts to show that 
defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong 
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.’ The strong circumstantial evidence of 
scienter includes: ‘engaged in deliberately illegal behaviour; or knew facts or had access to information 





including their ratings in their registration statement. As a consequence, the market of asset-
backed securities ( hereafter ‘ABSs’) almost froze following the repeal. 96  In order to 
facilitate the normal operation of the ABS market, the US Committee on Financial Services 
approved the removal of expert liability for CRAs (no action relief) in 2011.97 As a result, 
CRAs undertake expert liability under section 11, depending on whether or not they consent 
to have their rating contained in registration statement.  
  
In short, the effectiveness of the Dodd–Frank Act with regard to establishing civil liability 
against CRAs has fallen short in expectation. First, it did not provide what kind of expert 
liability is required for CRAs. Considering the fact that the role of CRAs are different from 
other gatekeepers (i.e., accountants and auditors), the scope and content of CRAs’ expert 
liability should be defined. Second, scienter remains an obstacle to be proven given section 
933(b). Last, the Dodd–Frank Act has no effect on establishing expert liability in a 
registration statement due to the no action letter.  
 
6.2.4 Settlements Against Credit Rating Agencies 
 
In terms of Public Enforcement,98 in 2015, the US Department of Justice and 19 state 
governments along with the District of Columbia sued S&P and its parent corporation 
McGraw Hill Financial Inc., based on the allegation that investors incurred substantial losses 
on structured financial products, such as RMBSs and Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(hereafter ‘CDOs’), for which S&P issued over-high ratings that misrepresented the actual 
credit risk of such financial products.99 In this case, the complaint was in accordance with 
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (hereafter ‘FIRREA’), 
the complaint alleged that the defendants had perpetrated some misconduct in violation of 
 
96  Ford Motor Credit Company LLC, ‘SEC No-Action Letter’ (22 July 2010) 
<https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/ford072210-1120-incoming.pdf> accessed 1 
August 2020.; see also Benjamin H. Brownlow, ‘Rating Agency Reform: Presenting the Registered Market for 
Asset-Backed Securities’ 15 North Carolina Banking Institute 132.  
97 SEC, ‘Response of the Office of Chief Counsel Division of Corporation Finance’ (23 November 2010) 
<https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/ford072210-1120.htm> accessed 1 August 2020. 
98 The two following cases are based on the public laws, such as the 18 U.S. Code § 1341 and 12 U.S.C. § 1833. 
99 The United States Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, ‘Justice Department and State Partners 
Secure $1.375 Billion Settlement with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to the Financial Crisis’ (3 
February 2015) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-state-partners-secure-1375-billion-




three forms of fraud.100 In another case, also pursuant to the FIRRA101 and other state laws, 
the Department of Justice and 21 state governments, along with the District of Columbia, 
sued Moody’s on the allegation that the inflated rating provided by Moody’s102 on structured 
financial products, including RMBSs and CDOs, exacerbated the financial crisis of 2007–
8.103 In this case, based on the investigation, the defendant had to acknowledge that its 
conducts violated its internal corporate code.104 However, both cases reached settlement 
agreements in the end, with the penalty of USD 1,375 billion and USD 864 million 
respectively.105  
  
Both cases mentioned above are mainly based on administrative laws and finally reached 
settlement agreements. A settlement plays a significant role in enforcement in the United 
States, whose main benefit is more efficient to complete the enforcement action at a lower 
cost, to underpin the deterrence effect of enforcement and to provide claimants with 
compensations.106 As MacNeil observed: ‘settlement procedures are commonly under close 
scrutiny, particularly in the United States where concern has been expressed that settlements 
do not achieve adequate accountability or deterrence when they are made without admission 
of guilt.’ However, at first, even though CRAs do not need to admit guilt, they still pay much 
in settlement agreements. The huge cost for settlement agreements has the moderate effect 
of deterrence against the misconduct of CRAs in future. In this regard, administrative 
enforcement is more effective than private law actions. Besides, the acknowledgements by 
the CRAs prove the existence of rating misconducts, which at least encourages both public 
and private claimants to pursue their compensation for damages. However, settlement could 
 
100 These violations include mail fraud under 18 U.S. Code § 1341, wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and 
financial institutions fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344. See in the United States Department of Justice, Office of 
Public Affairs, ‘Department of Justice Sues Standard & Poor’s for Fraud in Rating Mortgage-Backed Securities 
in the Years Leading Up to the Financial Crisis’ (5 February 2013) 
<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-sues-standard-poor-s-fraud-rating-mortgage-backed-
securities-years-leading> accessed 10 October 2020. 
101 One of the legal bases of this cases is civil penalties 12 U.S.C. § 1833 
102 Moody’s here includes Moody’s Investors Service Inc., Moody’s Analytics Inc., and their parent, Moody’s 
Corporation.  
103 the United States Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, ‘Justice Department and State Partners 
Secure Nearly $864 Million Settlement With Moody’s Arising From Conduct in the Lead up to the Financial 
Crisis’ (13 January 2017) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-state-partners-secure-
nearly-864-million-settlement-moody-s-arising> accessed 28 July 2020. 
104 ibid. 
105 The United States Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, ‘Justice Department and State Partners 
Secure $1.375 Billion Settlement with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to the Financial Crisis’ (n 
98).; the United States Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, ‘Justice Department and State Partners 
Secure Nearly $864 Million Settlement With Moody’s Arising From Conduct in the Lead up to the Financial 
Crisis’ (n 103). 
106 Iain MacNeil, ‘Enforcement and Sanctioning’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilìs Ferran and Jennifer Payne (ed), The 




be regarded as a compromise of formal enforcement. Without judgment, these cases cannot 
provide extensive facts to be discussed further. 
 
Regulators have a part in common motivation with the courts. The regulatory priority is the 
effective operation of market as well. Compared to the court, the difference for the regulators 
is that they have a great incentive to rebuild the confidence of investors and improve 
financial stability after the financial crisis of 2007. Regulatory techniques are more flexible 
than the law. The civil liability regime of CRAs under the Dodd–Frank Act is more like a 
temporary threat rather than fundamental reform. The regulatory object is to deter CRAs and 
make them behave well. In this regard, the administrative penalties have a better influence 
than private litigation. Hence, the next regulatory focus may be public enforcement rather 
the private law remedies. 
 
6.3 European Union 
 
6.3.1  The European Union Civil Liability Regime  
 
The current EU regulation governing CRAs is still far from satisfactory. Under contract law 
(or at least general rules of contract law), issuers or subscribers (investors) can hold CRAs 
liable for breach of contract when they have contractual relationships with CRAs;107 in other 
words, the relevant contract laws or general rules of contract law in member states will apply 
to these contractual relationships. However, for credit rating cases, most disputes arise 
between investors and CRAs in the absence of contractual relationships,108 which situation 
is quite common under the issuer-pays model.109  
 
Leading up to the financial crisis, among the EU member states, there was no specific 
legislation governing the civil liability of CRAs.110 Hence, the question becomes what legal 
 
107  Brigatte Haar, ‘Civil Liability of Credit Rating Agencies after CRA 3– Regulatory All-or-Nothing 
Approaches Between Immunity and Over-Deterrence’ (Center of Excellence, Sustainable Architecture for 
Finance in Europe, White Paper Series No1 2013) 3 <https://safe-
frankfurt.de/uploads/media/Haar_Civil_Liability_of_CRA_01.pdf> accessed 10 October 2020. 
108 ibid. 
109 European Commission, ‘IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Regulation 
Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies and a Proposal for a Directive Amending 
Directive 2009/65/EC on Coordination on Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers’ Commssion Staff Working Paper SEC (2011) 1354/F1, 142 
<https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/2/2011/EN/SEC-2011-1354-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF> 





basis could be relied on when investors bring actions to the court against CRAs. In the 
absence of contractual relationships, there is high uncertainty when investors claim damage 
caused by flawed ratings. In some EU member states, such as Sweden and Poland, investors 
cannot claim damage against CRAs, when there is no contractual relationship between the 
investors and CRAs, even though this situation is quite common under the issuer-pays 
model.111 In the United Kingdom, in the presence of contractual relationships, the liability of 
CRAs could be determined,112 while in the absence of contractual relationships, it is uncertain 
how to determine the duty of care of CRAs vis-à-vis investors, and courts take a flexible 
approach depending on the particular circumstances of the case.113 As discussed in the section 
on the United States, there is a similar debate in Germany with respect to the third-party 
beneficiary rule of contract law. The key point is whether investors can be regarded as third 
parties of contracts between issuers and CRAs, and hence ask for protection due to the 
potential implicit agreement of such contracts. The German mainstream approach is that the 
protection for third parties in contracts should not be extended to investors without 
contractual relationships with CRAs.114 Similar to the United States, the major ground is a 
lack of explicit intention to benefit investors from the agreements between issuers and 
CRAs.115  
 
In order to further determine the civil liability of CRAs and provide a redress for investors 
and issuers without contractual relationships, the Regulation 2013 introduced civil lability 
for CRAs into the regulatory framework.116 Article 35a of the Regulation 2013 creates a 
private law remedy for investors and issuers when an investor relies on a rating issued in 
breach of Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 (hereafter Regulation 2009)117 or the issuer suffers 
damage caused by a breach of the Regulation 2009, irrespective of contractual relationships 
between both parties and CRAs.118 Considering the difficulty for both investors and issuers 
 
111 ibid. 
112 Carsten Thomas Ebenroth and Thomas J Dillon Jr, ‘The International Rating Game: An Analysis of The 
Liability of Rating Agencies in Europe, England, and The United States’ (1993) 24(3) Law and policy in 
international business 783, 789-90 
113 European Commission (n 109). 
114 Brigatte Haar (n 106) 3-4. 
115 ibid 4 . 
116 Article 35a of the Regulation 2013 
117 Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on 
Credit Rating Agencies (OJ 2009 L 302).  
118 Article 35a of the Regulation 2013 states that ‘1. Where a credit rating agency has committed, intentionally 
or with gross negligence, any of the infringements listed in Annex III having an impact on a credit rating, an 
investor or issuer may claim damages from that credit rating agency for damage caused to it due to that 




to establish a civil liability in the absence of contractual relationship, the European Union 
created the civil liability regime that aims to provide a legal approach of redress for investors. 
This right of redress extends to the circumstance in which there is no contractual 
relationships between investors or issuers and CRAs.119 The four basic elements of the EU 
civil liability regime for CRAs will be discussed next. 
 
a. Duty and Breach of Duty 
 
Article 35a (1) requires CRAs to be held liable for their ‘intentional’ or ‘gross negligent’120 
infringement. All the specific infringements are listed in Annex III of the Regulation 2013. 
In other words, the EU civil liability regime chooses to provide specific breaches of duty 
rather than explain what the duty is – as the legal basis on which an investor can rely for the 
claim of damage – especially in the absence of contractual relationships. However, Article 
35a(5) does not exclude further civil liability claims according to national law.121 Besides, 
given that the differences in national laws in member states, the Regulation 2013 requires 
each member state to maintain national civil liability regimes which are more favourable for 
 
relied, in accordance with Article 5a(1) or otherwise with due care, on a credit rating for a decision to invest 
into, hold onto or divest from a financial instrument covered by that credit rating.  
An issuer may claim damages under this Article where it establishes that it or its financial instruments are 
covered by that credit rating and the infringement was not caused by misleading and inaccurate information 
provided by the issuer to the credit rating agency, directly or through information publicly available.  
2. It shall be the responsibility of the investor or issuer to present accurate and detailed information indicating 
that the credit rating agency has committed an infringement of this Regulation, and that that infringement had 
an impact on the credit rating issued.  
What constitutes accurate and detailed information shall be assessed by the competent national court, taking 
into consideration that the investor or issuer may not have access to information which is purely within the 
sphere of the credit rating agency.  
3. The civil liability of credit rating agencies, as referred to in paragraph 1, shall only be limited in advance 
where that limitation is:  
(a) reasonable and proportionate; and  
(b) allowed by the applicable national law in accordance with paragraph 4.  
Any limitation that does not comply with the first subparagraph, or any exclusion of civil liability shall be 
deprived of any legal effect.  
4. Terms such as “damage”, “intention”, “gross negligence”, “reasonably relied”, “due care”, “impact”, “rea-
sonable” and “proportionate” which are referred to in this Article but are not defined, shall be interpreted and 
applied in accordance with the applicable national law as determined by the relevant rules of private 
international law. Matters concerning the civil liability of a credit rating agency which are not covered by this 
Regulation shall be governed by the applicable national law as determined by the relevant rules of private 
international law. The court that is competent to decide on a claim for civil liability brought by an investor or 
issuer shall be determined by the relevant rules of private international law. …’ 
119 Recital 5 in the preamble of the Regulation 2013 
120 The Regulation 2013 does not define many important terms, including gross negligence, and it allows 
national courts to define these terms. See Article 35a (4) of the Regulation 2013. For example, the United 
Kingdom provides the definition of gross negligence’ as: it ‘ascribes to ‘gross negligence’ the meaning of 
recklessness which is well-established concept in the UK law’. See Explanatory Memorandum to the Credit 
Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013 2013 (2013 No1637) para 7.5. 




investors or issuers without contractual relationships.122 This at least implies that the EU 
approach aims to enhance the civil liability of CRAs, in order to protect parties that use credit 
ratings. The rationale is that considering the difficulties that investors and issuers are faced 
with when both parties force CRAs to conduct themselves responsibility, especially in the 
absence of contractual relationships, the favourable civil liability regime targets a better 
balance of the interests of the users of ratings and CRAs in the securities market. 
 
In fact, the Regulation 2013 merely created a private enforcement regime for redress rather 
than establish a duty to extend the existing civil liability for CRAs in the absence of 
contractual relationships. The contractual liability is not severely affected by Article 35a. On 
this point, CRAs are prone to pre-emptively limit their civil liability in contract, only if the 
limitation is reasonable and proportionate. This may bring a rise in the use of exemption 
terms in format contracts of rating services. In addition, Article 35a (4) leaves much to the 
discretion of the member states. This gives rise to an inconsistency among different 
jurisdictions throughout the European Union, as will be discussed below.  
 
b. Reliance  
 
According to Article 35a (1), the reliance requirement for claiming damage by investors is 
that the investment decision of investors is reasonably based on credit rating on a legally 
admissible basis.123 The reasonable reliance is one of necessary conditions for the causation, 
as discussed below. In order to prove reasonable reliance, an investor has to prove the due 
care it conducted when it relied on a credit rating before making a decision. 
  
For one thing, Article 5 required financial institutions to make their own credit rating.124 In 
the case of financial institutions,125 they have to prove that they conducted their due credit 
risk assessment and did not solely rely on their credit rating. These mentioned financial 
institutions, including institutional investors, are the groups who are most likely to claim 
damage against CRAs.126 Nevertheless, the problem is that these provisions are, in fact, 
 
122 Recital 35 of the Regulation 2013 
123 Article 32 of the Regulation 2013 provides: ‘An investor may claim damages under this Article where it 
establishes that it has reasonably relied, in accordance with Article 5a(1) or otherwise with due care, on a credit 
rating for a decision to invest into, hold onto or divest from a financial instrument covered by that credit rating.’ 
124 Article 5a (1) of the Regulation 2013 states that ‘the entities referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 
4(1) shall make their own credit risk assessment and shall not solely or mechanistically rely on credit ratings 
for assessing the creditworthiness of an entity or financial instrument. 
125 The financial institutions are listed in Article 4(1) of the Regulation 2013.  
126 Thomas M. J. Möllers and Charis Niedorf, ‘Regulation and Liability of Credit Rating Agencies – A More 




contradictory. There are two possibilities: first, if their own credit risk easement is the same 
as the external credit ratings and they choose to rely on credit ratings, how do they prove 
that the damage is caused by their reliance on credit ratings rather than their own risk 
assessment? Second, if their own credit risk assessment is different from the credit ratings 
and, in general, they are more likely to choose to rely on the credit ratings, how do they 
prove that the reliance is reasonable? 
 
For another, individual investors are not included in accordance with Article 4(1) and they 
thus do not undertake due risk assessment. In other words, the requirement of reasonable 
reliance for them is merely to prove the due care that they exercised in their investment 
decision or the reasonableness that they solely relied on the external credit ratings. In practice, 
it is apparently difficult for individual investors to justify their reliance. Some researchers 
observe that, to some extent, it is impossible to prove the exclusivity where there is media 
converge whether or not the information does conform to credit ratings.127  
 
Apart from that, there is the absence of definition regarding ‘reasonable reliance’. The high 
threshold of reasonable reliance, as a supplement for the EU regulation, targets reducing the 
over-reliance of market participants on external credit ratings. As a result, these reliance 
requirements in essence limits the redress for both institutional and individual investors, as 
well as limits the civil liability of CRAs.  
 
c. Burden of Proof  
 
Burden of proof in the Regulation 2013 can be regarded as another factor to restrict the civil 
liability regime. At first, in order to ensure the effective redress for investors against CRAs, 
the 2011 proposal attempted to partially reverse the burden of proof on CRAs, because 
investors cannot access the information on internal procedures. 128  Based on the 2011 
proposal, the burden of proof was partly transferred to CRAs pertaining to the existence of 
an infringement and the impact of infringement on the rating outcome, while the burden of 
proof regarding the damage the causation between the breach of duty and damage is still 
imposed on plaintiffs, such as investors.129 As can be seen from the Regulation 2013 and 
 
127 ibid.  
128  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of The European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies’ (2011) 747 final 2011/0361 (COD), 
paragraph 26, <https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0747:FIN:EN:PDF> 





other relevant regulations, the proposal was never adopted. The initial proposal aims to 
ensure the redress for plaintiffs through reducing the burden of proof for plaintiffs. However, 
it should be noted that the effectiveness of this proposal needs to be further justified, because 
the transfer just ensures a reduction in the burden of proof for plaintiffs rather than increasing 
the possibility that plaintiffs prevail in lawsuits.  
 
Pursuant to Article 35a (2), the Regulation 2013 finally did not reverse the burden of proof 
to CRAs. This provision requires plaintiffs to prove the infringement of CRAs by presenting 
accurate and detailed evidence, and the impact of the infringement on a credit rating 
outcome.130 This burden of proof is more stringent for plaintiffs, especially for individual 
investors. It is almost impossible for individual investors to attain the necessary information 
as proof.131 Even for institutional investors, this burden of proof is still hard to fulfil. 
 
Apart from that, many terms listed in Article 35a(4), such as ‘damage’, ‘intention’, ‘gross 
negligence’, ‘reasonably relied’, ‘due care’, ‘impact’ and ‘proportionate’, have not been 
defined, and Article 35a(4) allows national laws and courts to define these core terms.132 In 
this regard, on the one hand, the EU civil liability regime has a stringent fault standard. CRAs 
are held liable only if they have committed any infringement with intention or gross 
negligence, while mild, or even moderate, negligence does not meet the state of mind 
requirement. The ground is that credit rating is an assessment that includes complex 
economic factors during the rating process.133 Applying various methodologies may achieve 
various results, none of which can be deemed as fault, even if they are insufficiently accurate 
or of a high quality.134 On the other hand, EU legislators allows national courts to identify 
the boundaries of the civil liability regime. This may increase the uncertainty of the 
application of national laws.  
 
d. Damage and Causation 
 
The Regulation 2013 does not provide a specific definition of damage, and it grants this right 
to each member state to define and interpret damage and to apply it according to the national 
law. In practice, the obstacle regarding damage is to determine how much the damage is. 
 
130 Article 35a (2) of the Regulation 2013 
131 Thomas M. J. Möllers and Charis Niedorf (n 43) 348. 
132 Article 35a (4) of the Regulation 2013 





Even though there are some approaches to determining the damage, the harmonized one has 
been established at both the theoretical and practical stage so far. Two common methods of 
calculating damage claims include the (i) difference in market rate and (ii) reversal of 
investment decision.135 
 
The causation presents in two stages: (i) the infringement has an actual impact on the rating 
and (ii) the impact leads to the damage. The causation itself seems reasonable but this 
requirement put a heavy burden of proof on plaintiffs. For the former requirement, as 
addressed above, the burden of proof is borne by the plaintiffs. An investor cannot access 
the necessary information to prove whether or not there is any infringement during the rating 
process. Most investors are also unable to know what kind of impacts there are on ratings 
outcomes.  
 
In terms of causing damage, it also includes two things: first, the investor should prove that 
there is reasonable reliance on the affected rating. As discussed above, it seems a dilemma 
to prove the reasonable reliance and causation. In the absence of the definition of reasonable 
reliance, it is hard for plaintiffs to prove the reasonableness in practice. Second, an investor 
should prove the link between the credit rating and loss, that is, because of the reliance on 
the rating, the investor made such an investment decision whose financial instrument is rated 
by the same CRA.  
 




135 The former damages claim is based on the argument that a financial product was either purchased at an 
extremely expensive price or too low a price compared to a hypothetically correct price. Therefore, the damages 
claims should prove the reasonable difference between the actual price paid and the hypothetical correct price. 
In addition, it is also necessary to prove to what extent the impact of inaccurate credit rating on the actual price 
is. This is too difficult, because the market rate is driven by numerous economic factors instead of a single 
factor of credit rating. The latter damage claim is based on that reasonable reliance on a credit rating was the 
reason for the investment decision. Loss thus can be regarded as the result of reliance and is determined as the 
difference between the actual worth of the rated investment and the situation the investor never decided on the 
investment, namely negative interest. In addition to proof of reasonable reliance and causation, nvestors should 
prove that the investment preference of the investor was low risk. The financial instrument with inaccurate 
rating misled him into making such a decision. Thomas M. J. Möllers and Charis Niedorf (n 43) 349. The first 
resource seems Germen (Vasella, Haftung von Ratingagenturen, 2011, p. 370-2.; Barth, Schadensberechnung 




Article 35a of the Regulation 2013 allows the national courts to supplement and further 
constitute the civil liability regime in each member state,136 which also leads to the concerns 
arising from the lack of a harmonized civil liability regime of CRAs in the European Union.  
 
In Germany, even though there is no specific legislation governing civil liability of CRAs, 
an approach has been established to deal with the claimants without contractual 
relationships.137 In the absence of contractual relationships, investors can claim damage 
against CRAs in tort under section 826 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbu). 138  This provision has high requirements in scienter, reliance and showing 
violation of public policy.139 
 
In 2010, France adopted a specific law in relation to the civil liability of CRAs. Article L544-
5 of the French Code monétaire et financier required CRAs to be liable for not only their 
client but also the third parties under both tort law and for their own violation of the 
Regulation 2009.140  
 
Article 35a has been implemented in the UK legislation by the Credit Rating Agencies (Civil 
Liability) Regulations 2013.141  This statutory instrument provides definitions for many 
terms. As mentioned before, the civil liability of CRAs could be established when there are 
contractual relationships, while in the absence of contractual relationships, the possible 
approach may be found in tort law. The two possible approaches need to be examined further. 
First, the tort of deceit requires the ‘intention to cheat’. 142 For civil liability of CRAs, CRAs 
were held liable only when plaintiffs could prove that CRAs knew that their ratings were 
wrong or based on the wrong facts.143 Second, in tort law, claimants could also hold CRAs 
liable on negligent misstatement claims. However, to prevail in a negligent 
 
136 Article 35a (5) of the Regulation 2013 provides that ‘this provision does not exclude further civil liability 
claims in accordance with national law’. 
137 Chiara Picciau, ‘The Evolution of the Liability of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States and in the 
European Union: Regulation after the Crisis’ (2018) vol 15(2) European Company and Financial Law Review, 
393. 
138 Brigatte Haar (n 106) 4-5. 
139 ibid 5. 
140  Article L 544–5, para 1, Code monétaire et financier states that ‘Les agences de notation de crédit 
mentionnées à l’article L 544–4 engagent leur responsabilité délictuelle et quasi délictuelle, tant à l’égard de 
leurs clients que des tiers, des conséquences dommageables des fautes et manquements par elles commis dans 
la mise en œuvre des obligations définies dans le règlement (CE) n° 1060/2009 du Parlement européen et du 
Conseil, du 16 septembre 2009, précité .‘ see in Chiara Picciau (n 136) 392. 
141  The Credit Rating Agencies (Civil Liability) Regulations 2013 (2013 No 1637). This UK statutory 
instruments is the interpretation and complementation of Article 35a of the Regulation 2013.  
142 Nocton v. Ashburton [1914] A.C. 932, 953. .  




misrepresentation claim, claimants should prove the existence of the duty of care, the 
scienter that CRAs could foresee (and know) the trust of claimants in their ratings, and the 
proximity between the credit rating and the damage.144  
 
As can be seen from the above, in torts of negligence, there is a different degree of standards 
in EU national courts. This implies that various national courts apply their own laws and 
thus may have inconsistent results. On this point, this may also give rise to difficulties in 
choosing national applicable laws and further regulatory arbitrage between EU member 
states. There is great uncertainty regarding which country’s law should be applied, 
depending on many approaches: (i) the country where the issuer purchased the ratings; (ii) 
the country where the investors suffered the loss (given that the common damage in credit 
rating cases is pecuniary loss, it is difficult to identify the location of damage suffered); and 
(iii) the country in which the CRAs provided rating services.145 In summary, the absence of 
harmonized civil liability regime for CRAs dilutes creditability and consistency of the EU 
civil liability regime.  
 
6.3.3 Public Enforcement 
 
Compared to the absence of a test in private enforcement, public enforcement has seen some 
progress. The interesting thing within the EU legal framework is that under Annex III146, the 
same infringement can be regarded as the basis for not only civil liability, but also 
administrative liability. The Annex III was originally introduced by Regulation (EU) No. 
513/2011147 (hereafter ‘Regulation 2011’) and all the infringement listed in Annex III were 
originally designed to serve as the basis for regulatory power. Most of the infringements 
listed in Annex III under both Article 35a and Article 36 were also used to sustain civil 
liability claims since the Regulation 2013 introduced civil liability regimes.148  In other 
words, not all the infringements listed in the Annex III could be the basis for civil liability, 
while all the listed infringements are used as the basis for administrative sanctions. As a 
result, when one CRA commits, intentionally or negligently, any infringement listed in 
 
144 Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman (1990) 2 AC 605, 610 margin no. B.; Thomas M. J. Möllers and Charis 
Niedorf (n 43) 356–7. 
145 Andrea Miglionico (n 44) 235. 
146 Annex III of the Regulation 2009 
147 Regulation No. 513/2011 of 11 May 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating 
agencies (OJ 2011 L 145). 




Annex III, European Securities and Markets Authority (hereafter ‘ESMA’). 149  has the 
power to impose a fine on it. Compared to the elements under EU private civil litigation, one 
difference is that in public enforcement, ESMA can impose a fine only if there is simply 
negligence.  
  
As can be seen from Table 6.1, in 2014, ESMA started to censuring the first CRA, namely 
S&P, with a public notice because S&P failed to meet some of the organizational 
requirements. 150  For the first public notice, ESMA spent more than two years on the 
investigation.151 Between 2014 and 2020, there were 11 enforcement actions targeted at 
CRAs and ESMA fined six of them. Among all the existing monetary sanctions, the fine 
imposed on Fitch in 2019 is the biggest monetary penalty at a total amount of EUR 5.1325 
million. To determine each fine for each infringement, ESMA spent approximately two years 
on investigations in the United Kingdom, Spain and France. 152  This could be seen as 
prudence of each enforcement decision for ESMA, especially as a recently established 
regulator. It also implies the difficulty for ESMA to investigate rating processes and collect 
evidence to prove any violation of internal rules or infringement, let alone the common 
investor.  
 
In addition, according to the Table 6.1, ESMA has five public notices without monetary fines. 
Unlike the monetary sanction, the effect of public notice manifests in the consequent market 
responses. A public notice works via information diffusion and reputational mechanisms of 
markets.153 Compared to the high number of fines, the public notice could be the supplement 
for administrative penalties, whose main benefit is to put an emphasis on the deterrence 
impact of enforcement actions and at the same time to dilute the negative impact on small 
investors by high fines.154  
 
149 The Regualtion 2011 conferred ESMA centralized supervisory powers on credit rating agencies. Besides, 
Article 36(a) of the Regulation 2013 empowered ESMA to impose a monetary fine on credit rating agencies. 
150  ESMA, ‘Public Notice’ (2014) ESMA/2014/544 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014-544_-
_decision_supervisory_measure_articles_23e_and_24_of_regulation_1060-2009.pdf> accessed 12 August 
2020. 
151  Elizabeth Howell, ‘The Evolution of ESMA and Direct Supervision: Are There Implications for EU 
Supervisory Governance’ (2017) Volume 54, Issue 4 Common Market Law Review 1041. 
152  ESMA, ‘Public Notice’ (2019) ESMA41-356–22 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/public_notices_fitch_group.pdf> accessed 2 
September 2020. 
153 Dionysia Katelouzou and Konstantinos Sergakis, ‘Shareholder Stewardship Enforcement’ (ECGI Working 
Paper Series in Law, 2020) 11 <https://ecgi.global/working-paper/shareholder-stewardship-enforcement> 
accessed 10 October 2020. 
154 Proposal for a Regulation of The European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EC) No. 




Table 6.1 An Overview of all ESMA Enforcement Actions for CRAs155 
Name Date Breach 
Fine 
(EUR) 




Breaches of the CRAs Regulation in 
relation to the systematic application of its 
2015 Covered Bonds Methodology 
(CBM) and its revision. 
640 000 
2. Fitch Ratings 
Ltd. (UK). 
Fitch France S.A.S.; 




Between 2013 and 2015, issued four new 
ratings on instruments issued by a listed 
entity while a Fitch shareholder holding 
more than 10 per cent of its capital sat on 
the board of this entity; 
Failed to immediately assess the need to 
re-rate or withdraw ratings previously 
issued with regards to another entity, 
where a Fitch shareholder holding more 
than 10% of its capital sat on the board of 
this entity; 
Until March 2017, did not have in place 
adequate procedures with respect to 
conflicts of interest; 
Until March 2017, did not have in place 
internal control mechanisms designed to 
ensure compliance with its conflicts of 
interest obligations; 
Failed to disclose conflicts of interest 
regarding existing ratings of an entity, 
while a Fitch shareholder holding more 
than 10% of its capital sat on the board of 
this entity; 
Between 2013 and 2015, issued eight new 
ratings on instruments issued by a listed 
entity while a Fitch shareholder holding 
more than 10% of its capital sat on the 
board of this entity; and 
5 132 500 
 
 
155 These actions in blue font are monetary fine cases and the others are public notices. Table adapted from 
ESMA, ‘Enforcement Actions’ <https://www.esma.europa.eu/supervision/enforcement/enforcement-actions> 




Name Date Breach 
Fine 
(EUR) 
Failed to disclose that the existing ratings 
of the same listed entity were potentially 
impacted by the board membership of the 
Fitch shareholder holding more than 






Issuing credit ratings without being 








Issuing credit ratings without being 









Issuing credit ratings without being 








Issuing credit ratings without being 








Issuing credit ratings without being 










Ratings presentation Infringement; and 
Methodology disclosure infringement. 
1 240 000 
 




Failed to allow the Republic of Slovenia 
12 hours to consider and respond to the 
downgrade of its sovereign rating; 
No sound internal controls enabling it to 
comply with ‘the 12-hour requirement’; 
and unauthorised disclosures of new and 
potential new sovereign ratings before 
that information was made public. 
1 380 000 




Failed to meet the organizational 
requirements to establish adequate 





Name Date Breach 
Fine 
(EUR) 
decision-making procedures and clear 
organisational structures; 
Failed to meet the requirements for an 
effective compliance function; and 
Failed to meet the requirements for 
adequate record keeping. 
11. Standard & Poor’s 
Credit Market Services 
Europe Limited; and 
Standard & Poor’s 




Failed to meet the organizational 
requirements when erroneously 







In short, the advantages of EU public enforcements include: first, the public enforcer, such 
as ESMA, has better investigative power to obtain the internal information during rating 
process than an individual claimer in civil litigation. Considering the burden of proof on the 
plaintiffs under Article 36(a), effective administrative sanctions are able to better improve 
the intrinsic limitations within the private civil liability regime; second, the enforcement 
actions by ESMA is harmonised and consistent through the European Union, which also 
avoids potential conflicts arising from the application of national laws and the consequent 
regulatory arbitrages; third, the administrative monetary penalties and sanctions (such as a 
public notice) have a significant deterrent effect in preventing potential misconduct in the 
credit rating industry. However, ESMA administrative enforcements have so far been limited 
in number. One major reason is that ESMA was recently established and regulatory 
resources are, to some extent, limited. For instance, ESMA distributed 32 members of staff 
(132 staff in total) to one S&P investigation in 2013, 156 which indicates that one investigation, 
merely as a part of an enforcement action, already occupied one fourth of ESMA’s human 
resources. Another ESMA report supports this argument: ‘approximately 35% of staff time 
was engaged in thematic and individual investigations; 25% in single rulebook and 
international cooperation; and 10% in registration/perimeter and risk analysis-related 
 




activities (totalling 90% of staff time)’.157 Although the deficiency of the ESMA supervision 
seems evident, public enforcement appears as a more efficient remedy against credit rating 
misconduct. 
 
To sum up, public enforcements play a greater role in deterring CRAs, especially when the 
civil liability of CRAs cannot be established. As discussed earlier in this section, these EU 
enforcement attempts (including administrative enforcements and private litigation) suggest 
a trend of a dual-track approach that combines public and private enforcement. It should be 
noted that the enforcement by ESMA is ex post enforcement action and cannot replace the 
role of private enforcement in reinstitution and deterrence to CRAs. It is also notable that all 
the ESMA enforcement actions are based on the compliance of organization or rating process 
rather than the liability for inaccurate rating, which further supports the fact that public 
enforcement plays a more important role in practice than private enforcement.  
 
6.3.4 Critical Assessment 
 
First, the EU civil liability regime is designed to provide redress for investors and issuers 
without contractual relationships, but it has some obstacles for claimants. Under the EU civil 
liability regime, many key terms contained in elements are not clearly defined. In addition, 
causation and reasonable reliance make it difficult to satisfy plaintiffs. The burden of proof 
rests entirely with investors, which further increased the difficulties to prevail the claim.  
 
Second, the civil liability regime lacks a harmonized standard across the EU member states. 
For one thing, judicial result of a relevant credit rating case under Article 35a may depend 
on various national courts. For another, this may also give rise to regulatory arbitrage in 
possible member states. This uncertainty of the application of national laws may dilute the 
credibility of the civil liability regime. 
 
Third, public enforcement could be regarded as an optimal remedy to deter credit rating 
misconduct, while private litigation focuses more on restitution. As MacNeil observed, ‘the 
emphasis on ex ante prevention of systemic risk means that ex post enforcement action 
cannot play a major role in prudential supervision because by that time the regulator will 
have failed to secure the regulatory objective’ and ‘private enforcement is often available as 
 
157  ESMA, ‘Report on Staffing and Resources’ (2014) ESMA/2014/939 
<https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014-




a supplement to or substitute for the public enforcement’.158 The EU civil liability regime 
was originally designed to supplement public enforcement or constitute a dual-track legal 
framework, combining public and private enforcements. Nevertheless, with few relevant 
cases arising after the establishment of the EU civil liability regime, the effectiveness of the 
EU civil liability regime remains to be seen in future. In contrast, public enforcement appears 
more efficient and effective.  
 
There are some similarities between the European Union and the United States. First, like 
the United States, the European Union has a similar motivation to rebuild the market 
confidence in CRAs and the financial market after the financial crisis. Therefore, in order to 
deter CRAs, both the European Union and United States apply the same regulatory strategy: 
imposing a threat of holding CRAs liable may make CRAs behave well. The rationale behind 
this is that according to the least-cost avoider principle, the party who is more likely to avoid 
harm at less cost should have a liability imposed on it.159 Between a CRA and an investor, a 
CRA is more capable of obtaining more public and private information from its frequent 
clients (issuers), and to better analyse and assess such information based on its expertise. 
Unlike a CRA, most investors cannot have the information and expertise. The cost investors 
pay to avoid harm arising from negligence is much more than that CRAs do as a whole. In 
other words, a CRA that is able to better avoid the harm caused by negligence should have 
a liability imposed on it. In this regard, both the European Union and United States thus 
enhanced the civil liability regime for CRAs as a supplement to the regulatory framework.  
 
Second, it has been observed that claimants are unlikely to establish civil liability of CRAs 
through private litigation in both European Union and United States; on the contrary, public 
enforcement appears more progresses. The major reason is that the plaintiffs face very 
demanding pleading standards in private litigation. The impediments are the high-level 
burden of proof imposed on claimants and limited capability of access to internal information 
for claimants. Before these difficulties can be solved or mitigated, private enforcement 
remains ineffective in deterring rating misconducts. This also explains that along with the 
establishment of civil liability, both the European Union and United States carry out some 
public enforcement actions. The future enforcement regarding CRAs may attach more 
importance to public enforcement, as well as private enforcement as a supplementary support.  
 
 
158 Iain MacNeil, ‘Enforcement and Sanctioning’ in Niamh Moloney, Eilìs Ferran and Jennifer Payne (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press 2015) 293, 298. 






6.4.1 The Civil Liability Regime 
 
Before analysing the civil liability of CRAs, it should be noted that the most important 
characteristic of China’s legal system is that it is based on statute law rather than cases. 
Therefore, in general, the assessment a civil liability regime of CRAs should stem from each 
statutory law. Even though there are a few relevant statutory laws regarding the civil liability 
of CRAs, these can still constitute a civil liability regime for redress in theory. In general, 
where there is a contract between a CRA and the other party, such as an investor or issuer, 
the dispute can be solved in accordance with contract law; while in the absence of a 
contractual relationship, whether or not an investor or issuer can still claim for damage 
becomes the question. It should be noted that Chinese contract law does not have express 
protection for the third-party beneficiary. Even though there is no specific legislation 
governing the civil liability of CRAs, several provisions of securities laws and the general 
rules of tort law will apply to the CRA civil liability. 
 
According to Article 169 of the Securities Law of China, CRAs can be regarded as securities 
trading service organizations, like other professional securities investment consulting 
organizations. 160  Also, Article 170 provides the requirements of rating analysts within 
CRAs.161 These provisions granted a role of professional financial intermediary to a CRAs. 
More importantly, Article 173 specifies the civil liability for CRAs in theory.162  These 
 
160 Article 169 the Securities Law of China provides that ‘where an investment consulting institution, financial 
advising institutions, credit rating institutions, asset appraisal institutions, or accounting firm engages in any 
securities trading service, it shall be subject to the approval of the securities regulatory authority under the State 
Council and the relevant administrative departments. The measures for the administration of examination and 
approval of the practice of securities trading services by the investment consulting institutions, financial 
advising institutions, credit rating institutions, asset appraisal institutions and accounting firms shall be 
formulated by the securities regulatory authority under the State Council and the relevant administrative 
departments.’  
161 Article 170 the Securities Law of China provides that ‘the staff of an investment consulting institution, 
financial advising institutions or credit rating institutions who engage in securities trading services shall have 
the special knowledge of securities as well as work experience in the securities business or securities trading 
services for more than 2 years. The standards for recognizing the securities practice qualification and the 
measures for administration thereof shall be formulated by the securities regulatory authority under State 
Council.’ 
162 Article 173 the Securities Law of China states that ‘where a securities trading service institution formulates 
and issues any auditing report, asset appraisal report, financial advising report, credit rating report or legal 
opinions for the issuance, listing and trading of securities, it shall be assiduous and dutiful by carrying out 
examination and verification for the authenticity, accuracy and integrity of the contents of the documents 
applied as the base. In the case of any false record, misleading statement or major omission in the documents 
it has formulated or issued, which incurs any loss to any other person, the relevant securities trading service 
institution shall bear several and joint liabilities together with the relevant issuer and listed company, unless a 




provisions in essence constitute civil liability of CRAs. Under the Chinese civil legal system, 
the mainstream idea is that the expert liability of CRAs should be based on tort law 
principles.163 According to the rationale of Chinese tort law, each element of expert liability, 
namely infringed conduct, damage, causation and fault will be discussed.164  
 
a. Infringed Conduct 
 
First of all, Article 173 introduces expert liability and the relevant civil liability of CRAs. A 
CRA should be ‘assiduous and dutiful’ for the ‘authenticity, accuracy and integrity’ of its 
statements that are used for insurance of securities. Based on this, a CRA is held liable when 
it issues a false, misleading statement or major omission. The harm conduct involves issuing 
the aforementioned. However, the China Securities Act has not provided specific standards 
to further determine these conducts for CRAs, such as the definition of false record, 
misleading statement, major omission, infringed party and so on.  
 
In the absence of contractual relationships, an investor or issuer could claim for damage 
under Article 173, because an infringed party involves ‘any other person’.165 Thus, the 
question is how to determine the scope of ‘any other person’. So far, few researchers have 
addressed this question definitively, and there is no defined scope.166 However, combining 
the words in the same sentence, namely ‘the relevant issuer and listed company’, could imply 
that the ‘any other person’ here does not include an issuer but an investor. Even though there 
is no conclusion, at least Article 173 is initially designed to provide redress for investors. 
 
In terms of false record, misleading statement and major omission, Article 17 of ‘Some 
Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising 
from False Statement in Securities Market’ (hereafter ‘Civil Compensation Arising from 
 
163 Mei Yang [杨梅] and Suzhi Wang [王肃之], ‘On The Theory and Legislation About Third Party Tort 
Liability of Experts [专家对第三人侵权责任的理论与立法思考 ]’ [2014] Journal of Heilongjiang 
Administrative Cadre Institute of Politics and Law [黑龙江省政法管理干部学院学报] 82.; see also Wenyu 
Liu [刘文宇], ‘Research of Civil Responsibility of Credit Rating Agency [信用评级机构民事法律责任研究]’ 
(PhD Thesis, University of Jilin 2013). 
164 Xinbao Zhang [张新宝], Tort Liability Law[侵权责任法] (China Renmin University Press [中国人民大
学出版社] 2016) 23-34. 
165 Article 173 of the Securities Law of China. 
166 Regarding this definition of ‘any other person’, there is no relevant discussion, see Xiao Cheng [程啸], Tort 
Liability Law [侵权责任法] (Law Press [法律出版社] 2008) 208; Jinqing Zhu [朱锦清], Securities Law 证




False Statement’)167 provides a reference standard to determine the false record, misleading 
statement and omission. The first thing is that the contents of a false record, misleading 
statement and omission should be the important issue, which means having an impact on 
issuing or trading securities. The second thing is that the false record and misleading 
statement could be proven false. For the former standard, the credit ratings have a significant 
impact on securities issuing and trading, and they could thus be deemed as important issues. 
Nevertheless, for the latter, it is difficult to prove whether or not the credit rating outcome is 
accurate, because a credit rating is a financial prediction, as discussed in the United States 
and European Union sections above. In addition, using different methodologies may lead to 
various ratings outcomes, but there is no uniformly accurate methodology; in other words, 
it remains uncertain how to determine the existence of a false record, misleading statement 




As Zhang provides, the damage is an adverse result of person and property under Chinese 
tort law.168 The property damage includes destruction of property, economic loss and so 
on.169. Under Articles 30 and 33 of the Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement,170 
the scope of compensation for damage should be determined by the actual loss, and the 
 
167 Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from False 
Statement in Securities Market [最高人民法院关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事赔偿案件的若干
规定] 2003 (Interpretation No. 2 [2003] of the Supreme People’s Court). 
168 Xinbao Zhang [张新宝] (n 163) 27. 
169 ibid. 
170 Article 30 of the Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement provides that ‘the scope of liability of a 
person disseminating false statements in the securities market is determined by the actual loss suffered by the 
investors from relying on the false statements. Actual losses that can be suffered by investors include: 
(1) Loss from caused by the difference in investment capital. 
(2) Commission and duties caused by the difference in investment capital. 
The interest referred to above shall be calculated from the date of purchase to the date of sale of the securities 
in accordance with the bank's savings account interest rate for the respective period in question.’ 
Article 33 provides that ‘the term "base date" for the purpose of calculating the difference in capital refers to 
the deadline set down within a reasonable period of time after the false statement is disclosed or corrected, so 
as to calculate the scope of losses suffered by investors as a result of the false statements. The base date shall 
be determined according to the following: 
(1) From the disclosure or correction date to the date when the volume of the shares affected by the false 
statement achieve 100%. However, the volume of shares transferred through major deals shall not be included 
in this calculation. 
(2) If it is not possible to determine a base date in accordance with Clause (1) prior to the court hearing, then 
the base date shall be 30 transaction days after the disclosure or correction date. 
(3) For shares already withdrawn from the securities market, the base date shall be one transaction day prior to 
the date the shares are withdrawn from the securities market. 
(4) For shares which have already ceased trading in the securities market, the base date shall be one transaction 
day prior to the date the shares have ceased being traded in the securities market; where trading has resumed, 




damage can be calculated by the difference in investment capital within a reasonable period, 
such as from the date of purchase to the date of sale of the securities. In this regard, a plaintiff 
is able to claim for compensation based on these provisions.  
 
c. Causation and Reliance 
 
In terms of causation, China has a single requirement of a causal connection between the 
conduct by a defendant and the loss suffered by a plaintiff. Article 173 implies that a plaintiff 
should prove the damage he suffered is caused by the infringed conduct by a CRA, but this 
provision lacks specific explanation. Some researchers argue that Article 18171 and Article 
19172 of the Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement provide specific standards to 
determine the causation between the securities transaction made by investors and infringed 
conduct by defendants.173 Nevertheless, whether the two provisions can be regarded as a part 
of the civil liability regime of CRAs remains uncertain. 
 
For credit rating cases, Article 18 requires that (a) the financial instrument invested by an 
investor should be rated by a CRA; and (b) the investor should prove that it suffered the loss 
during its purchase of the financial instrument ‘on or after the date the false statement 
disseminated and before the disclosure or correction date and selling or holding the financial 
instrument after the disclosure or correction date.’ Article 19 provides specific defences for 
a defendant to invalidate the proof of causation; in other words, the two provisions constitute 
a rebuttable presumption of reliance.  
 
 
171 Article 18 of the Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement provides that ‘when the investor satisfies 
any of the following conditions, the People's court should make a judgment that there is causality between the 
false statement and the losses of investor. 
(1) The securities, in which the investor invested, have a direct relationship with the false statement 
(2) The investor purchased the securities on or after the date the false statement was disseminated and 
before the disclosure or correction date. 
(3) The investor suffered losses because of selling or holding the securities after the disclosure or 
correction date.’ 
172 Article 19 of the Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement provides that ‘if the defendant can 
present the evidence to prove that the plaintiff satisfies any of the following conditions, the People's Court 
should make a judgment that there is no causality between the false statement and the losses of investor. 
(1) The investor sold the securities before the disclosure or correction date. 
(2) The investor purchased the securities after the disclosure or correction date 
(3) The investor purchased the securities knowing about the false statement. 
(4) The losses or partial losses were caused by systematic risks related to the stock market. 
(5) The investor acted in bad faith or intended to manipulate the prices of securities.’ 
173 Tian Yu [田彧], ‘The Study on The Legal Issues of Civil Liability of Credit Rating Agencies [信用评级机
构民事责任法律问题研究]’ (Master Dissertation, China University of Political Science and Law [中国政法




Zhu argues that Articles 18 and 19 resemble the US fraud-on-the-market theory in many 
respects.174 The application of fraud-on-the-market aims to reduce the burden of proof on 
plaintiffs. However, as addressed in the reliance element of the US section, whether the 
fraud-on-the market theory has or does not have an effect on reducing the burden of proof 
for plaintiffs seems still in doubt. Apart from that, one of the assumptions of the fraud-on-
the-market theory is that the market is public and efficient, and the price of traded stock is 
determined by all the available information regarding companies and businesses, whether 
true or false.175 In this regard, there is no need to identify the reliance of investors on that 
information, because the information, whether true or not, was incorporated into, and 
reflected in, the market price. Back to China, it still remains uncertain whether the Chinese 
stock market is or is not an efficient market, let alone the bond market. 
 
Like the United States, even though some researchers argue that Articles 18 and 19 could be 
deemed as presumption of reliance in relation to CRAs cases, several necessary 
preconditions were not justified. They neither affirm that the Chinese bond market is 
sufficiently efficient, nor justify whether the adoption of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine 
contributes to decreasing the burden of proof for plaintiffs. In short, the current Chinese civil 
liability regime appears vague, especially when it comes to causation and reliance.  
 
d. Fault standard  
 
In terms of the fault standard, under tort law, the burden of proof is generally borne by the 
claimant. In contrast, for the relevant cases against CRAs, Article 173 of the Securities law 
of China reverses the burden of proof to the defendant. Unless CRAs can prove they are not 
at fault, otherwise, they should bear the relevant liabilities. This implies that the state of mind 
for CRAs is assumed as fault before CRAs prove lack thereof. Compared to the strict 
requirement of state of mind in the European Union (gross negligence) and the United States 
(scienter), China, to a large extent, has lessened the burden for state of mind. 
 
It should be noted that the reason why the Chinese civil liability regime has the lower burden 
of proof on a claimant is the pretrial procedure, as it will be discussed in the next section. 
According to the pretrial procedure, the court accepts the lawsuit only when the claimants 
has provided the penalty decision issued by the relevant regulators, as will be addressed in 
 
174 Jinqing Zhu [朱锦清] (n 165) 154. See also Tian Yu [田彧] (n 173). 




detail in the next section. In short, the administrative penalty decision has a parallel impact 
on the civil litigation. The penalty decision is the important supplementary evidence to 
support the causation. Thus, the civil liability regime puts lower burden on the fault standard.  
 
Having demonstrated all the elements of Chinese civil liability for CRAs, the current civil 
law framework is too concise to establish civil liability of CRAs. The concise description 
aims to avoid mitigating the protection scope, but its disadvantage is obvious that the vague 
and broad expression creates difficulties for the application. Owing to the lack of a specific 
legislation or provisions, the Chinese civil liability regime has intrinsic limitations. In a 
nutshell, it is difficult for claimant to hold CRAs liable in the absence of contractual 
relationships. 
 
6.4.2 Pretrial Procedure 
 
Besides the intrinsic limitations of the Chinese civil liability regime, in practice, it is nearly 
impossible for investors to prevail the lawsuits against CRAs. So far, only a limited number 
of civil actions of false statement have been allowed to be brought to court. Among these 
cases, none is associated with the CRAs. The major shield against the Chinese civil liability 
regime is the pretrial procedure in litigation.  
 
In 2002, the Supreme Count enacted ‘Notice of the Supreme People's Court on the Relevant 
Issues Concerning the Acceptance of Cases of Disputes over Civil Tort Arising from False 
Statement in the Securities Market’ (hereafter ‘2002 Notice of False Statement’).176 Article 
2 177  established a requirement of pretrial procedure in civil actions arising from false 
statement. This requires an investor who attempts to bring a lawsuit against a CRA under 
securities law to obtain the official document with a penalty decision issued by the CSRC 
and its affiliates first. Otherwise, investors are not allowed to bring a lawsuit to court directly. 
This pretrial requirement of litigation, to a large, extent blocked the channel for all cases 
associated with CRAs.  
 
176 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on the Relevant Issues Concerning the Acceptance of Cases of 
Disputes Over Civil Tort Arising from False Statement in the Securities Market[最高人民法院关于受理证券
市场因虚假陈述引发的民事侵权纠纷案件有关问题的通知] (No.43 [2001] of Supreme People’s Court
（法明传[2001]43号）).  
177 (Own translation) Article 2 of the 2002 Notice of the False Statement provides that ‘in the case of civil 
compensation for false statements accepted by the people's court, the possible conduct of false statement must 
be investigated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission and its dispatched agency, and be affirmed as 
conduct of false statement with an effective penalty decision. If the party relies on the investigation result as 





In order to understand the rationale for this pretrial procedure, the background of the 2002 
Notice of False Statement should be sketched. In China, the first-edition securities law did 
not go into effect until 1999.178 The first civil action of false statement related to securities 
was brought in 2001.179 At that stage, few courts had expertise and experience to deal with 
such relevant cases. In this regard, the 2002 Notice of False Statement was designed to cope 
with the following cases of false statement, but, at the same time, the pretrial procedure was 
created to avoid a large number of cases being brought to court. Therefore, as the Supreme 
Court explained, the rationale behind the pretrial procedure was that without the pretrial 
procedure in private securities litigation, the number of cases might be excessive, and the 
court was unable to effectively and technically deal with numerous lawsuits of false 
statement in the securities market.180  
 
On the one hand, the courts had insufficient capability and expertise to deal with numerous 
litigations of false statement. The normal concern is that without the pretrial procedure, the 
number of relevant cases would increase rapidly. If the courts insisted on dealing with 
relevant overloaded litigation, it may lead to uneven allocation of judicial resources. More 
importantly, the improper judicial response to each civil action may have a negative 
influence on the stability of the securities market. Apart from that, the pretrial procedure 
requires plaintiffs to access official documents with a penalty decision issued by relevant 
regulators, which contributes to reducing the burden of proof on plaintiffs. The document 
issued by the relevant regulators can be regarded as the most appropriate evidence. 
Compared to courts, the relevant regulators have more expertise and experience in financial 
markets, and they are more capable of collecting and processing relevant information and 
issuing a professional judgment. 
 
On the other hand, the pretrial procedure shields claimants from bringing actions to the 
courts. These blocked actions include not only credit rating lawsuits, but also a large number 
 
178 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (1998). See Xinhua News Agency [新华社], ‘China 
Enacted the Securities Law at the First Time [中国颁布第一部证券法]’ Beijing Evening News [北京晚报] 
(29 December 1998) <http://news.sina.com.cn/richtalk/news/money/9812/122903.html> accessed 20 August 
2020. 
179 The first case is Yinguangxia( or Guangxia Yin Corp.) [银广夏事件 ] Yaoyao Chang[常瑶瑶], ‘Research 
on Prepositional Procedure of Civil Litigation [民事诉讼前置程序研究]’ (Master's Dissertation, Southwest 
University of Political Science and Law [西南政法大学] 2016, 22). 
180  Guoguang Li [李国光 ], The Supreme People’s Court’s Understanding and Application of Judicial 
Interpretations on Trial of Cases of False Statements in the Securities Market [最高人民法院关于审理证券




of false statement lawsuits. The pretrial procedure was originally created to prevent 
floodgate effects of lawsuits, based on the fact that the judges had insufficient experience 
and expertise to deal with such cases. Given the background of the enactment of the 2002 
Notice of False Statement, the pretrial procedure was, to some extent, reasonable during a 
particular period. Nevertheless, three decades later, the pretrial procedure still remains, and 
the legislator has not shown any intention to abolish it. One possible reason is that legislators 
lack an incentive to abolish it because they are more inclined to ensure the efficiency of the 
securities market rather than investors’ protection, which is similar to the freedom of speech 
as a shield against plaintiffs in the United States.  
 
6.4.3 Administrative Approach 
 
In terms of public enforcement, there is only one administrative punishment on Dagong so 
far. In 2018, the CSRC 181  suspended Dagong securities business for one year. 182  The 
investigation by the CSRC states: (1) Dagong failed to adhere to its internal corporate codes; 
(2) Dagong sold additional services at an overly high price to its clients who already 
purchased its rating services; (3) some of their rating analysts and senior managers were not 
qualified in accordance with relevant laws; and (4) material omissions and deficiencies 
existed in rating data of manuscripts as well as its rating model.183 Besides suspension, the 
CSRC did not impose any other penalty on Dagong. Compared to the administrative 
enforcements in the United States and European Union, the degree of sanction in China 
seems mild.  
 
As discussed in the section of the pretrial procedure, the court transferred the problem to the 
regulator, thus why is there only one administrative punishment? One possible explanation 
is that the pretrial procedure is designed not just for credit rating cases, but all the securities 
cases arising from false statement. Like the situation in the United States and European 
Union, prior to the financial crisis of 2007–8, CRAs are evidently not the regulatory focus 
in China.  
 
 
181 One of main governmental regulators in China [中国证监会] 
182  Dagong’s misbehavior violated the relevant regulation and rules under Interim Measures for the 
Administration of the Credit Rating Business Regarding the Securities Market[证券市场资信评级业务管理
暂行办法] (No 50 [2007] of China Securities Regulatory Commission [证监发[2007] 50号]). See CSRC, 
‘CSRC Suspended Dagong Securities Rating Business for One Year [证监会暂停大公国际证券评级业务一
年]’ (2018) <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwdd/201808/t20180817_342750.html> accessed 
22 February 2019.  




Until 2019, the four main regulators184 enacted the Interim Measures for the Administration 
of the Credit Rating Industry (hereafter ‘Interim Measures’). 185  Compared to the two 
previous laws,186 the most significant change brought about by the Interim Measures is that 
the administrative penalties have been strengthened to a large extent. The whole of Chapter 
8 (from Article 53 to Article 63) provides a set of sanctions associated with various violations, 
ranging from a public notice to a monetary penalty. In great detail, pursuant to Article 63, 
an official website (Credit China) 187  was specially designed to disclose all the public 
warnings and punishment notices with regard to CRAs. In addition, the Interim Measures 
raised the level of penalties. The amount of monetary penalty increased dramatically, with 
the maximum fine from 0.3 million yuan (nearly equal to USD 45 thousand) before188 to 5 
million yuan (nearly equal USD 0.75 million)189 Looking back to the case of Dagong, as 
mentioned above, this also explains why the penalty in that case is far less severe than the 
administrative penalties in the United States and European Union, because the regulator did 
not have such wide-ranging power to punish CRAs with misconduct until the enactment of 
the Interim Measures. In summary, CRAs did not come into regulatory sight and became 
regulatory focus until recently. Additionally, China attaches more importance to public 
enforcement rather than private liability regime in deterring CRA misconducts. 
 
6.4.4 Critical Assessment 
 
There are some similarities and differences in the European Union, United States and China. 
First, the motivation to establish civil liability of CRAs bear resemblances. The United States, 
European Union and China seek to rebuild market confidence through enabling CRAs to be 
held liable for their misconduct. There is a contingency that CRAs become the regulatory 
focus. The reason why CRAs were chosen to be the regulatory or legislative focus is that 
CRAs played a significant role in the financial crisis and thus come into public sight. After 
 
184 People's Bank of China, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance and 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
185 Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating Industry [信用评级业管理暂行办法] 2019 
(No. 5 [2019] of People’s Bank of China, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of 
Finance and the China Securities Regulatory Commission). 
186 The two previous laws are Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit Rating Business Regarding 
the Securities Market[证券市场资信评级业务管理暂行办法] and Guiding Opinions of the People’s Bank of 
China for the Management of Credit Rating [中国人民银行信用评级管理指导意见] (No 95 [2006] of the 
People’s Bank of China [银发[2006]95号]). 
187 Credit China [信用中国], ‘Credit China’ <https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/home/index.html> accessed 10 
October 2020. 
188 Article 202 of the Securities Law of China 





the financial crisis, the United States and European Union have more active incentives to 
rebuild financial confidence and they thus take more measures to pursue this objective. 
However, this regulatory attention may be temporary and contingent.  
 
By contrast, the first difference in the three areas is the varying degree of the incentives. 
Both in the United States and European Union, the establishment of civil liability is directly 
motivated by the financial crisis of 2007. For CRAs, the financial crisis yielded at least two 
lessons: (i) the systemic risk of the whole financial market was aggravated by CRAs190 and 
(ii) the failure of reputation mechanism in the credit rating industry added to this, 191 as 
addressed in the previous chapters. However, China did not learn the lessons from the 
financial crisis as soon as the European Union and United States did. The financial crisis had 
a comparatively moderate influence on the Chinese financial market. As a result, in contrast 
to the United States and European Union, China did not make CRAs its regulatory focus 
immediately. 
 
Aside from that, unlike the United States, the Chinese market of the structured finance is 
comparatively limited in scale and transaction amounts. Furthermore, in 2012, the Chinese 
regulator further required that the structure of credit asset securitisation products should be 
simple and clear, and therefore, the re-securitisation or synthetic securitisation in the 
expanded pilot stage would not be allowed.192 Unlike the European Union, China had not 
experienced the sovereign rating crisis. The stage of Chinese CRAs maybe remains that 
between unregulated and highlighting regulated stage. With the bonds market enlarging, 
even though China realised the important role of CRAs in financial stability, it still lacks one 
direct motivation to establish the civil liability of CRAs to rebuild market confidence.  
 
Second, the insurmountable obstacles within each civil liability regime bear a resemblance. 
The United States, European Union and China explored several possible approaches to 
establish civil liability for CRAs in the absence of contractual relationships. The major 
obstacles within each civil liability regime are similar, such as the state of mind, reasonable 
reliance and causation.  
 
190 As addressed in the section 3.4 of Chapter  
191 As addressed in the section 4.4.1 of Chapter 4 and section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5 
192 People’s Bank of China, Ministry of Finance, and China Banking Regulatory Commission, ‘Notice of the 
People’s Bank of China, the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the Ministry of Finance on Relevant 
Matters Concerning Further Expanding the Pilot Securitization of Credit Assets [中国人民银行、中国银行
业监督管理委员会、财政部关于进一步扩大信贷资产证券化试点有关事项的通知]’ (2012) No. 127 





On the contrary, the three regions are faced with different forms of resistance. When the 
United States attempted to establish expert liability arising from the false registration 
statement against CRAs, it faced market resistance and the expert liability attempt finally 
stalled. The European Union has to deal with the inconsistent application of laws in each 
member state. In China, the primary obstacle is the pretrial procedure, while from an in-
depth perspective, the internal limits of legal structures demotivate courts and regulators 
from dealing with the CRA issue. 
 
As discussed above, one possible explanation for the long-term existence of the pretrial 
procedure is that legislators do not have an incentive to repeal or replace it. For one thing, 
the pretrial procedure creates information asymmetry between the potential claimants and 
courts, and this institutional deficiency further hinders the courts from realising the real 
demand for credit rating actions. Unlike the common law system, Chinese civil liability 
cannot be enriched by each case. In a civil law country, when potential claimants find that 
some obstacles within the litigation are too difficult to overcome, they do not have sufficient 
incentives to bring actions to the court. Furthermore, this has a negative effect on the future 
reform of CRAs, because the pretrial procedure, in reverse, reduces the opportunities for 
courts to deal with the cases, and small numbers of relevant actions may mislead the supreme 
court in accurately assessing the importance of the issue.193 This explains, from another point 
of view, why there has been no civil action with regard to credit ratings so far.  
 
At last, as has already been examined, the recent legal attempts against credit rating 
misconduct through the establishment of a civil liability regime in the European Union, 
United States and China, make it apparent that public enforcements are more effective means 
than private enforcement. This chapter does not highlight the greater role of public 
enforcement, but tries to compare the effectiveness between the public and private 
enforcement. Is civil liability a solution? Before answering this question, it is noted against 
which background these regulations were proposed. After reviewing the financial crisis and 
the role of CRAs in the 2007–8 financial crisis, the US and EU regulators have put in place 
measures to reduce the regulatory over-reliance, to manage conflicts of interest and improve 
market competence.194 In order to achieve the common regulatory objectives, namely make 
the CRAs behave well and rebuild market confidence, the CRA civil liability regime was 
 
193 The supreme court will issue relevant judicial interpretation as a supplement annually once a particular class 
of cases are accumulated to a certain amount. 




proposed to supplement these regulations. In this regard, the CRAs’ civil liability regime has 
not achieved its anticipated goal. From the perspective of curbing CRAs misconduct, public 
enforcement appears to be a better strategy.  For one thing, compared to the private law 
remedies, the public enforcement is more practicable and effective, which could be seen 
from the comparison between the cases of administrative punishments and civil lawsuits. 
Few plaintiffs successfully established the civil liability for CRAs in civil claims, while the 
CRAs were more frequently punished by the public enforcement. For another, the cost, 
namely damage compensation and reputation loss, that CRAs suffered, when they lose 
lawsuits of the civil liability, is less than that they suffered in the public enforcement, such 
as censure, public notice and monetary penalty.  In other words, the public enforcement can 





Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
This thesis analysed the issues that resulted in the big rating failure during the 2007–8 
financial crisis from both an external and internal perspective. From the external perspective, 
the market and regulatory over-reliance on credit ratings strengthened the impacts of rating 
downgrades so that these downgrades resulted in a cascade of negative effects on the 
financial system. Chapter 3 explained that the over-reliance exacerbated the liquidity risk, 
as well as the systemic risk, stemming from the rating downgrades, especially during the 
financial crisis. From an internal perspective, the inaccuracy of credit ratings constitutes 
another reason for the rating failure. As seen in Chapters 4 to 6, the three issues negatively 
affected the credit rating quality, namely (i) conflicts of interest, (ii) the oligopolistic market 
structure and (iii) the civil liability for CRAs. Chapter 4 addressed the fact that CRAs are 
motivated by huge profits from the rating businesses on structured finance, regardless of 
their capability and rating quality. In Chapter 5, it is observed that under an oligopolistic 
market, the big three usually lack the necessary deterrence to ensure their rating quality. 
Chapter 6 addressed the weakness of the civil liability regime for CRAs in the European 
Union, United States and China in effectively deterring CRAs for their rating quality. In 
short, the four issues in this thesis address the external and internal grounds of the rating 
failure. 
 
As seen above, the legal and regulatory developments are in parallel with the actual market 
demand in each region. Thus, when comparing the different regulatory approaches in the 
European Union, United States and China, the underlying demand should be considered first. 
Chapter 2 provided the three differing social contexts of the European Union, United States 
and China. It is observed that under each social context, regulating CRAs faced with similar 
but varying degrees of impediments. All the existing regulatory regimes for CRAs are 
reasonable but not effective enough. For one thing, the reasonability manifests in two regards: 
(i) these regulatory approaches are targeted to existing problems; and (ii) the regulatory 
approaches fit, to some extent, the flexible demand for regulators. For another, the 
implementations seem less effective than expected. This thesis aimed to find a path to 
making CRAs behave well by discussing key issues related to the rating failure in detail. 
Based on the existing reforms related to CRAs, this thesis provided some supplementary 
suggestions on how to improve current issues. The rating failure has been caused by many 
factors for a long time. To achieve the improvement of CRAs, innovative and thorough 
solutions considering all the factors mentioned should be thought of and be implemented 




In Chapter 2, having illustrated the evolution of CRAs and the relevant regulatory systems 
in the European Union, United States and China, the comparative and retrospective study 
assists with the analysis of the main CRA issues and the three regions’ various regulatory 
approaches in chapters that follow. It should be noted that the varying degrees of 
development trajectories lead to different problems and provide various incentives for the 
three regions to regulate CRAs. In the United States, the regulatory licence, namely the 
NRSROs, played an important role in the development of CRAs, because the approval of 
NRSROs offered special market status to recognised CRAs. Since the approval of NRSROs, 
the credit ratings issued by them have increasingly been employed int legislation, regulations 
and standards. This contributed to the over-reliance on credit ratings in the United States. 
Given the huge impact of the eurozone crisis, the European Union has the political 
motivation to deal with issues related to CRA. Compared to the global financial crisis of 
2007–8, the subsequent euro area crisis raised more significant concerns for the EU member 
states about the over-reliance on the external or foreign CRAs. The Chinese multi-regulator 
system, to some extent, held back the development of CRAs during a certain period. China 
has fewer unsolved problems or less severe problems than those faced by the other two 
regions.  
 
Furthermore, the backgrounds sketched assisted with a better understanding of the 
differences in the main issues and regulatory approaches in these regions in the chapters that 
followed. In addition, to the over-reliance on ratings provided by NRSROs, for a long time 
the approvals of NRSROs were merely offered to the big three in the United States, which, 
from a historical perspective, explains the oligopolistic market structure of the big three in 
the US market. With the development of economic globalization in the European Union, the 
big three gradually occupy global market share, especially in the European market. At that 
time, the Chinese bond market was not yet formed. This also explains why the EU market 
was occupied by the big three, while the Chinese market seems moderately concentrated. 
Apart from that, it seems obvious from the EU regulations for CRA set out in the chapters 
that the European Union has political motivations. It is also observed that the Chinese regime 
of CRAs seems over-concise, as the demand for regulation of CRAs is less than in other two 
areas. 
 
Chapter 3 points out that the wide uses of credit ratings in legislation, regulation, standards 
and political standards are the root of over-reliance on CRAs. More importantly, the negative 
impacts of the over-reliance on credit rating address the need to reduce this over-reliance. 




reliance have achieved a certain degree of success, but the situation still needs to remain 
persistently, because the over-reliance on credit rating still exists to varying extents in the 
three areas mentioned. Even though the United States has removed the hardwiring of credit 
rating from legislation, regulations and standards, the effective alternative has not been 
found so far, and both the market and regulators inevitably rely on credit ratings to some 
extent. The elimination of credit rating references from legislation, regulations and standards 
in the European Union is not thorough, because the EU regulatory strategy is softer; it merely 
requires the regulator to remove the existing rating references when appropriate. Like the 
United States, the main impediment is also the lack of an alternative. Furthermore, the 
European Union fears not only the risk of an over-reliance on external CRAs, but is also 
concerned about the over-reliance on foreign CRAs. In China, the extent of the over-reliance 
on credit ratings is less severe than that in other areas, and the relevant regulations against 
over-reliance have thus shown less progress. Like the European Union, the Chinese 
regulatory focus is more on the risk of over-reliance on foreign CRAs. it should be noted 
that the market and regulators still need to rely on the credit ratings at this stage. Thus, it is 
necessary to continually implement the regulations against the over-reliance on the credit 
ratings in the long run. 
  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 addressed the internal factors that affecting CRA rating quality. As 
addressed in these chapters, owing to the inaccuracy of their ratings, CRAs should scrutinize 
and reflect on their rating failure during the global financial crisis. The failure of the 
reputation mechanism proves the necessity of strengthening regulation. Chapter 4 introduced 
conflicts of interest at the individual level and agency level, and the countermeasures. By 
comparison, rating shopping and ancillary service stemming from the conflicts at the agency 
level are too difficult to manage. In terms of the ancillary service, existing regulations and 
measures against the potential risk of ancillary service include prohibiting CRAs from 
providing ancillary services, and separation from rating services and ancillary services. 
However, as a response, parent companies of CRAs tend to set up several subsidiaries so 
that other subsidiaries can be responsible for ancillary services that may give rise to potential 
conflicts of interest with the rating service, but they are not subject to the prohibitions 
targeted at the CRAs. The current corporate system increases the opaqueness of relevant 
businesses between subsidiaries. Therefore, even though it remains difficult to manage this 
conflict by virtue of the existing countermeasures, it should be noted that the structured 
finance created huge profits in ancillary services. In terms of rating shopping, the scenario 
has existed for a long time, but it has been worse recently since the boom of structured 




becomes a breakthrough point for regulatory reform. Most academic and regulatory 
discussion focuses on the change to the issuer-pays business model. A comparison of the 
CRA performances in corporate bonds and structured finance, under the same issuer-pays 
model, demonstrates that CRAs are able to provide accurate ratings on corporate bonds, 
while the rating quality on structured financial products cannot be ensured. Which is to say, 
CRAs are more likely to be unwilling, rather than unable to provide high-quality ratings. 
The reason for this is that the business associated with structured finance created a huge 
amount of revenue for CRAs. Compared to changing the business model, the reduction of 
relevant businesses may be another way to improve the situation. Thus, this chapter 
supported the reform proposal that put limitations or prohibitions on structured finance 
instead of the change in business model. 
 
Chapter 5 introduced and compared the situation of the oligopolistic market structure in the 
European Union, United States and China. Having demonstrated that the oligopolistic 
market took away the threat for oligopolistic members, it further addressed the negative 
impacts of oligopoly on the credit rating industry and the relevant CRA regulation. For one 
thing, the big three lack incentives to update their methodologies and rating models. At the 
same time, they lack deterrence from other competitors to motivate them to improve their 
rating quality. For another, the oligopoly increases regulatory costs and impediments 
because it is hard to design a regulatory regime to motivate oligopolistic members, but also 
because the oligopoly of the big three raises the concern about the independence of the global 
big CRAs for many regions, such as the European Union. The current regulatory strategy is 
to enhance the competition so that new market entrants could deter the incumbent CRAs. 
The existing regulations include lowering barriers to market entry by approving more 
eligible CRAs; weakening the regulatory privileges by reducing the regulatory reliance on 
approved CRAs (such as NRSROs); and encouraging small and new CRAs to enter the 
market by offering some regulatory favouritism (such as a rotation mechanism). However, 
the existing regulations have not changed the oligopolistic market structure. It should be 
noted that the approach of greater competition indeed contributes to incentivizing the 
incumbent CRAs to improve their rating accuracy. The deficiency of the approach is that the 
greater competition cannot ensure the rating quality, while it is more likely to give rise to 
vicious competition under a high-competition market because CRAs often compete with one 
another by applying lax rating standards at the cost of their reputation – especially when the 
reputation mechanism does not work – rather than improving their innovation and rating 
accuracy. Thus, based on the existing regulatory approaches, a supplementary reform 




of ratings for each rating grade. For example, the annual number of issuances of AAA rating 
is less than the 10 per cent of the annual total issuance of ratings. Once a CRA fails to 
conform with this requirement, it will become the regulatory focus for a certain period, and 
regulators will reinforce its supervision of it in case of its rating inflation or rating shopping.  
 
Chapter 6 discussed the civil liability for CRAs. CRAs were broadly criticized for their 
inaccurate rating, and many actions for claims for damages were brought against CRAs to 
the courts. Investors suffered huge losses during the financial crisis, partly because they 
made impolitic investment decisions relying on the ratings provided by CRAs. Nevertheless, 
it is nearly impossible for them to prevail in damages claims against CRAs, especially prior 
to the financial crisis, because most investors do not have contractual relationships with 
CRAs. Following the financial crisis, it is time for regulators to increase market confidence 
and investor confidence in CRAs. As seen in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, CRAs have neither the 
incentive nor the deterrence to behave better. Thus, establishing civil liability for CRAs 
seems a good legal attempt to deter CRAs and rebuild investor confidence in the market. In 
order to enhance the civil liability for CRAs, the European Union, United States and China 
reformed or revised many relevant laws and regulations. However, by illustrating the 
elements required to establish CRA civil liability in the European Union, United States and 
China after the financial crisis, plaintiffs without contractual relationships are still faced with 
many impediments to holding CRAs liable under each civil law system in these regions. It 
is difficult to extend the civil liability for CRAs within the current civil law framework, 
including tort law, contract law and securities law. It is also difficult to impose an expert 
liability on CRAs. For one thing, the role of CRAs as expert is different from common 
experts, such as accountants and auditors, and the scope and context of expert liability for 
CRAs need to be further determined. For another, in practice, CRAs take many 
countermeasures to avoid expert liability. The effectiveness of private remedies needs to be 
further examined. In addition, the implementation of public enforcement was also examined. 
By comparison, public enforcement has a better deterrent effect on CRAs in each of the 
regions mention above. On this point, more importance should be attached to public 
enforcement against CRAs.  
 
In order to better regulate CRAs, this thesis discussed the key issues related to CRAs. 
Although some recent progress has been noted in this thesis, there are limitations and 
weaknesses. Thus, future researchers could further improve on the following points: First, 
this thesis provides a comprehensive Chinses legal framework, which gives a good reference 




on the structured finance in Chinese law, other Chinese solutions may be meaningful 
approaches, of which the application of the EU and US cases would be studied to help EU 
and US regulatory practices to solve similar problems. Second, as mention in Chapter 5, the 
supplementary proposal with respect to greater competition in the credit industry could be 
further improved. Third, in terms of the civil liability regime for CRAs, it is extremely 
difficult to break through the hurdles under the existing civil law framework.  In this regard, 
the future research could focus on the improvement of the expert liability regime or the 
application of the gatekeeper theory into the CRAs.  Last, the future researchers could further 
improve the current public enforcement regime for CRAs, such as a dual-track approach that 
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